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Abstract
This  dissertation  explores  the  relations  between Yugoslavia  and the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany
(FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the period between 1955 and 1968. This is the
first analysis using sources from all three countries, and the first one written in English.
In 1955, the FRG developed a set of diplomatic measures which aimed to prevent the GDR’s
international  recognition  as  a  sovereign  country.  These  measures  became  known  as  the  Hallstein
Doctrine, named after one of the West German civil servants responsible for developing them. Under
these measures, the FRG would break off diplomatic relations with any third country that recognized
the GDR. Thus the two Germanies became involved in a diplomatic battle, with the GDR searching for
recognition and the FRG trying to thwart these efforts.
Much of the GDR’s counter-efforts in the early years of the Doctrine were aimed at Yugoslavia,
which was in the process of rebuilding its relations with the Soviet Union following the Tito-Stalin split
in  1948.  This  development  opened  the  door  for  Yugoslav  cooperation  with  other  Eastern  Bloc
countries, including the GDR. In 1957, Yugoslavia finally recognized the GDR. This caused the FRG
broke  off  relations  with  Yugoslavia,  a  decision  it  would  reverse  eleven  years  later,  in  1968.  This
dissertation shows that Yugoslavia’s decision to recognize the GDR did not reflect its general foreign
policy goals,  and that  in subsequent  years,  Yugoslavia was more concerned with developing good
economic relations with the FRG. This dissertation also shows that the GDR expected Yugoslavia to
influence other non-aligned countries to recognize it, but that Yugoslavia was reluctant to jeopardize its
position in the non-aligned world by lobbying for the GDR.
By using multi-archival sources, this dissertation examines the relations between Yugoslavia
and the two Germanies, focusing on their bilateral relations and agency, but also takes into account the
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Introduction
Willy Brandt, the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) vice-chancellor and foreign minister,
arrived in Yugoslavia on June 12, 1968 for a state visit. Three days into his stay, Brandt finally
met with the Yugoslav president Josip Broz-Tito at his summer residence on the Croatian Brioni
Islands.  At  one  point  during  their  conversation,  Tito  argued  that  it  is  best  for  countries  to
develop relations step-by-step, as long as they are always moving forward. In response, Brandt
joked that “one should not make steps bigger than one’s stride.” After a “heartfelt” laugh, Tito
retorted, “sometimes, one could even leap [forward].”1 
Brandt’s 1968 visit certainly symbolized a leap forward in relations between the FRG
and  Yugoslavia.  The  two  had  reestablished  diplomatic  relations  in  January  of  that  year,
following an eleven-year hiatus caused by Yugoslavia’s recognition of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) in 1957. Not only was Brandt the first West German foreign minister to visit
Yugoslavia,  he was also the highest ranking West German official  ever to visit  the country.
The breakdown in diplomatic relations was a stipulation of The Hallstein Doctrine – a set
of measures the West Germans developed in order to prevent the recognition of the GDR by
specifying that any act of recognition of the GDR by a “third country” would be considered an
1 “Razgovor predsednika Tita sa Willijem Brandtom” (June 15, 1968), AJ, KPR I-3-a/83-19, p. 2.
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“unfriendly act.”2 The most severe official West German response was to break off diplomatic
relations with that country. 
This  dissertation  is  an  examination  of  relations  between  Yugoslavia  and  the  two
Germanies in the period between the introduction of the Hallstein Doctrine in 1955, and the
reestablishment of relations between Yugoslavia and the FRG in 1968. Analyzing the relations
between these three countries offers a window into the interactions between lesser Cold War
actors, who, nevertheless, played an important role during this period. Recognizing the GDR
was not only detrimental for Yugoslavia’s relations with the FRG, it  also contributed to the
international  tensions  surrounding  the  division  of  Germany  by  making  that  division  more
concrete. At the same time, the FRG’s rigid adherence to the Hallstein Doctrine obstructed the
European détente. It was not until Bonn began slowly dismantling the Doctrine in the late 1960s
that significant progress was made in East-West rapprochement. 
The  West  Germans  unveiled  the  Doctrine  in  1955  to  prevent  East  Germany  from
achieving any sort of legitimacy in the international community. This was one of the central
goals  of  the  FRG’s  foreign  policy,  and  stemmed  from  its  claim  to  sole  representation
(Alleinvertretungsanspruch). In other words, West Germany claimed to be the only legitimate
representative of the German people on all of German territory. In its eyes, East Germany was
still only the “Soviet Occupation Zone,” which was also the moniker West German politicians
and media used for the GDR during this period. On the other side of the inner-German border,
the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED)
2 The Doctrine was presented publicly in a radio interview with one of its authors, Wilhelm Grewe, who was the 
head of the Political Department at the FRG Foreign Office at the time. “Zusammenfassung Interview Des 
Ministerialdirektors, Professor Dr. Wilhelm G. Grewe Mit Dem Chefredakteur Des Nordwestdeutschen 
Rundfunk, Hans Wendt [Hallstein-Doktrin], 11. Dezember 1955/ Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (BSB, 
München).” http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0019_hal&l=de. 
2
initially also claimed sole representation rights, but by the mid 1950s had abandoned the claim,
opting instead to lobby for the international recognition of the GDR as a second German state. 
While Soviet patronage allowed the SED to stay in power, especially after the popular
uprising of June 17, 1953, it also robbed it of internal legitimacy.3 The lack of popular domestic
support was one of the main West German criticisms of the SED regime, yet an upper hand in
legitimacy alone would do little to stop third countries from recognizing the GDR. After all,
apart  from  Albania  and  Yugoslavia,  none  of  the  Eastern  European  countries’ Communist
regimes could boast of popular support either. They were all propped up by the Soviets, and yet
they all enjoyed diplomatic relations with a number of non-Communist countries. Hence the
West German need for a diplomatic mechanism to prevent the recognition(s) of East Germany.
Using the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany was able to prevent a number of countries from
recognizing the GDR. Conversely, the GDR wanted nothing more than recognition from outside
their Bloc. The lack of international legitimacy weighed heavily on Walter Ulbricht’s shoulders,
so much so that in 1963 – during a successful diplomatic phase – the East German leader could
finally  boast  that  “we are also  someone,”  alluding to  the  West  German Chancellor  Ludwig
Erhard’s famous claim that “we are someone again!”4
 The Hallstein Doctrine was in effect from 1955 until  1972, when the West German
government under Willy Brandt's chancellorship officially abandoned it. The Doctrine’s most
severe measure was to break off diplomatic relations with any country that recognized the GDR.
3 The East German authorities were able to suppress the uprising only due to Soviet military involvement. Gareth
Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 32-33. For the relationship between the
GDR and the USSR during East German crises see Gary Bruce, “Die Sowjetunion und die ostdeutschen Krisen
1953 bis 1961” in Diedrich Torsten and Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk (eds.), Staatsgründung auf Raten?: zu den 
Auswirkungen des Volksaufstandes 1953 und des Mauerbaus 1961 auf Staat, Militär und Gesellschaft der DDR
(Berlin: Links, 2005), pp. 39-64.
4 Werner Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin: Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973 :  
aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Aussenministerien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), p. 31.
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The West Germans only implemented this measure twice: first with Yugoslavia in 1957, and
second, with Cuba in 1963.5 Thus, in late 1957, one of the most peculiar episodes of Cold War
diplomacy began, involving the West, the East, and the non-aligned world.
What  made  the  two  Germanies’ relations  with  Yugoslavia  different  than  with  other
socialist countries? The answer lies in Yugoslavia’s position during the Cold War. In 1949, the
then United States secretary of state Dean Acheson allegedly repur posed an old bon mot and
said  that the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito was a “son-of-a-bitch,” but that he was “our
son-of-a-bitch.”6 In the previous year, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had excommunicated Tito
from the Soviet Bloc as punishment for refusing to conform to his leadership.7 Tito, like Enver
Hoxha in Albania, had been the leader of a strong homegrown resistance movement against
Nazi occupiers and local fascists with minimal aid from the Allies for much of the war.8 When
Moscow demanded complete loyalty after the war, Tito decided he would not relinquish his
hard-fought achievements. For this decision, Tito paid the price. It was only his mass support in
Yugoslavia and the considerably large army experienced in guerrilla warfare that saved him
from a Soviet invasion – a fate much worse than excommunication.9
Regardless of the veracity of Acheson’s quip, the sentiment in Washington was clear.
Tito was hardly a model recipient of American support, but in the harsh reality of a postwar
bipolar world order, where the United States’ foreign policy was shaped by George F. Kennan’s
“Long Telegram” and his policy of containment  of Soviet expansion, discarding Yugoslavia
5 Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, p. 28.
6 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 33.
7 For the latest assessment of the Tito-Stalin schism see Jeronim Perović, “The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment 
in Light of New Evidence,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 2 (April 2007): 32–63.
8 Swain, Tito, p. 49, 57, 63.
9 Mark Kramer, “Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet–East European Efforts to Reassert Control, 1948–
53,” in Svetozar Rajak et al., (eds.), The Balkans in the Cold War, e-book, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017), p. 34.
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would have been a mistake which could have had grave consequences for West European and,
by extension, American security.10
If the Americans were ready to embrace an orthodox Communist such as Tito, then the
other Western Powers, the United Kingdom and France, not to mention the rest of the West
European  states,  had  to  follow  suit.11 By  the  mid-1950s,  owing  a  lot  to  this  anomalous
partnership, Yugoslavia had mutated into a socialist country sui generis. Buoyed by American
loans and aid – totalling around US$2.2 billion between 1950 and 1965 – Yugoslavia developed
its own strain of economic system called ‘workers’ self-management’ which placed it firmly
outside the planned economy orthodoxy of the Soviet Bloc.12 On the other hand, it remained a
one-party state that exercised complete control of its political sphere by regularly imprisoning
Tito’s political opponents. These were mostly Communists still loyal to Stalin – the so-called
Informbiroovci (Cominformists) – and to a lesser extent, various nationalists.13
As a renegade Communist, Tito would never completely side with either Bloc after 1948.
While he valued Western aid that helped him stay in power, he was a Communist through-and-
through. On the other hand, his fear of Soviet domination, not to mention his bruised ego, never
did allow him to return to the Soviet fold, regardless of his eternal sympathies for Moscow as
the epicentre of the socialist revolution – which always annoyed his top diplomats. However, as
his  former  confidant  and  later  dissident  Milovan  Djilas  noted  in  1980,  Tito  was  a  person
10 George F. Kennan was a US diplomat stationed in Moscow in 1946, where he drafted an outline of US foreign 
policy, later named the Long Telegram, which focused on the containment of Communism in Europe. For the 
full text of the telegram, see: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v06/d475
11 An example of this new alliance was in March 1953, when Tito became the first Communist head of state to 
visit the UK. Dragan Bogetić, “Saradnje Jugoslavije i Zapada u vreme sukoba sa Kominternom 1952-1955” in 
Ljubodrag Dimić, ed., Velike sile i male države u hladnom ratu 1945-1955: slučaj Jugoslavije (Beograd: 
Katedra za istoriju Jugoslavije Filozofskog fakulteta, 2005). p. 52.
12 Robert Niebuhr, The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy: Foreign Policy and Tito’s Yugoslavia, e-book, (Leiden;
Boston: Brill, 2018), p. 56. Adjusted for inflation, this would amount to just over US$16 billion.
13 For an excellent analysis of the conflict between Tito and Yugoslav Stalinists see Ivo Banac, With Stalin 
Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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“exceptionally without any talent, except for one – political talent.”14 After 1948, this talent went
into overdrive. As a result, Tito searched for a foreign policy that would eschew bloc allegiances
and also ensure Yugoslavia’s survival (under his rule, of course). He found it in non-alignment.
Isolated in Europe, Tito could only look outside its confines for support. Fortunately for Tito, a
number of new countries in the Global South also decided to avoid alignment with one of the
global superpowers.15 By the 1960s, the necessity of finding allies transformed Yugoslavia into a
global diplomatic player. On the one hand, Yugoslavia was an impoverished socialist country
which was being courted by both Superpowers and receiving large loans, usually in return for
diplomatic support, but also just neutrality in certain international issues. On the other hand, it
was developing strong ties in the Global South with the newly independent countries, as well as
revolutionary and freedom movements alike.
The German Question, that is, the issue of a divided Germany, compared to Yugoslavia’s
non-alignment, had a more immediate importance for Europe’s security. As Timothy Garton Ash
argued, Germany was in fact the answer to the problem of a divided Europe.16 A divided nation
at the centre of a continent was a practical issue as much as an ideological one, especially if we
consider that apart from being the border between capitalism and socialism, it was also the front
line of a nuclear standoff.17 
14 Milovan Đilas, Druženje s Titom (Harrow: Aleksa Dijlas, 1982), p. 9.
15 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “Neutrality and non-alignment during and beyond the Cold War” in Sandra Bott et al., 
(eds.), Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?, 1st edition (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 213.
16 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994).
17 The issue of nuclear weapons had been one of the most important political and diplomatic problems in postwar 
Germany, and indeed Europe. See Stephan Geier, Schwellenmacht: Bonns heimliche Atomdiplomatie von 
Adenauer bis Schmidt, (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013); Mark Cioc, Pax Atomica: The Nuclear
Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); 
Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle 
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1945-1970 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Benjamin Ziemann, “German Angst?
Debating Cold War Anxieties in West Germany, 1945–90,” in Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann, (eds.), 
6
Conversely,  Yugoslavia’s  non-alignment  made  an  impact  mostly  in  the  post-colonial
Global  South.  Although  non-alignment  was  a  manifestation  of  Tito’s  desire  for  ideological
linkage  outside  the  two  blocs,  it  also  developed  out  of  a  practical  need  for  economic
cooperation, since Yugoslavia had little more to offer Western Europe than raw materials. In his
recent monograph on Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, Richard Niebuhr argues that for Tito, non-
alignment was “part of the deliberate effort by the regime to [...] search for external support”
and that “Tito and his government manipulated foreign policy victories to reinforce the regime’s
standing  among  Yugoslavs.”18 Although  Niebuhr  is  right  to  identify  Tito’s  pragmatism  in
developing  non-aligned  connections,  the  ideological  component  cannot  be  ignored.  As  Leo
Mates, one of the scions of Yugoslavia’s Tito-era diplomacy, argued, non-alignment is too broad
of an idea to be described by just one narrow definition.19 
In  1955,  when  the  West  Germans  decided  to  begin  sanctioning  the  countries  that
recognized East Germany by creating the Hallstein Doctrine, the German Question and non-
alignment,  two hitherto relatively separate issues,  began to overlap.  While the FRG had for
years been using various diplomatic or economic measures to prevent the GDR’s recognition, it
was only in 1955 that it decided to implement the breaking off of diplomatic relation as one of
these mechanisms. With the two blocs already entrenched in their positions, the Doctrine was
clearly aimed at non-aligned countries. Conversely, by the mid-1950s Yugoslavia was quickly
becoming a leader among non-aligned nations. As a result, the German Question became a non-
aligned issue. This dissertation is a detailed investigation of this overlap and shows that the two
Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90, 1 edition (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2016).
18 Niebuhr, The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy, p. 90.
19 Leo Mates, Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy (New York: Oceana Publications, 1972), p. 9.
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Germanies, in their own diplomatic conflict over the German Question, spent considerable time
and resources influencing Yugoslavia’s German policy due to its specific position as a leading
non-aligned country, and the only European non-aligned country.
The role of lesser actors in the Cold War was discussed by several political scientists as
early as the 1960s.20 In his 1968 study of small powers, Robert L. Rothstein dedicated a chapter
to the various ways countries tried to eschew Superpower control to create their own foreign
policies.  Rothstein  suggested  that,  at  the  time  of  writing,  “on  the  political  level  (but  not
economic) and on the level of conventional warfare, bipolarity has given way to multipolarity in
the ways in which states behave, if not in the actual capabilities they posses.”21
This approach was tested by a number of historians using newly-declassified archival
sources following the end of the Cold War. In his seminal book The Global Cold War: Third
World  Interventions  and the  Making of  Our  Times,  Odd Arne  Westad  argued against  those
historians of the Cold War who focused solely on the decades long sparring between the United
States and the Soviet Union, and who discounted other countries – mostly in the Global South –
for their lack of agency. Here Westad points out that Superpower involvement in some events in
the Global South, such as revolutions, does not preclude the legitimacy of their struggle.22
Tony Smith is another historian who addressed the importance of non-superpowers in the
Cold War. Smith goes further than Westad when he argues that “while junior members in the
international system at times took actions that tried to block, moderate, and end the epic contest,
20 In fact, small state agency became the focus of academic inquiry even earlier. Namely, in 1959, Annette Baker 
Fox analyzed the actions of smaller states during the Second World War. Annette Baker Fox, The Power of 
Small States Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).
21 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 238. 
Similar arguments have been provided in Jan F. Triska, Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United 
States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986).
22 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 3.
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they also took actions that played a key role in expanding, intensifying, and prolonging the
struggle  between East  and West.”23 In  a  recent  essay,  Robert  McMahon also  addressed the
agency of “small powers,” indicating that actors on all three Cold War sides – East, West, and
non-aligned – often disregarded the interests of the superpowers.24 
This dissertation is adjacent to Westad, Smith, and McMahon’s respective theses, in that
it  looks  at  events  driven  mostly  by  local  actors  directed  –  at  times  –  by  their  respective
superpower backers, but also takes into account the two Germanies’ own foreign policy goals, as
well as Yugoslavia’s agency and influence as a non-aligned leader. By examining the relations
between Yugoslavia and the two Germanies, I will show that Yugoslavia held a specific position
in the foreign policies of the latter two. I will also show that often the two Germanies’ bloc
allegiances did not always translate into complete compliance with their senior partners’ policies
and wishes, even in the case of the Soviet satellite, the GDR.25 The FRG enjoyed American
support in its mission to stop the international recognition of the GDR, yet the US did not
support  the  implementation  of  the  Hallstein  Doctrine  on  Yugoslavia.  Neither  did  the  GDR
always follow Moscow’s lead in several Soviet rapprochements with Yugoslavia during the Cold
War, and when it did, it was often begrudgingly. Thus, this dissertation argues that the Cold War
cannot be reduced to an ideological battle between two superpowers, and that the desires of less
23 Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” Diplomatic
History 24, no. 4 (January 1, 2000): 567–91, p. 568. See also: Federico Romero, “Cold War Historiography at 
the Crossroads,” Cold War History 14, no. 4 (2014): 685–703.
24 Robert J. McMahon, “Agency, Structure, and Interdependence: Reflections on the Regional and Global Cold 
Wars” in Lorenz Lüthi (ed.), The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial 
Periods and Turning Points (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 22-24.
25 This thesis is not novel. Perhaps the most notable research on East Germany’s ability to “wag the dog” is Hope 
Harrison’s Driving the Soviets up the Wall. Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East 
German Relations, 1953-1961, ACLS Humanities E-Book (Series) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005).
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powerful actors were often strong enough to veer away from the course the United States and
the Soviet Union set.
Many volumes have been produced that focus on either of the Cold War episodes that
constitute the basis of this dissertation. There is a large body that deals with the FRG’s foreign
policy during the Cold War,  both during and after  the Hallstein  Doctrine.26 During Konrad
Adenauer’s tenure,  the FRG’s diplomacy was firmly turned towards the West. As Ronald J.
Granieri  explained, the FRG’s foreign policy during the Adenauer years was marked by his
drive to  integrate  West  Germany into the West.  The so-called  Westbindung was  Adenauer’s
strategy that would “allow the Federal Republic to determine its international fate, to be an
independent subject rather than merely an object of superpower policy.”27 Adenauer’s firm focus
26 For literature on West Germany’s foreign policy before Brandt’s Ostpolitik, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, 
Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1994, 2nd edition 
(Schöningh: Paderborn, 1995); David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the 
Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and 
the Nazi Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), Yeshayahu Jelinek, Deutschland und Israel 1945–
1965, Ein neurotisches Verhältnis, Reprint 2014 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2003); Eugenie M. Blang, “A 
Reappraisal of Germany’s Vietnam Policy, 1963-1966: Ludwig Erhard’s Response to America’s War in 
Vietnam,” German Studies Review 27, no. 2 (2004): 341–60; James C. Van Hook, Rebuilding Germany: The 
Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945–1957 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
Hannfried von Hindenburg, Demonstrating Reconciliation: State and Society in West German Foreign Policy 
toward Israel, 1952-1965 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Steven Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer: 
Alliance Maintenance Under Pressure, 1953-1960 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Mathias Stein, Der 
Konflikt um Alleinvertretung und Anerkennung in der UNO: die deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen zu den 
Vereinten Nationen von 1949 bis 1973 (Göttingen: V&R unipress GmbH, 2011); Dominik Geppert, Die Ära 
Adenauer, 3. Auflage. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012); Mathilde author Von Bulow, 
West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War, New Studies in European History (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
For literature on West German foreign policy during Brandt’s tenure as foreign minister and chancellor, see 
Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994); M. E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973, New Cold 
War History (Chapel Hill; London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Horst Möller and Maurice 
Vaisse, Willy Brandt und Frankreich (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2005); Julia von Dannenberg, The 
Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR, 1 edition 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Dirk Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2009); 
Claudia Hiepel, Willy Brandt und Georges Pompidou, Deutsch-französische Europapolitik zwischen Aufbruch 
und Krise (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2012); Bernd Rother (ed.), Willy Brandts Außenpolitik, Akteure Der 
Außenpolitik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014).
27 Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966 (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 142.
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on Western integration was coupled with a rigid stance towards Eastern Europe. While the latter
was mostly informed by the issue of East Germany’s claim to sovereignty, it was also in part
motivated by the twelve million Germans expelled from Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  and other
Eastern European countries after World War II. The expellees demanded a return to their homes
and refused to acknowledge the new borders drawn in the East. As Pertti Ahonen has shown, the
expellees formed a voting bloc that was influential far beyond their numbers, because political
parties championed expellee causes without being able to actually deliver on their promises.28
The expellees’ influence began to wane towards the end of the 1950s, which simplified West
Germany’s rapprochement with the East in the 1960s. 
A wealth of literature on the GDR’s foreign policy has also been published over the last
three decades. The historiography here shows that it suffered from two key deficiencies: first,
the  Soviet  Union’s  control  of  its  foreign  policy,  and  second,  the  absence  of  international
recognition.29 As Hermann Wentker argues, the GDR’s diplomacy was operating in very limited
parameters,  and  it  owed  its  rare  successes  to  external  factors.  There  were  periods  of
“aggressive” East German foreign policy, but these were in sync with the USSR’s, and cannot
therefore be seen as independent.30
28 Pertti Ahonen, After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990 (Oxford ; New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2003). See also R. M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans 
after the Second World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).
29 Gareth M. Winrow, The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa, Soviet and East European Studies; 78 (New York,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ingrid Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949-1972. Inhalte, 
Strukturen, Mechanismen, 2. Auflage (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2001); Heiner Timmermann, 1961 - Mauerbau
und Aussenpolitik (Münster: Lit, 2002); Joachim Scholtyseck, Die Außenpolitik Der DDR (München: 
Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003); Hope Millard Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East 
German Relations, 1953-1961, 2005; Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im 
internationalen System 1949-1989. Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007); Friederike Baer, Zwischen Anlehnung und Abgrenzung: Die 
Jugoslawienpolitik der DDR 1946 bis 1968., 1st ed. (Köln: Böhlau, 2009).
30 Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, p. 559.
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Yugoslavia’s non-alignment also attracted considerable attention from various scholars
during the Cold War. Alvin Rubinstein’s analysis of non-alignment offered an early detailed look
into the role non-alignment played in Yugoslav foreign policy. Rubinstein argued that it “filled
various needs,” from finding friends in the Global South, but also to encourage other states to
adopt  its  own style  of  market  socialism,  and  ultimately  to  “end  its  diplomatic  isolation.”31
William Zimmerman focused on the evolution of the Yugoslav leadership’s thinking on how to
proceed after the expulsion from the Cominform. According to Zimmerman, “[t]he impact of the
changed international environment on Yugoslav behaviour could be felt only as mediated by
changed perceptions on the part of the Yugoslav leadership, and as those changed perceptions
were legitmated by explanations cast in doctrinal terms.”32
As Yugoslavia’s archives opened after its dissolution, a number of studies of Yugoslav
foreign policy – including its role in non-alignment – emerged, mostly authored by historians
from former Yugoslavia.33 One of the leading Serbian Cold War historians, Dragan Bogetić,
argues that in the mid-1950s the Yugoslav leadership contemplated closer cooperation with the
31 Alvin Z Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 77.
32 William Zimmerman, Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution Of Yugoslavia (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 20-21. A discussion of the Yugoslav strain of Communism can also be 
found in Robin Alison Remington, “Eurocommunism and Yugoslavia,” in Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta, 
and David P. Burke (eds.), Eurocommunism between East and West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1980).
33 Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Tvrtko Jakovina, Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici: (1948-1963) 
(Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2002); Dragan Bogetić, Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike: 1956-1961 
(Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006); Dragan Bogetić and Aleksandar Životić, Jugoslavija i Arapsko-
Izraelski Rat 1967 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010); Vladimir Petrović, Titova lična diplomatija 
studije i dokumentarni prilozi (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010); Dragan Bisenić, Mister X: 
Džordž Kenan u Beogradu, 1961-1963, 2011; Robert Niebuhr, “Nonalignment as Yugoslavia’s Answer to Bloc 
Politics,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 1 (April 10, 2011): 146–79; Svetozar Rajak, Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953-57, Cold War History 
Series (London, England); 26 (London; New York: Routledge, 2011); Aleksandar Životić, Forsiranje peska: 
odred JNA na Sinaju (1956-1967) (Beograd: Medija centar “Odbrana,” 2011); Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslovensko-
američki odnosi, 1961-1971 (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2012); Đoko Tripković, Jugoslavija - 
SSSR: 1956-1971 (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2013); Ljubodrag Dimić, Jugoslavija i hladni rat: 
ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944-1974) (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014).
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West, but that the realities of Yugoslavia’s political incompatibility and economic backwardness
would not produce positive results for Yugoslavia. Instead, Belgrade decided that creating strong
economic ties with the even more underdeveloped Global South countries presented a more
prudent strategy.34 The intention here was to form relations from a position of strength, and to
couple  it  with  the  worldview that  opposed  neocolonialism,  in  this  instance  US and  USSR
control.  While the economic component of this strategy never panned out, since Yugoslavia
could not compete with either bloc in that sector, “Yugoslavs had already staked out a claim of
how to deal with both outside control and notions of transforming society,” two other key issues
on the minds of Global South leaders.35 The latter two issues were more important to Tito, who
did not have much proclivity for economic matters.
According  to  Vladimir  Petrović,  Tito’s  central  role  in  creating  Yugoslavia’s  foreign
policy remains unchallenged in post-Cold War historiography. While other aspects of his rule
have succumbed to – often malicious – revisionism, even the more sober accounts of Yugoslav
diplomacy  recognize  Tito’s  importance  in  creating  it.36 This  dissertation’s  findings  are  in
agreement  with  both  of  these  assessments,  but  with  one  caveat.  Due  to  the  poor  state  of
Yugoslavia’s relations with both Germanies through much of the first half of the Cold War, the
focus here is often on contacts between low- to mid-level diplomats, far from the pomp usually
associated with Tito’s ‘personal diplomacy’. It is therefore not surprising that Tito’s role in this
dissertation is not as prominent as in other studies of Yugoslav foreign policy during the Cold
War.
34 Bogetić, Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike, p. 8. 
35 Niebuhr, The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy, p. 99.
36 Petrović, Titova licna diplomatija studije i dokumentarni prilozi, pp.21-23.
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As Federico Romero explained, in the past two decades Cold War historians have been
trying to “decentre from a primarily Euro-Atlantic focus to the complex heterogeneity of the
global South, and from a close frame on the superpowers’ decision-makers to the agency of a
variety of actors in Latin America, Asia or Africa.”37 Non-alignment studies have profited from
this global turn in Cold War historiography, with numerous contributions reflecting this.38 The
Hallstein Doctrine received considerable attention from historians in the past twenty years as
well, including specific studies on Yugo-German relations during this period.39
This dissertation is situated in the nexus of these Cold War topics. It shows a Western
lesser power, a Soviet satellite, and a non-aligned country navigating a quintessential Cold War
hot spot that was the German Question. Yugoslavia faced pressure from both the GDR and the
FRG, and to a lesser extent from the US and USSR, to adapt its position in this issue, and both
Germanies used threats and incentives to achieve their goals. However, this dissertation is also a
study  of  bilateral  relations.  Yugoslavia  had  a  number  of  agreements  in  place  with  both
Germanies concerning trade, culture, sports, and various other areas of cooperation. Finally, it is
37 Romero, “Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads,” p. 686.
38 Two edited collections stand out in this field: Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska, The
Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung - Belgrade (Routledge, 2014); Sandra Bott et al., 
(eds.), Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?, 1 edition (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2015). There is also a recent history of the Non-aligned Movement published in 
German: Jürgen Dinkel, Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten: Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927-1992) 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015).
39 Werner Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin: Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973 :  
aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Aussenministerien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001); William Glenn 
Gray, Germany’s Cold War the Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2003); Amit Das Gupta, Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin (Matthiesen, 2004); Dušan 
Nećak, Hallsteinova Doktrina i Jugoslavija: Tito Između Savezne Republike Njemačke i Demokratske 
Republike Njemačke (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2004); Zoran Janjetović, Od Auschwitza Do Brijuna : Pitanje  
Odštete Žrtvama Nacizma u Jugoslavensko-Zapadnonjemačkim Odnosima. (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2007); 
Marc Christian Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin: die Beziehungen der beiden deutschen Staaten zu 
Jugoslawien im Vergleich, 1957-1968 (Berlin: Logos-Verlag, 2008). Vladimir Ivanović, Jugoslavija i SR 
Nemačka, 1967-1973: Između Ideologije i Pragmatizma (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2009); 
Dušan Nećak, “Ostpolitik” Willyja Brandta i Jugoslavija (1963.-1969.), Biblioteka Povijest i suvremenost 
(Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2015); Agnes Bresselau Von Bressensdorf, Christian Ostermann, and Elke Seefried 
(eds.), West Germany and the Global South and the Cold War (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017).
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a  study of  the  two Germanies,  as  “junior  members,”  pursuing their  own,  local  and global,
foreign policy goals.  In other  words,  attempting to “wag the dog,” with varying degrees of
success.
This research project  adds to the extensive body of scholarship mentioned above by
bringing together for the first time archival evidence from both Germanies and Yugoslavia about
the  German-German-Yugoslav  relations  during  the  Hallstein  Doctrine  period.  Most  often
historians were limited by their language skills – ones from the former Yugoslavia usually used
only sources in Serbian/Croatian and English, while the rest used mostly German and English
(or  documents  in  other  languages).  For  this  dissertation,  I  have  conducted  research  at  two
German archives.  The first  was the Political  Archive of the Federal Republic of Germany’s
Foreign Office in Berlin (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts), which hold the records of
the FRG’s Foreign Office, as well as the GDR’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The second one
was the Berlin branch of the German Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde), which
holds the records of the GDR government as well as the SED. For Yugoslav primary sources, I
have  worked in the Archive  of  Yugoslavia in  Belgrade  (Arhiv Jugoslavije),  which hold the
records of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic (Kabinet predsednika republike), as well
as  the  party  archive  of  the  League  of  Communists  of  Yugoslavia  (Savez  komunista
Jugoslavije).40 I have done additional research at the Croatian State Archive, which holds the
records of the League of Communists of Croatia.
The dissertation is divided into seven chronologically ordered chapters. Chapter 1 sets
the scene for this  study. It  covers the years 1955 and 1956, outlining the state of the three
40 Yugoslav Communists adopted this name for their party in 1953 as part of a wider effort to distance themselves
from the Soviets. John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, 2nd edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 255.
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countries’ foreign policies during this period. West Germany’s foreign policy was marked by the
official  announcement  of  the  Hallstein  Doctrine  in  December  1955.  The  GDR  was  still
struggling with creating a reliable foreign ministry, and grappling with adjusting to the changes
in Soviet foreign policy that were slowly under way following Stalin’s death in 1953 and Nikita
Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party. Yugoslavia,
apart from rebuilding its own bridge to Moscow, was also in the process of solidifying its non-
aligned connections in the Third World, symbolized by the summit meeting between Tito, the
Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The
chapter takes into account how these separate events affected the relations between the two
Germanies and Yugoslavia.
Chapter  2  (1957)  deals  with  the  events  leading  up  to,  and  including  the  Yugoslav
recognition of the GDR, the FRG’s subsequent implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine, and
the severing of diplomatic relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia. The chapter discusses
why Yugoslavia proceeded with the recognition even though Bonn had warned Belgrade on
multiple  occasions  to  tread  carefully,  taking  into  account  ideological,  as  well  as  economic
factors.
Yugoslavia’s recognition of the GDR reshuffled the cards in  the Bonn-Belgrade-East
Berlin triangle. Chapter 3 (1958-1960) deals with the recognition’s actual aftermath, focusing on
how each of the countries dealt with the newly reconfigured bilateral relations. Yugoslavia tried
to keep the assertive East Germans at bay, while at the same time aiming to maintain good
relations with the FRG, mostly for economic gain. This chapter will also explore to what extent
the GDR – in  the shadow of a new Yugo-Soviet breakdown – tried to exploit  Yugoslavia’s
16
position as a non-aligned leader and the only non-Soviet Bloc country to recognize it. Most
importantly, this chapter will look at the ways the second Berlin Crisis, which began in 1958
influenced these relations.
In 1961, Belgrade hosted the first non-aligned conference. Chapter 4 (1960-1961) looks
at East Germany’s campaign to influence the conference, as a case study of its diplomacy in the
Global South. Their goal was to include the German Question in the conference’s agenda, with
the hopes that a pro-East German discussion might ultimately lead to group recognition at the
conference, which would have had much greater impact than recognition from individual non-
aligned  countries.  This  chapter  will  also  analyze  West  Germany’s  attempts  to  prevent  this
outcome. Both Germanies used various diplomatic tools at their disposal, including sending out
envoys to leading non-aligned countries in an attempt to convince them to support their agenda
at the conference. In addition, the chapter analyzes the East German attempt to capitalize on the
fact that they had a strong diplomatic presence in Belgrade, due to the existence of diplomatic
relations with Yugoslavia.
Chapter  5  (1961-1964)  is  divided  into  two parts.  The  first  part  analyzes  Yugo-West
German  relations  during  chancellor  Konrad Adenauer’s  last  years  in  power,  as  well  as  his
successor Ludwig Erhard’s first year in office. This period was marked by intensified terrorist
activities of Croatian fascist émigrés in the FRG who targeted Yugoslav diplomats. However, in
1963, officials from Yugoslavia and the FRG met officially for the first time since 1957, for
economic negotiations. This was a breakthrough that paved the way for more official talks later
on.  The  East  Germans  were  also  recalibrating  their  Yugoslav  policy  during  this  period,
following a new Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, which resulted in Walter Ulbricht’s first visit to
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Yugoslavia  in  1964.  The  second  part  of  the  chapter  deals  with  the  second  non-aligned
conference  in  Cairo  in  October  1964,  and  the  efforts  of  both  Germanies  to  influence  the
conference  agenda,  in  a  repeat  of  the  their  efforts  during  the  1961  Belgrade  non-aligned
conference.
The last two chapters focus mainly on the sea change in West Germany’s Ostpolitik, and
its effect on Yugoslavia. Chapter 6 (1964-1966) traces the transition in West German Yugoslav
foreign policy from the Cairo non-aligned conference to the election of Kurt Georg Kiesinger as
the new West German chancellor in December 1966. The most important event of Erhard’s last
year  in  power was his  “Peace  Note” initiative,  through which the  FRG offered  to  improve
relations with Soviet Bloc countries, but excluding the GDR. This chapter will analyze the effect
the peace note had on Yugo-West German relations, as well as the Yugo-East German relations,
which entered a phase of stabilization in the mid-1960s, crowned by Tito’s official state visit to
East Berlin.
Chapter  7  (1966-1968)  deals  with  the  events  leading  up  to,  and  including  the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia in December 1968.
The driving force behind it  was  Kiesinger’s  foreign  minister,  Willy  Brandt.  He instituted a
significantly more lax reading of the Hallstein Doctrine than his predecessors, which allowed for
the FRG and Yugoslavia to begin seriously contemplating reestablishing relations for the first
time. This process culminated in January 1968 – eleven years after the FRG’s implementation of
the  Hallstein  Doctrine  on  Yugoslavia  –  when  Yugoslavia  and  the  FRG finally  signed  their
agreement to reestablish diplomatic relations.
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Chapter 1
No guarantees: Yugoslavia and the two Germanies (1955-1956)
On  September  19,  1964,  The  Chairman  of  the  State  Council  of  the  German  Democratic
Republic (GDR) Walter Ulbricht arrived in Belgrade by train. He was there to meet, for the first
time as a head of state, the Yugoslav president Josip Broz-Tito.41 Although it was an unofficial
visit – a stop on Ulbricht’s return from a state visit to Bulgaria – it fulfilled the East German
leader’s long-standing wish to meet with Tito. After all, Yugoslavia was the first country outside
of the Eastern Bloc to recognize the GDR, in 1957.42 During his toast at dinner at Tito’s Dedinje
residence, Ulbricht praised the friendly Belgrade locals, who spontaneously approached him on
the capital’s streets, and the gracious hosts. “In my opinion,” Ulbricht asserted, “it could not
have been otherwise.”43 In fact, the road to the Dedinje palace was anything but straightforward
for the East Germans, and the relationship between both German states and Yugoslavia was a
difficult one. The latter’s role in answering the German question was at times as complicated as
the question itself. In order to understand why Yugoslavia decided to recognize the GDR and
jeopardize its already advanced relations with the FRG, we must look at the relations between
these three countries in the mid-1950s, and the series of events that facilitated the recognition. 
41 Ulbricht and Tito most likely met in Moscow in the late 1930s, since both were living at the Hotel Lux, the 
infamous designated lodgings for international communists and the headquarters of the Communist 
Internationale (also known as the Comintern). Mario Frank, Walter Ulbricht: Eine deutsche Biografie (Siedler 
Verlag, 2009), e-book, “Leben im Lux.” Tito was living on the fourth floor of the hotel, and worked in the 
Balkan secretariat of the Comintern under Wilhelm Pieck, who was also the chairman of the German 
Communist party. Geoffrey Swain, Tito: A Biography (London ; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2010), p. 16-20. 
42 At that point in time, Yugoslavia remained the only non-communist country to recognize the GDR.
43 “Zdravica Valtera Ulbrihta na večeri u dvoru na Dedinju” (September 19, 1964), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8.
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Ever since its creation in 1949, the German Democratic Republic had been pursuing
international  recognition.  However,  the  years  1955-1956  were  the  turning  point  in  this
campaign. Early 1955 saw the GDR settled into a stable, albeit limited role as far as its foreign
policy was concerned. In March 1954, the Soviet Union bequeathed sovereignty to the GDR,
and the latter  became a founding member of the newly formed Warsaw Pact in May of the
following year. The integration of the GDR into the Eastern Bloc was thus solidified. Although
East Berlin still paid lip service to German reunification, the de facto division of Germany – or
“the two state theory,” as it was known – had been the preferred answer to the German question
in Socialist Unity Party (SED) leadership circles since 1953 at the latest.44 Although this also
meant that its foreign policy would continue to be constrained by Cold War realities, it was still
more acceptable to the SED than a compromise with Bonn regarding reunification, which would
have certainly resulted in the SED’s marginalization. The year 1955 was also important for the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). After the failure of the European Defence Community the
previous year, the FRG was made a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in May 1955.45 Unlike the GDR, the FRG’s inclusion into a Cold War Bloc did not have an
effect on its German policy, and Bonn continued to sincerely pursue reunification. Perhaps more
importantly, its claim of being the sole legitimate representative for all of Germany was still at
the heart of its foreign policy in 1955. In fact, in West German eyes, the negation of the GDR
was a necessary prerequisite for reunification, even before the Hallstein doctrine made it policy,
and West  German diplomats  were at  times more than eager  to warn any country about  the
44 Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989. 
Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich: De Gruyter, 2007), p. 97.
45 For the demise of the European Defence Community and West Germany’s integration into NATO see David 
Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996).
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dangers of recognizing the GDR.46 But generally, they lobbied throughout the non-aligned world
against any kind of international endorsement of East Germany. In this respect, Yugoslavia was
no exception. In this chapter I will trace Yugoslavia’s shift towards the Soviet Bloc in 1955 and
1956, which opened the door for its recognition of the GDR, as well as the FRG’s attempts to
dissuade the Yugoslavs from doing so.
Early rapprochement between East Berlin and Belgrade
 On January 14, 1955, the West German ambassador in Belgrade Hans Kroll met with the
Yugoslav state undersecretary Aleš Bebler to discuss various issues.47 One of them was East
Germany’s membership in the International Labour Organization.  Bonn wanted Yugoslavia’s
support in blocking the East German access to this organization. Bebler was noncommittal, but
added that Yugoslavia’s position on the German question was well known, and that the West
Germans  had  no  reason  to  protest  their  policies  so  far.48 Bebler  was  telling  the  truth.  For
example, when Tito visited Burma in January of 1955, he informed the Burmese prime minister
U Nu that Yugoslavia had very good economic relations with the FRG, and that it  was not
against West German rearmament, as long as it was limited to self-defence capacities. Tito did
add that he believed Germany would remain divided for the foreseeable future, but more as a
46 Werner Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin: Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973: 
aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Aussenministerien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), p. 19.
47 Bebler was one of the highest ranking Slovenes in the Yugoslav government during this period. He received a 
doctorate in international law from the Sorbonne. At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War he joined the 
International Brigades. During the Second World War, he was one of the leaders of partisan resistance in 
Slovenia. After the war he held a number of positions in the Yugoslav diplomacy. “Bebler, Aleš (1907–1981) - 
Slovenska Biografija,” accessed January 11, 2018, http://www.slovenska-biografija.si/oseba/sbi1001800/.
48 “Zabeleška,” (January 14, 1955) AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, p. 33.
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judgment of Soviet intentions in Germany rather than an endorsement of the division.49 It is also
true that in early 1955 Yugoslavia had a far better relationship with the FRG than with the GDR.
For one, it had established diplomatic relations with the FRG in 1951. It had also developed
solid  economic  and  cultural  relations  with  the  West  Germans,  and  was  in  the  process  of
negotiating an agreement regulating World War II reparations. On the other hand, the GDR had
hardly any ties with Yugoslavia. However, this would soon start to change. By mid-1955, the
rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia was well under way, and it would come to
affect  Yugoslavia’s  German  policy  in  the  near  future.  A Soviet  delegation  led  by  Nikita
Khrushchev landed in Belgrade in May, eager to make amends for the 1948 split, and hopefully
negotiate Yugoslavia’s return to the fold.50 Although Tito was much too shrewd to agree to the
latter, he nevertheless welcomed a closer relationship with Moscow, preferably one that would
not jeopardize his ties with the West. Conversely, Khrushchev could not return from his Canossa
pilgrimage empty-handed. The result of the difficult talks was the Belgrade Declaration, which
for the time being normalized the relations between the two countries, and paved the way for
similar processes between Yugoslavia and the rest of the socialist camp.51 
The  newfound  understanding  between  Moscow  and  Belgrade  was  mirrored  in  the
Yugoslav view of the German question. A 1955 Yugoslav report stated that the existence of two
Germanies was “an objective fact,” a fact made even more palpable after the signing of the Paris
Accords and the creation of the Warsaw Pact. The report also compared the Soviet German
49 “Zabeleška” (January 12, 1955), AJ, KPR I-2-4-2, doc. no. 506.
50 Khrushchev saw the split with Yugoslavia as one of Stalin’s biggest errors, and the visit to Belgrade was more 
than a gesture of good will. In addition, Khrushchev wanted to use the visit to undermine his Politburo 
adversary Vyacheslav Molotov, one of the most vocal proponents of the split, who still opposed the 
rapprochement. William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man, His Era. (London: Free Press, 2005), p. 267.
51 Svetozar Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, 
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policy favourably against the Western one, arguing that at least the Soviets did not deny the
existence of Western Germany, whereas the West denied the existence of the GDR and tried to
suppress any attempts by the latter to act internationally.52 On the other hand, Belgrade had been
slowly growing impatient with Bonn over their negotiations. Yugoslav officials believed that the
West Germans were dragging their feet, themselves unhappy with Yugoslav demands, which
they considered unrealistic. 
With the relationship between Bonn and Belgrade seemingly stuck on the most important
bilateral  issue,  the  East  Germans  seized  the  chance  the  Belgrade  Declaration  gave  them to
improve  their  ties  with  Yugoslavia.  Even  before  the  Declaration  was  signed,  East  German
diplomats in Prague approached their Yugoslav counterparts inquiring about the possibility of
opening trade offices in Belgrade and East Berlin.53 A few weeks later, a joint delegation of the
GDR’s  Foreign  Trade  Ministry  (Ministerium  für  Außenhandel  und  Innerdeutschen  Handel,
MAI) and the Foreign Trade Chamber (Kammer für Außenhandel, KfA) visited Belgrade in late
June  1955  in  search  of  improved  trade  relations.  The  East  Germans  suggested  that  the
negotiations  should  take  place  between  state  level  delegations  with  the  opening  of  trade
missions in Belgrade and East Berlin as the ultimate goal. Their hosts believed that the East
Germans  were  getting  ahead  of  themselves,  citing  the  poor  trade  results  so  far.54 The  two
countries signed a trade agreement worth four million dollars in 1954, but only a fraction had
been fulfilled by mid-1955.55 For comparison, West  Germany was Yugoslavia’s number one
trade partner, with the former receiving over seventy percent of Yugoslavia’s exports in 1954.56
52 “Pitanje stava i odnosa sa Istočnom Nemačkom” (1955), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.
53 “Gespräche unserer diplomatischen Vertreter in den befreundeten Staaten mit den dort anwesenden 
jugoslawischen Vertretern” (June 23, 1955), PA AA, MfAA, C 360/75, p. 156.
54 “Zabeleška” (June 27, 1955), AJ, KPR I-5-B/81-1, p. 608.
55 “Pitanje stava i odnosa sa Istočnom Nemačkom” (undated, 1955), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.
56 “Naši ekonomski odnosi sa Zapadnom Nemačkom” (April 6 1955), AJ, KPR I-5-B/82-2, p. 319.
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Nevertheless,  the  Yugoslavs  were  open  to  the  East  German  suggestions.  According  to  the
Yugoslav  report,  the  East  Germans “could  not  hide  their  delight.”57 Their  reaction  was  not
surprising. The meeting had taken place just weeks after Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade, and
now it seemed that the GDR had taken a giant step towards establishing a strong presence in a
European country outside of their bloc.
To be sure, this was not the GDR’s first diplomatic success. Due to the Soviet influence
in  Finland,  the  East  Germans  had opened a  trade  mission  in  Helsinki  in  1953.  The Soviet
influence was also strong enough to limit the West German presence in Finland, resulting with
the Helsinki government accrediting a FRG trade mission but not a diplomatic outpost, thereby
ensuring that both Germanies were treated equally.58 The GDR had also made inroads outside of
Europe, opening up a trade ministry office in Egypt and an office of the chamber of commerce
in Burma in 1954.59 However, having the opportunity to develop relations with Yugoslavia, with
palpable results, was a matter of prestige considering Yugoslavia’s international position.
Alongside  the  trade  delegation,  representatives  of  the  East  German  Film  Company
(DEFA) also visited Belgrade in late June. They arranged a deal with Jugoslavija Film, the state-
owned cinema distribution company, to exchange a number of films. East Germans also planned
to  send  a  gymnastics  team  to  an  international  competition  in  Ljubljana,  and  to  invite  the
conductor of the Belgrade philharmonic to East Berlin. A first time showing at the Zagreb Trade
57 “Zabeleška” (June 27, 1955), AJ, KPR I-5-B/81-1, p. 608. East Germans described the meeting as “cordial and 
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Fair  was  also  planned.60 It  seemed  that  the  East  Germans  were  taking  full  advantage  of
Khrushchev’s nod.
West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s visit to Moscow, however, overshadowed
the  successes  in  Belgrade.  Khrushchev  invited  Adenauer  to  discuss  establishing  diplomatic
relations, following the Four Powers summit in Geneva in July, where the Soviets sabotaged any
prospect of a German reunification.61 Adenauer was ambivalent after the summit, writing Dulles
that:
in my opinion the 1st Geneva conference showed that the Soviets do not understand
a  reasonable  and  normal  language  and  that  they  are  inaccessible  for  objective
considerations. They are and remain convinced that communism will rule the world
and that they are and shall stay to be the leaders of communism [sic]. Insofar the 1st
Geneva conference will have a good effect [sic], if the free world is going to draw
the necessary conclusions therefrom, as you have already said in a press interview.62
From an East German perspective, although Khrushchev promised East Berlin that he would
keep its interests in mind during his talks with Adenauer, they could not take this statement at
face value.63 The fact that their benefactors would negotiate with the Bonn government about
their  international  status,  without  ensuring  that  the  GDR could  do  the  same with  the  other
powers,  showed that  Moscow would  circumvent  East  Berlin  if  it  were  beneficial  to  Soviet
60 “Jugoslawien” (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, p. 45.
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interests. This did not sit well with Ulbricht, but he could not sway the Soviets.64 The Yugoslavs
followed the Moscow talks closely. The head of the Yugoslav military mission in West Berlin,
Dimitrijević, told a GDR Foreign Office official that he hoped that Adenauer would not be too
successful in Moscow, as that would strengthen his presently weak position at home, and that he
did not expect the talks to move beyond an exploratory level. However, Dimitrijević did not
want  to  comment  on  the  German  question  in  the  context  of  the  talks.65 Nevertheless,  the
Yugoslav ambassador to West Germany, Mladen Iveković,  saw the outcome of the Moscow
talks  as  a  Soviet  victory.66 The  pro-Soviet  tone  in  Iveković’s  report  indicated  Yugoslavia’s
position. Its alignment with the Soviet Union in regards to the German question was further
revealed in a November 1955 letter from Tito to the Soviet leadership after a meeting with the
US foreign secretary John Foster Dulles, held during a break of the Geneva Summit. Tito argued
that East Germany, as a “new state formation,” must be made part of the reunification processes.
Tito added that the Western fear of East Germans spreading communism into the rest of the
country in  the case of  a reunification was unfounded,  and that  East  Germany could be the
counterbalance  to  the  revanchism  in  the  West.67 These  statements  suggested  that  the
rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow, however guarded, would continue into 1956,
and the GDR was eager to continue capitalizing on that.
The West Germans, on the other hand, were growing ever suspicious of Tito’s intentions.
There were fears in Bonn that after the Moscow talks other countries might begin to ignore the
64 Gerhard Wettig, “Adenauers Moskau-Besuch aus sowjetischer Sicht Wende der sowjetischen Deutschland-
Politik nach Stalins Tod,” Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 12 (2005), p. 198. 
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65 (September 6, 1955) PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, p. 65-66.
66 “Sporazum Moskva-Bonn o uspostavi diplomatskih odnosa” (September 26, 1955), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, p. 19. 
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FRG’s sole representation claim, although Adenauer argued that nothing had changed in this
respect.68 These fears extended over the FRG’s relations with Yugoslavia, and some believed
that Belgrade was being diplomatic about the German question only because of the still ongoing
reparation  negotiations.69 By  the  end  of  the  year,  these  fears  turned  into  policy.  At  the
ambassadors’ conference in Bonn on December 8, foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano, state
secretary  Walter  Hallstein,  and  the  head  of  the  political  department  at  the  Foreign  Office
Wilhelm Grewe, presented their ideas to West German diplomats. In his talk, Grewe laid out a
policy  that  would  be  strong  enough  to  prevent  any  third  country  from  recognizing  East
Germany. Central to the policy was the idea that any act of recognition was an “unfriendly act”
towards the FRG, one that accepted the division of Germany, and thus undermined the FRG’s
claim to represent all of Germany. As a result, those countries would have to face consequences.
Likewise, any East German attempts in this respect had to be blocked. 
The  Hallstein  doctrine  was  conceived  after  Adenauer’s  visit  to  the  USSR,  whose
diplomatic relations with both Germanies Bonn labelled as a singularity, and it wanted to keep it
that way. The FRG’s penalty for any country recognizing the GDR would be to immediately end
diplomatic relations with it.  Although its  seeds originated in the Moscow visit,  the doctrine
seemed  to  have  been  developed  with  Yugoslavia  and  other  non-aligned  countries  in  mind.
Grewe was a pragmatist, and understood that the FRG could not completely isolate a territory
with 17 million inhabitants, and therefore allowed the possibility of trade and traffic agreements
between the GDR and third countries.70 This decision was probably also influenced by the fact
that  several  countries,  including Yugoslavia,  had  already developed trade  relations  with  the
68 Adenauer’s speech in the Bundestag, (September 22, 1955), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/02/02101.pdf
69 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 40.
70 Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, pp. 22-23.
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GDR.  Accordingly,  the  doctrine  would  not  be  implemented  retroactively.  In  an  interview
following  the  ambassadors’ conference,  Grewe explained  that  it  could  not  always  be  clear
whether a recognition took place, and pointed out that there were several intermediate stages in
appraising diplomatic actions, and that the reaction had to correspond to the gravity of the action
in question.71 West Germany knew that it wanted to punish any country which acknowledged
East German sovereignty, but it was not exactly sure what the punishment would be, barring a
case  of  outright  recognition.  This  was  in  part  fuelled  by  West  German  fears  that  the  East
German  campaign  for  recognition  was  gaining  some  momentum,  as  witnessed  by  India’s,
Yugoslavia’s, and Egypt’s vote to admit the GDR to UNESCO.72 Thus the Hallstein doctrine
signalled to the third countries that they would have to tread carefully without knowing the
boundaries. In other words, they would have to find the boundaries themselves. Yugoslavia was
to be the first country to find, but also test these boundaries.
1956 – The year the gates opened
The year 1956 was one of the most tumultuous in the history of the Soviet bloc. The catalyst for
the tumult was Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ at the 20th Congress of the CPSU on February 25,
in  which  he  addressed  and  criticized  the  mistakes  made  during  Stalin’s  reign.  The  Soviet
leader’s quasi-public denunciation of Stalinism signalled to the Soviet satellites that they too
71 “Zusammenfassung Interview Des Ministerialdirektors, Professor Dr. Wilhelm G. Grewe Mit Dem 
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might attempt a course correction of their  own without repercussions. This belief  was most
prominently seized upon by the Poles and Hungarians, with disastrous results later that year.
While the ‘secret speech’ and its effects dismayed the ever orthodox East German leadership
because they endangered the cohesion of the bloc – and more importantly, their own position –
they  did  not  influence  their  relations  with  Yugoslavia.  This  course  had  been  plotted  with
Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade the previous year, and it seemed that the turmoil within the bloc
had no effect on it. 
On January 20, 1956, Fritz Grosse, a senior official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of
the German Democratic Republic (Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der Deutschen
Demokratischen  Republik,  MfAA),  sent  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  and  Intra-German  Trade
(Ministerium für  Außenhandel  und Innerdeutschen Handel,  MAI)  a  memo about  a  meeting
between the Yugoslav and East German ambassadors in Prague. The Yugoslavs proposed Prague
as the official  location for all  future diplomatic  contacts between the two countries.  Grosse
assessed this as a serious offer, and suggested that the MAI should also consider Prague for all
future contacts with the Yugoslavs.73 Yet from the East German perspective, the Yugoslavs were
not moving fast enough. The GDR’s plans for 1956 aimed to build on the contacts established
during  the  previous  year,  but  at  a  pace  which  by the  end  of  the  year  would  result  in  the
international recognition of the GDR, not just better trade or cultural relations, although these
played an important part in the East German strategy. The list of tasks necessary to carry out this
strategy was laid out in  the 1956 annual  plan composed by Herbert  Barth,  the head of the
Yugoslav  department  at  the  MfAA.74 These  revolved  mainly  around  preparing  for  the
73 Letter from Grosse to the MAI (January 20, 1956), PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, pp. 129-130.
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negotiations  with  Belgrade,  such  as  collecting  information  on  the  political  and  economic
situation in Yugoslavia, the potential reparation demands, and the Yugoslavs in the GDR; and
selecting the appropriate staff for the future embassy in Belgrade.  Other objectives included
publishing propaganda material in Serbo-Croatian, both in print and on film, and distributing it
in Yugoslavia. Connections in areas where there were no or very few contacts, such as sports,
culture and the sciences were also to be intensified. Lastly, the mass and party organization
contacts were to be intensified as well. The MfAA’s plan was ambitious, especially since Barth
petitioned for “a second staff member” to be added to the Yugoslav department, hinting at the
lack of qualified personnel, one of the biggest problems faced by the MfAA in its early years.75 
The main thrust of the GDR’s Yugoslav spring campaign was Ulbricht’s March 20 letter
to Tito, inviting him to send a delegation to the SED party congress taking place in East Berlin
on 24-29 March.76 This was significant due to the importance party connections held in the
Communist world view. Ulbricht's timing left no room for manoeuvring, and the Yugoslavs had
to decline the invitation. They responded with a short note thanking Ulbricht and expressing
their  best  wishes  for  the  congress.  At  the  same  time,  the  Yugoslav  ambassador  in  Prague
explained to his East German counterpart that since the two countries have not had any relations
so far, sending a delegation would not be understood by the public in Yugoslavia or abroad, and
that relations needed to develop gradually.77 Ambassador Iveković met with Mihajlo Javorski
over three days in early April to discuss the state of relations between Yugoslavia and the FRG.
They concluded that it was now clear that the two countries did not have the same international
interests and hence cannot act together. The Yugoslavs blamed this outcome on West German
75 Ibid.
76 Telegram from Ulbricht (March, 20, 1956) , AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.
77 Letter from Vlahović to Mladen Iveković (March 23, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.
30
insistence on sole representation. However, they did not see this as a barrier to their economic
relations, which they presumed could grow substantially. Seemingly, their only concern was the
ratification of the reparations agreement, which they hoped would happen before the summer
break in the Bundestag, and were ready to use the full potential of the Bonn embassy to push for
an early ratification. The Yugoslavs also discussed their position on the GDR. Their primary
concern was the creation of some sort of official presence in East Berlin – most likely an outpost
of the chamber of foreign trade – since the military mission in West Berlin was not suited for
such a role. Apart from this office, the Yugoslavs also planned to open a diplomatic office by the
end of the year, the title of which was not as important, as long as the Belgrade government had
an  official  presence  in  East  Berlin.  The  Yugoslavs  were  annoyed  that  even  some  NATO
countries had better relations with the GDR than they did, something that they again blamed on
the FRG, for delaying the ratification of the reparations agreement.78 In the final analysis, the
West  Germans  seemed  to  be  a  nuisance  more  than  anything  else,  but  Belgrade  prescribed
caution in Yugoslavia’s dealings with the GDR. 
For Yugoslavia, caution may have been the order of the day as far as high-level bilateral
meetings with the East Germans were concerned, but contacts at lower levels were not avoided.
At the meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (SEV) in Berlin in early June
1956, the East Germans approached the Yugoslav delegation for talks. It seemed that the East
Germans invested a  lot  of  effort  into these  meetings.  Vlajko Begović,  one of  the Yugoslav
delegation members, reported to Tito that they had met with a large number of high ranking
GDR officials, including Peter Florin, the head of the International Connections (Internationale
Verbindungen) department of the SED, and the GDR prime minister Otto Grotewohl. The East
78 “Zabeleška” by Mihajlo Javorski (undated), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, doc. no. 357/56.
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Germans agreed with the Yugoslav stance on the German question (not expanded on in the
report), and Grotewohl personally thanked the Yugoslavs for helping the GDR by expressing
this stance in international fora. Trying to build on this, the East Germans pressed for closer ties
on all levels. Most importantly, however, they were hoping that Yugoslavia could help them
break through their international isolation. Primarily, they could help in setting up connections
with West Germany, especially the Social Democrats. Furthermore, Yugoslavia could aid them
in establishing ties with Asian countries, and facilitate exports outside the socialist camp. In
exchange, the GDR offered technical aid, and suggested expanding bilateral trade. Lastly, the
East Germans were also interested in cultural exchange, handing the Yugoslavs a list of over
forty suggestions.79
While the East German advances were in line with their annual plan, it is also important
to note that Tito was visiting Moscow at the same time, which was perceived as the high point
of  Yugo-Soviet  rapprochement,  and  the  East  Germans  might  have  felt  that  events  were
developing  in  their  favour.80 Conversely,  the  West  Germans  were  aware  of  the  potentially
damaging outcome of this  meeting could have on their  German policy.  Therefore,  the West
German ambassador  in  Belgrade Karl-Georg Pfleiderer  met  with Tito prior to  the Yugoslav
president's  trip  to  Moscow.  Pfleiderer  had  hoped  to  persuade  Tito  to  use  his  influence  in
Moscow to steer Khrushchev towards a more acceptable Soviet German policy.81 Pfleiderer’s
appeal fell on deaf ears. Even if Tito had found Bonn’s policy appealing, Khrushchev would not
have been persuaded. During his talks with Tito, the Soviet leader was adamant that the GDR
79 “Izveštaj o razgovorima u Istočnoj Nemačkoj i preduzetim merama” (June 3, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1.
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must  be  made  the  “showcase”  of  the  socialist  world,  and  that  the  Soviets  would  pour  all
necessary aid into East Germany to do so. The East German leadership undoubtedly understood
that achieving a favourable result with the Yugoslavs would be easier with the weight of the
Soviet support in their corner, now that the Soviets and the Yugoslavs seemed to have made
amends.
After their meetings in East Berlin, the Yugoslav delegation devised a set of general
guidelines in response to the East German proposals. The most important detail of this plan was
the item pertaining to the renewal of their trade agreement. According to the Yugoslavs, initially
it would be renewed at the level of the Chambers of Commerce, but as soon as the reparations
agreement with the FRG was ratified by the Bundestag, the agreement would be raised to the
state level, at least in its content.82 The wording here shows that the Yugoslav leadership was
still not bold enough to predict a recognition of the GDR in the near future, but still certain
enough that it would have more leeway with the West Germans after they ratified the agreement.
Barth wrote a similar assessment of these meetings, but pointed out that creating mass and party
organization links should perhaps be postponed until a more opportune moment. Since this was
one of the main objectives in Barth’s annual plan, this decision can be attributed to Yugoslav
caution.83
Several days after his return from the SEV meeting, Begović wrote to Heinrich Rau, the
GDR trade  minister,  informing  him that  Belgrade  agreed  with  what  was  discussed  in  East
Berlin. Begović repeated the main ideas in the Yugoslav guidelines, and also informed Rau that
the  Yugoslavs  had  contacted  the  West  Germans  to  probe  them  about  the  possibility  of
82 “Izveštaj o razgovorima...”
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establishing direct lines of communication between the two Germanies. According to Begović,
Bonn categorically  refused to talk to  the GDR leadership,  namely Ulbricht,  Grotewohl,  and
especially the GDR minister of justice, who’s name Begović could not remember.84 Begović did
not mention whether the West Germans suggested any alternative interlocutors.85
At this  time the equilibrium of relations between the two Germanies and Yugoslavia
seemed to be shifting irrevocably in the GDR’s favour. On June 19, towards the end of his visit
to Moscow, Tito gave a speech at the Dynamo football stadium. Despite the volatile nature of
the talks, Tito decided not to antagonize Khrushchev. The Soviet leader, who spoke before Tito,
“used  the  occasion  to  launch  an  exceptionally  vitriolic  attack  on  the  West.”  Tito  did  not
contradict him in his speech. In general,  Tito avoided any public manifestation of a discord
between the two leaders during his stay in Moscow, even though more than a few chances to do
so arose. Tito’s motivation here was to not undermine Khrushchev’s position, which he knew
was under attack by a Politburo faction.86 However, Tito’s remarks on the German question
during his Dynamo stadium speech were all his own.87 He asserted that the question of German
reunification must be seen through the lens of the factual state of affairs, which was that there
were now two German states.88 This position, a staple of Yugoslav internal discussions but never
84 The minister of justice at this time was Hilde Benjamin, who was vilified in the West for her role in the show 
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expressed  publicly  until  late  May,  delighted  the  East  Germans.  Unsurprisingly,  the  West
Germans were even more irritated. 
On the evening of Tito’s Dynamo stadium speech, ambassador Pfleiderer met with the
Yugoslav  state  undersecretary  for  foreign  affairs  Dobrivoje  Vidić  to  discuss  the  Yugoslav
president’s  statements  in  Moscow.  He  “was  not  pleased”  with  Tito’s  words  regarding
Yugoslavia’s position on the German reunification, which Tito had described as being “similar”
to the Soviet position. Pfleiderer wanted to know whether “similar” meant the same thing as
“identical,” in which case Yugoslavia would not find much understanding in Bonn, not even
from the socialists. He added that he would soon be consulting with Brentano regarding Tito’s
Moscow visit. Vidić described Pfleiderer as being “dramatic” for alluding to the possibility of a
civil  war in Germany.89 Immediately prior to his trip to West Germany, Pfleiderer met with
another state undersecretary, Srđan Prica. This time Pfleiderer was more diplomatic. He asked
his host whether Yugoslavia was responsible for the positive aspects of the Tito-Khrushchev
joint statement, such as the call for foreign powers to be proactive in the reunification process.
Prica answered affirmatively, but in their conversation added that Yugoslavia could recognize
the GDR, but chooses not to in the current political climate, which might endanger Belgrade’s
relationship with the West. In short, Prica added, the Yugoslavs were being realistic. Although
this answer could not have pleased Pfleiderer since it left the door wide open for the recognition
of the GDR, Prica reported that this answer satisfied the West German ambassador.90 But even if
Pfleiderer was satisfied, Bonn most certainly was not.
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 On June 30,  after  returning to  Belgrade,  Pfleiderer  informed the Yugoslavs  that  all
parties in the Bundestag were now linking the ratification of the reparations agreement with the
Yugoslav  position  on  Germany.  The  Yugoslavs  were  “surprised  and  unhappy”  with  this
development  and  saw  no  logic  behind  it.91 The  feigned  surprise  was  certainly  diplomatic
posturing, since by now all sides involved were aware that the only thing keeping Yugoslavia
from recognizing the GDR was the ratification of the agreement. A week later, Pfleiderer tried to
ameliorate the tense situation. He informed undersecretary Prica that the delay in ratifying the
agreement  was a  result  of  other  parliamentary debates  that  simply  took up more  time than
expected. He added that the agreement will most likely be ratified within the next two months,
and that it would help if he could meet with Tito.92 
Pfleiderer  was  most  likely  acting  on  orders  from  Bonn,  where  a  few  days  earlier
Adenauer’s cabinet discussed the agreement. Walter Hallstein was present at the meeting, and
provided five courses of action:  to condition the agreement  with the non-recognition of the
GDR; to  reject  the  agreement  altogether;  to  delay  the  ratification  until  after  the  Bundestag
elections; to ratify the agreement after a satisfactory statement from Tito about Yugoslavia’s
intentions regarding the recognition of the GDR; and to ratify the agreement but declare the
non-recognition as the basis for the agreement’s fulfillment [without making it legally binding].
Hallstein himself  suggested  the  last  option  as  the most  suitable,  reflecting his  longstanding
belief that trust had to be built mutually, and in this case he was willing to show Yugoslavia that
the FRG trusted it.93 The cabinet did not make a decision that day, but agreed that there must be
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no delay in the ratification, and that it would be best if Hallstein spoke in the Bundestag and
persuaded  the  members  of  this  necessity.94 Undersecretary  Prica  was  not  convinced  by
ambassador  Pfleiderer’s  explanation  and  acted  aloof  during  the  meeting,  which  ended
unsatisfactorily for both parties.95 This was the first signal that the relations between the FRG
and Yugoslavia were taking a sharp turn for the worse, beyond a disagreement and towards a
serious rift.
In the week following Tito’s visit to Moscow, the MfAA evaluated Yugoslavia’s current
position as a positive development. Their report asserted that Yugoslavia now assumed that there
were two sovereign states on German territory, the GDR and the FRG. The report also pointed
out  that  Tito  even  signed  a  joint  statement  with  Khrushchev  in  which  East  Germany  was
referred to by its full official name. Although Tito’s position on the actual act of reunification
was vague, the report pointed to a statement by the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koča Popović.96
When asked by a reporter whether Tito supported an all-German election – which was a West
German suggestion for solving the German question – Popović answered that Tito would have
said so if  that were the case.97 From the East German perspective, Yugoslavia had not only
unofficially  just  recognized  the  GDR,  but  also  became  an  international  advocate  for  its
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recognition, finally granting them a foot in the door of the non-aligned world.98 Following this
realization, the report concluded with a proposal for the next step, namely to persuade other
statesmen to publicly endorse the GDR in the same way Tito did, and to ask the Yugoslav leader
to assist the East Germans in this undertaking, starting with his upcoming summit meeting with
the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, at
his summer residence on the Brioni islands in early July.99
Equipped  with  the  belief  that  Yugoslavia  had  the  potential  to  initiate  a  recognition
domino effect  in  Asia  and Africa,  Ulbricht  wrote  to  Tito  in  the  hopes  of  kick-starting  this
process.  In  his  appeal,  he  linked  the  German  question  to  the  principles  of  the  Bandung
Conference.100 The East German leader explained that the GDR shared those same principles.101
In addition, Grotewohl wrote to Nasser and Nehru. He repeated the same themes from Ulbricht’s
letter, urging them to stand with the “peace-loving forces of the German people” and by doing
so help shape the future of Europe.102 The letters did not have the desired effect. The three non-
aligned leaders prioritized other topics, such as disarmament and the situation in the Middle
East, but even here they were cautious in their statements, partially as a result of the nature of
non-alignment, but also a reflection of the three leaders’ inability to agree on some of the non-
98 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 61.
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aligned issues.  Hence,  a  strong position on Germany could not  have been expected.  In  the
summit  joint  statement,  the German question was addressed carefully,  as  a  “question [that]
should be solved in conformity with the wishes of the German people by peaceful negotiated
settlements.”103 Although by this time the GDR had made substantial contacts with the non-
aligned world, the reduction of the German question to a platitude at the Brioni summit showed
that the East Germans still could not seriously penetrate the agenda of the Global South, even
when their efforts were framed within the non-aligned ideology.
Regardless of the unsatisfactory outcome of the Brioni summit, the GDR’s relationship
with Yugoslavia seemed to have reached a new peak in the summer of 1956. Prior to the talks in
Moscow, the Soviets had promised to assist Yugoslavia develop its aluminum production. Tito
had made it clear that he wanted this agreement to be settled bilaterally, rather than through the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), in order to preserve its non-alignment.104
Although  unable  to  bring  Comecon  into  the  deal,  the  Soviets  chose  to  pressure  Tito  into
allowing the GDR to sign the treaty as a co-creditor. It us unclear whether this idea originated in
East Berlin or Moscow, since the East German economy could hardly afford to take part in an
international  operation  worth  700  million  rubles.105 The  Yugoslavs  attempted  to  avoid  the
inclusion  of  the  GDR,  and  when  confronted  by  ambassador  Mićunović,  the  East  Germans
themselves did not object to Yugoslavia’s reasons for leaving them out.106 However, the Soviets
kept increasing the credit amounts for the East Germans, while decreasing the size of the loan
promised to the Yugoslavs. Thus the East Germans clearly accepted their role in this triangle,
103 “Joint Statement by the President of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, the President of the Republic 
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using their position to their advantage. The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow Veljko Mićunović
saw this as a transparent ploy to force Yugoslavia into closer ties with East Germany by making
the latter the former’s debtor.107 Ultimately, the Soviet pressure was too strong for the Yugoslavs
in dire need of foreign aid. The aluminum production in particular was crucial for Yugoslavia, as
it  was a prerequisite for developing its own arms industry,  another aspect of non-alignment
pursued  by  Tito.108 On  August  1,  the  tripartite  treaty  between  the  USSR,  the  GDR  and
Yugoslavia was signed in Moscow. 
When the news of the agreement reached Bonn, the West Germans were incensed and
demanded an explanation through their embassy in Belgrade. Ambassador Pfleiderer was away
due to illness, and his place was taken by an interim chargé, Herbert Müller-Roschach. In his
meeting  with  state  undersecretary  Vidić,  he  voiced  Bonn’s  biggest  concern  over  the  treaty,
which was whether the treaty was an indirect act of recognition of the GDR, since it was signed
by an East German government representative.109 The West Germans asserted that this would
have negative implications on the ratification of the reparations agreement, and rob the future of
the Yugo-West German relations of a “healthy political basis.” Vidić answered that the only
reason  the  East  German  signatory  was  a  member  of  the  government  was  because  of  the
centralized nature of Eastern Bloc economies, where all decision-making power lay in the hands
of the government. Hence, this signature was a mere technicality, and not intended to prejudice
an act of recognition. Vidić added that given Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, the recognition of the
GDR would  be  “quite  natural,”  but  that  Belgrade  chose  not  to  do  so  out  of  consideration
towards the FRG. It would be unrealistic of Bonn to expect Yugoslavia to conduct its foreign
107 Ibid.
108 Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War, p. 171.
109 The East German signatory was Fritz Selbmann, the deputy prime minister at the time.
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policy guided only by West German wishes. Interestingly, Müller-Roschach then assured the
Yugoslavs  that  the  Bonn  government  would  continue  endorsing  the  ratification  of  their
agreement. By saying so, Müller-Roschach framed the delay of the ratification of the agreement
as a conflict between the government and the Bundestag, which was misleading, but bought
Adenauer more time. 
Another West German concern was the Yugoslav trade mission in East Berlin. The West
Germans were hopeful that Yugoslavia could follow Egypt and India’s example.110 These two
countries had agreed to open trade missions in East Berlin and allowed the East Germans to
open their missions in Cairo and New Delhi, which the East Germans did. However, the Indians
and the Egyptians did not follow up on their end of the bargain, and avoided opening their
respective missions in East Berlin.111 Ultimately, the Yugoslavs did not offer a response to this
plea.112 Although the reparations agreement gave Bonn a strong position in the stand-off with the
Yugoslavs, this meeting gave the impression of a West Germany almost resigned to Yugoslavia
sliding towards East German recognition. This can partially be attributed to Müller-Roschach’s
inexperience, since he had only arrived in Belgrade a couple of weeks earlier. However, he had
also undoubtedly been instructed by Bonn prior to  his  arrival.  Regardless of the reasons,  it
seemed that Bonn could do nothing else but wait and see.
With the tripartite treaty signed, the East Germans’ attitude to Yugoslavia evolved in a
more positive direction. A short MfAA report on the relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia
asserted that the latter are very interested in establishing diplomatic relations.113 The MfAA’s
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annual 1957 plan for Yugoslavia echoes this sentiment. Although it was the same goal as the
previous year, the language used to describe Yugoslavia was much friendlier, with it referred to
as a socialist  country, a description previously reserved only for the Eastern Bloc countries,
whereas Yugoslavia was often labelled capitalist in older reports. The plan cited the Moscow
Declaration as the foundation for the recognition, and although shorter than the one for 1956,
the plan for 1957 seemed more realistic, if only because the East Germans could now refer back
to public statements made by Tito endorsing the GDR’s statehood. Furthermore, economic ties
now also had a concrete foundation in the aluminum treaty. Compared to this, other areas of
economic interest in the plan seemed well within reach, unlike the previous year’s plan, which
read more like a “wish list” than a realistic diplomatic road map.114 
As important as Yugoslavia’s recognition was on a state level, a people’s democracy’s
diplomatic relations with another socialist country could not be complete without official party
connections. Hence, the SED believed that the time was ripe to negotiate an official agreement
with  the  League  of  Communists  of  Yugoslavia  (SKJ),  something  that  both  sides  had  been
discussing since June 1956.115 On August 28, SED Central Committee member and head of its
Foreign Affairs department Peter Florin wrote his counterpart in the SKJ Veljko Vlahović and
inquired  whether  the  SKJ would  be  willing  to  host  him in  Belgrade  and establish  contact.
Despite the confidence the East Germans might have felt at this point in time, Florin suggested
that the talks be held in secret.116 For good measure, and in his capacity as the First Secretary of
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the SED, Ulbricht himself wrote Tito on this matter and repeated the request.117 The Yugoslav
response was affirmative, and the meeting was scheduled for the week of September 25.118
Florin  and  Fritz  Müller,  the  head  of  the  SED  Central  Committee’s  department  of
finances, arrived in Belgrade not only with the intention to establish party connections, but to
also set  the groundwork for mass organization cooperation,  and to discuss the “problems of
German politics,” hinting at the increasingly unavoidable issue that was the German question.119
Florin  and Müller  met  with  Vlahović  and Begović  on September  26.  The minutes  of  their
meeting showed that Yugoslavia saw the GDR’s “specific position” as no real obstacle on the
path towards the GDR’s recognition. Yugoslavia would have preferred the recognition to be a
multilateral move, hopefully made with Egypt and India, but if that could not be engineered then
Belgrade would probably go it alone.120 As in the past, the Yugoslavs indicated their current
relations  with  the  FRG as  the  only  real  roadblock,  and  pointed  out  that  the  timing  of  the
recognition should be such as to provide maximum benefit for both the GDR and Yugoslavia.121
While most of the Yugoslav position was acceptable to Florin, he added that the GDR
wanted the recognition to have an effect on the FRG as well. Specifically, the East Germans
wanted to use the recognition to manipulate the West German elections in late fall of 1957, in
order to remove Adenauer from power. For this purpose the recognition should take place in the
spring of 1957. The East Germans were operating under the assumption that Adenauer planned
to recognize several socialist countries before the election, a move that, according to Florin,
would help him win. The GDR’s recognition would therefore not only undermine Adenauer’s
117 Letter from Ulbricht to Tito (September 4, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.
118 Note from Vlahović (September 13, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.




efforts to improve relations with the Eastern Bloc, but also “break the illusion” that a German
reunification on his terms would ever be possible. Florin added that East Berlin was keen on
group recognition only because of the West German elections.122 Florin  and  Müller  met  with
Vlahović and Begović once again at the end of their visit to Yugoslavia, this time to officially
ask  for  an  exchange  of  party  delegations  before  the  end of  the  year,  which  the  Yugoslavs
rejected on the grounds of an already full schedule, and any further cooperation would have to
continue after the New Year.123
For Yugoslavia, the more immediate concern was the situation in Hungary in late 1956.
The Soviet Union could no longer tolerate the reformist movement and the popular revolt which
threatened  Moscow’s  stranglehold  on  the  country,  and  the  effects  of  the  uprising  would
undoubtedly also have an effect on Yugoslavia.124 Tito was initially sympathetic to Imre Nagy,
the  ousted  Hungarian  prime  minister  whom  Moscow  removed  in  1955  for  pushing  de-
Stalinisation  too  far  for  their  liking,  leaving  Mátyás  Rákosi,  the  Stalinist  chairman  of  the
Hungarian Communist Party, in control. According to one Yugoslav report, Nagy survived that
crisis mostly due to Tito’s public support.125 Despite this, Tito also instructed his diplomats in
Budapest to closely monitor the activities of the more moderate Communists such as János
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Kádár and István Kovács, who were “anti-Rákosi” rather than “pro-Nagy.”126 This indicated that
Tito was invested in an acceptable ending to the Hungarian crisis, but not one which necessarily
involved Nagy. In any case, Tito was careful not to let his support for the anti-Stalinist forces in
Hungary get in the way of rapprochement with Moscow. As the Hungarians pushed for Nagy’s
reinstatement,  Tito  avoided  making  any  comments  on  the  situation  in  Hungary  during  his
meetings with Khrushchev in the first half of 1956, despite the rumours circulating in Moscow
that  Tito  demanded  the  removal  of  Rákosi.  According  to  the  rumour,  which  ambassador
Mićunović recorded in his diary, Tito also demanded the removal of Walter Ulbricht.127 While
these  claims  were  fabricated,  they  spoke  to  the  Soviet  perception  of  Tito  as  a  disruptive
maverick. In fact, Tito was not that reckless. He found both Rákosi and Ulbricht odious, but he
did not directly lobby for their removal. The Soviets themselves decided that Rákosi’s position
was untenable, but they replaced him with another Stalinist, Ernő Gerő, whom the Yugoslavs
found no different than Rákosi. When Khrushchev presented Tito with the Soviet decision to
crush the revolt, the Yugoslav leader could only accept the fait accompli. More importantly, Tito
did  not  want  to  provoke  the  Soviet  leader  at  a  moment  when  he  was  ordering  a  military
intervention in a neighbouring country, and tried to avoid providing his critics in the Soviet Bloc
with more reasons to pin him as the inspiration for the reformists in Hungary, a claim which was
not unfounded.128 In the final analysis, the Hungarian Revolution pushed Yugoslavia further into
the Soviet orbit, and by extension closer to the GDR, even though the Soviet intervention in
Hungary showed the Yugoslavs that any real reconciliation was impossible as long as Moscow
was willing to exercise total control over its satellites. 
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The East Germans, for their part, were not as concerned with the Yugoslav role in the
Hungarian Revolution or the events in Poland for several reasons. The first was the Yugoslav
self-restraint  in  commenting  on  these  events,  especially  in  the  case  of  Hungary,  since  the
Hungarian  Revolution  deviated  from a  ‘different  road  to  socialism,’ and  veered  toward  its
complete rejection, a development which horrified even Tito.129 In regards to Poland, the events
there were far less worrisome to the Yugoslavs than the Hungarian Revolution. This was not
only because of the geographic distance between Yugoslavia and Poland, but also because the
new Polish leadership under Władysław Gomułka was not a direct threat to the integrity of the
Warsaw  Pact  and  Soviet  hegemony,  demonstrated  by  Gomułka’s  attempts  to  placate
Khrushchev,  something the  Soviet  leader  could not  expect  from the Hungarians.130 Besides,
Gomułka  sided  with  the  rest  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  members  in  describing  the  Hungarian
Revolution as “counterrevolutionary.”131
The second reason was that the Yugoslav position regarding the German question was
enough to counteract any desire to criticize Tito.  The prospect of Yugoslav recognition was
simply too enticing to bring up old animosities.132 Furthermore, Yugoslavia and the GDR were
also  in  agreement  over  the Suez Crisis.133 Both countries  strongly criticized France,  United
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Kingdom, and Israel for their military intervention in Egypt in October 1956, following Nasser’s
nationalization of the Suez Canal.134 However, while the East Germans toed the Soviet line, the
Yugoslavs were more concerned with the survival of Nasser, a key non-aligned partner. They
supported  the  Egyptian  President  in  the  UN,  which  drew the  ire  of  the  Western  Powers.135
Furthermore, by supporting Egypt, Yugoslavia aligned itself with the GDR in regards to Israel,
which amplified Yugoslavia’s divergence from the West.136 Regardless of their motives, both
countries supported the same outcome of the Suez Crisis, namely the retreat of all foreign troops
from Egyptian territory, which precluded any East German criticism of Yugoslavia. 
Conclusion
The period between early 1955 and the end of 1956 signified a shift in Yugoslavia’s
relations towards the GDR and the FRG. The key element in this shift was the thaw between
Moscow and Belgrade,  initiated by Khrushchev as part  of  the de-Stalinization process.  The
Yugoslavs were socialists, and good relations with Moscow were a desired and valuable goal,
but not only from an ideological perspective. Yugoslavia was in need of foreign aid, and the
Soviets  promised  to  support  Yugoslavia  with  large  loans,  specifically  for  developing  its
aluminum industry. While Khrushchev was keen to rebuild relations with Yugoslavia, he was
also intent on making the GDR the “showpiece” of the Eastern Bloc, and convinced Tito to
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accept the GDR as a co-creditor for the loan. The tripartite agreement had a three-fold purpose
for the Soviets. It brought Yugoslavia closer to Moscow, while at the same time promoting the
GDR to the position of an economic powerhouse, capable of crediting other countries, ignoring
the fact that the GDR’s share of the credit was financed by the Soviets in full. The third benefit
was the reconciliation between East Berlin and Belgrade, after years of animosity and mistrust.
To be sure, the rapprochement was superficial, and these feelings continued to fester beneath the
surface. 
The FRG’s foreign policy during this period showed that the West Germans were still not
sure how to maintain the GDR’s international isolation, at least in regards to Yugoslavia. For all
its economic power, the FRG could not use it as leverage against Yugoslavia, which refused to
profess long-term commitment to not recognizing the GDR. The West Germans were hoping
that Yugoslavia would recognize the benefits of maintaining good relations between them, but
their efforts were milder than the Hallstein doctrine would suggest, which allowed the Yugoslavs
to continue forging closer relations with the GDR.
While the SED delegation was in Belgrade negotiating the seemingly bright future of the
GDR-Yugoslav relations, the West German parliament finally ratified the reparations agreement.
With a vote of 236 for and 96 against, the West Germans opted to act in good faith, shifting the
onus on Yugoslavia.137 This was a precarious position,  since prior statements from Belgrade
never suggested that a desirable outcome for the FRG was forthcoming, but simply that there
will be no recognition at this particular point in time. There were no guaranties that Yugoslavia
would continue holding this position in 1957.
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Whose Success? Yugoslavia’s Recognition of the GDR in 1957
On a cold January 1957 evening in East Berlin, crowds gathered at  Ostbahnhof  on a platform
decorated with flowers. A military band played the German Democratic Republic’s anthem as an
East German delegation boarded the night train to Moscow.138 Lead by Walter Ulbricht,  the
delegation was travelling to  meet  the  Soviets  in  the  wake of  the  Hungarian revolution and
amidst a Socialist Unity Party (SED) leadership feud. The fanfare sent off a strong delegation:
Ulbricht was accompanied by Otto Grotewohl and other top GDR officials, including foreign
minister Lothar Bolz. The high ranking group was travelling to Moscow to discuss a plethora of
important  issues  with  their  Soviet  patrons,  ranging from  regulating  the  international  use  of
GDR’s airspace to negotiating a new Soviet loan.139 In addition, the East Germans were to meet
with a Chinese delegation, led by Premier Zhou Enlai. On the margins of this important visit, at
a dinner party the East Germans organized at their embassy, Grotewohl and Ulbricht approached
ambassador  Mićunović.  While  Grotewohl  was  courteous,  Ulbricht  bluntly  asked Mićunović
whether Yugoslavia intended to recognize the GDR in the same way it recognized the Federal
Republic of Germany.140 Mićunović answered vaguely, saying that Yugoslavia, and any other
country interested in a peaceful solution, will make the right decision in this matter, an answer
which did not satisfy the East German leader. Never known for his subtlety, Walter Ulbricht’s
138 “Regierungsdelegation nach Moskau” Neues Deutschland (Berlin, GDR), January 2, 1957, p. 1. 
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outburst  was not well  received in Belgrade,  especially since this  encounter was reported by
Neues Deutschland, the SED party organ, painting Yugoslavia in a unfavourable light.141
What had changed in the relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia in the short period
between Peter Florin’s visit to Belgrade in late September and the dinner at the East German
embassy? Certainly,  the Soviet  pressure on Yugoslavia regarding the handling of the Polish
crisis and the Hungarian Revolution left a bitter taste in Tito’s mouth.142 Ambassador Mićunović
noted in his  diary on January 10 that it  was obvious that the Soviet-Yugoslav relations had
deteriorated because of Hungary. To Mićunović it seemed that Moscow was willing to honour
all of its economic agreements, including the latest one with the GDR, except the ones with
Yugoslavia, and that Moscow was willing to elevate this latest rift to an international level.143
Ulbricht  must  have  been  in  two  minds  over  this  development.  On  the  one  hand,
Yugoslavia’s unwillingness to adopt the Soviet position vis-à-vis Hungary vindicated the East
Germans’ view of Yugoslavs as pseudo-communists. On the other, the possibility of Yugoslavia
recoiling from its rapprochement with the Soviet Bloc would jeopardize the prospect of East
Germany’s recognition. Given his opinion on Yugoslavia, and despite a low in relations not seen
since 1954, Ulbricht was not about to become pragmatic. January 1957 was the point in time
when Ulbricht decided to use the aluminum treaty to blackmail the Yugoslavs into recognizing
the GDR.144 This decision was probably an option since the treaty’s inception, but the immediate
cause was the Yugoslav reparation agreement with the FRG, which the East Germans believed
141 “Erlauschtes aus einem Gespräch Walter Ulbrichts mit dem jugoslawischen Botschafter” Neues Deutschland 
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signified the Yugoslav pendulum swinging toward Bonn. In addition, Ulbricht had survived the
turmoil of 1956 and had consolidated his power, which gave him emboldened him to take more
decisive action against Belgrade.145 The Yugoslavs had just ratified the agreement with the FRG
in early January, and the East Germans realized that only strong pressure could force Belgrade
to fulfill  what  East  Berlin  believed was promised to  them.146 In  early February,  a Yugoslav
delegation visited East Berlin in order to sign a new trade agreement between the two countries
valued at 12 million US dollars. Initially, the agreement was supposed to be signed by chamber
of commerce representatives, but at the last moment the East Germans insisted that it be signed
on a governmental level. Their bluff backfired. The Yugoslavs were angered, and left East Berlin
without  having  signed  the  agreement.147 But  Ulbricht  was  also  not  keen  on  destroying  his
relationship  with  Yugoslavia,  and  apologized  to  the  Yugoslavs  shortly  afterwards  via  a
representative of the GDR foreign trade office in Belgrade.148
The East German apology was merely an interlude. The Yugoslav ambassador in Prague,
Marko Nikezić, was one of Yugoslavia’s best and brightest diplomats and would later become its
foreign minister (1965-1968). He met with his East German counterpart Bernard Koenen in
early March after the latter’s return from consultations with Ulbricht. Ulbricht’s message to the
Yugoslavs was more nuanced than during his exchange with ambassador Mićunović in Moscow,
but still barbed. But most of all, it was symptomatic of the GDR’s conflicting and inconsistent
policy  towards  Yugoslavia.  Koenen  opened  the  meeting  with  Ulbricht’s  apology  about  the
mistreatment of the Yugoslav trade delegation at the hands of the East German authorities. The
145 Gareth Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany, p. 70.
146 Nećak, Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija, pp. 111-112.
147 Ibid., pp.112-113.
148 “Zabeleška” (February 18, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, p. 196.
51
next point was Ulbricht’s suggestion to negotiate a trade agreement on a ministerial level, which
in itself was a reiteration of previous East German demands, but this time they included a veiled
warning, adding that it would not be in Yugoslavia’s interest to decline this proposition. The
final  item during  this  meeting  was  a  note  from the  GDR government  asking  for  Yugoslav
support in its campaign to become an observer at  the European Economic Commission and
thanking them for  all  their  support  in  international  organizations,  including this  one.149 The
mixed  message  sent  from  East  Berlin  must  not  have  confused  the  Yugoslavs,  who  were
accustomed  to  East  German  whims,  but  it  was  undeniably  counterproductive. Both  sides
retreated, and their relations entered a lull that was to last until late summer of that year.
If the West Germans, who followed the quarrelsome relationship between East Berlin
and Belgrade with some glee, had hoped that this could open up the possibility of a definitive
Yugoslav  rejection  of  the  GDR’s  recognition,  they  were  mistaken.  A Yugoslav  report  of  a
meeting between ambassador Pfleiderer and the new state undersecretary Mladen Iveković, who
had  just  ended his  tenure  as  the  Yugoslav  ambassador  in  Bonn,  showed that  there  was  no
progress  on  this  front.  Pfleiderer  complained  about  an  anti-FRG  text  in  the  League  of
Communists  of  Yugoslavia  (SKJ)  party  organ  Borba,  and  Iveković  argued  that  the  recent
debates in the Bundestag showed that West Germany was not really working towards better
cooperation between the blocs.150 Soon afterwards, Dušan Kveder, who succeeded Iveković as
the  ambassador  in  Bonn,  compiled  an  extensive  report  on  the  latest  developments  in  West
149 Letter from Nikezić (March 2, 1957), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 82. The organization in 
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German foreign policy, in which he described the Bonn government as utterly convinced of the
hopelessness of any chance of reunification at this point, which was reflected in their policies.
According  to  Kveder,  they  simply  blamed  the  USSR for  this  impasse.151 While  this  is  not
completely true, the fact of the matter was that for all the focus on the reunification in FRG’s
public sphere, the West Germans did not expect any change of the current situation in the near
future, but Adenauer did acknowledge that it was a result of inflexibility on both sides.152 
Regardless  of  Bonn’s  perspective  on  reunification,  it  was  not  willing  to  completely
resign  itself  to  the  status  quo.  Chancellor  Adenauer  was  facing  domestic  criticism for  his
seemingly  soft  stance  on  German  reunification.  In  the  previous  year,  he  had  initiated  a
reunification campaign to placate his voters, but it had failed.153 While Adenauer could not force
a reunification by dealing with the Soviets, he could at least try to prevent Yugoslavia from
recognizing  the  GDR,  an  act  that  would  have  made  his  bid,  not  to  mention  reunification,
exponentially more difficult. In mid-April, ambassador Pfleiderer met again with Iveković, in
what seems to have been a West German attempt to charm the Yugoslavs and dangle in front of
them the  carrot  of  economic  cooperation.  Pfleiderer  had  just  returned  from a  trip  through
Germany, and in every Land (West German federal state) he met people who were apparently
interested in Yugoslavia and harboured sympathies towards it. He also met with a number of
industrialists,  including  representatives  from  Krupp  and  GHH,  who  admittedly  were  not
particularly  keen to  support  the  development  of  the  Yugoslav  aluminum industry,  but  were
rather interested in the production of electricity. After Pfleiderer’s presentation, the conversation
151 “Teze o spoljnoj politici Savezne Republike Nemačke” (February 16, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 
193/57.
152 Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer, p. 204.
153 Ibid., p. 174.
53
inevitably turned to the GDR. The exchange between him and Iveković again showed that the
divide between Bonn and Belgrade could not be bridged by the mere prospect of economic
cooperation.  While  Pfleiderer  tried  to  emphasize  the  commonalities  shared  in  their  foreign
policies, Iveković was quick to point towards a wide range of issues where they disagreed. The
most important of Iveković’s points was also indicative of the evolution of Yugoslavia’s German
policy. Iveković repeated the now well-known idea that the existence of two German states was
a reality, but added that the logical consequence of this position should be the recognition of the
GDR.  This  was  a  significant  departure  from the  previous  Yugoslav  position,  which  merely
indicated the idea of recognizing the GDR as a clear and acceptable option.154 If this change
alarmed the West Germans, they gave no indication.
Pfleiderer returned in June with another proposal for economic cooperation, this time
suggesting that Bonn had changed its mind about aiding Yugoslav aluminum production, but
that the financing thereof posed an issue. Pfleiderer’s idea reeked of desperation. Iveković told
him that  Belgrade  had  in  the  past  made  inquiries  about  working  with  Western  companies,
including some from the FRG and the US. Yugoslavia had always made it clear that it could not
bear the financial burden of these endeavours alone and therefore needed substantial loans, but
none were forthcoming.155 Pfleiderer must have known of these Yugoslav travails, which made
his meeting with Iveković seem that much more like a last-ditch effort, which, as is often the
case, failed. Pfleiderer brought up this idea one more time with Iveković, admitting that he is
taking it upon himself to pursue this option, since the German government showed no interest in
it. Not surprisingly, Iveković did not respond positively to this suggestion, and Pfleiderer never
154 “Zabeleška” (April 17, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 412.
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brought it up again.156 As in the previous two years, the West Germans did not have a solution to
the Yugoslav problem.
Perhaps Pfleiderer sensed that the window for West German action – at least in order to
prevent the triggering of the Hallstein Doctrine – was closing fast. A period of tense Soviet-
Yugoslav relations, which started with the Hungarian Revolution, continued until the summer of
1957.  Then,  a  series  of  events  caused  a  new,  but  rather  short  thaw between  Moscow and
Belgrade.  In  June,  Khrushchev  was  able  to  survive  the  ‘Anti-Party  Group’ coup  led  by
Malenkov,  Molotov  and  Kaganovich,  and  consolidate  his  power.  Even  before  Khrushchev
removed the Stalinist faction from the Politburo, the Yugo-Soviet relations were sailing towards
calmer  waters.  Set  in  motion  before  the  coup,  a  high  ranking  Yugoslav  delegation  visited
Moscow  shortly  thereafter.  The  delegation  was  headed  by  Edvard  Kardelj,  Tito’s  closest
associate and the main Yugoslav economic planner, and Aleksandar Ranković, another of Tito’s
closest associates and considered to be the third most powerful man in Yugoslavia due to his
control of the secret police.157 The visit was marked by an uneasy atmosphere and ended on a
sour note.158 Despite the turmoil in Moscow, the visit was a positive step for the Yugo-Soviet
relations, because in late July Yugoslav, Soviet, and East German delegations met in Moscow to
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finalize the timeline for the fulfillment of the aluminum treaty.159 During this meeting, the East
Germans again attempted to use the treaty as leverage to gain recognition, but the Yugoslavs did
not bow to their pressure, and the timeline was confirmed without any conditions. This was the
highlight of an otherwise calm summer as far as East Berlin-Belgrade relations were concerned.
These positive developments culminated in a meeting between Khrushchev and Tito in
August.  The  meeting  took  place  in  Bucharest  and  was  for  the  most  part,  unremarkable.160
Nothing of importance was decided in this small town near Bucharest in terms of Yugo-Soviet
relations, but the mere fact that it happened demonstrated that both sides were committed to
cooperation. The Soviets were hoping that the meeting would show that Yugoslavia was indeed
politically and ideologically moving closer to the Soviet bloc, and the Yugoslavs hoped that their
cooperation would motivate the Soviets to carry on with the process of de-Stalinisation, cut
short by the interventions of 1956.161 However, Tito did make two concessions to the Soviets in
Romania. One was to allow a Yugoslav delegation to attend the 40 th anniversary celebrations of
the October Revolution in November. The other concession was Tito’s promise to recognize the
GDR.162 The  latter  was hardly  a  coup for  the  Soviets,  since  Tito  had been considering  the
recognition  for  some  time,  but  it  did  attest  to  the  general  atmosphere  of  reconciliation  in
Romania. In addition, the East Germans had always believed that the Yugoslav recognition was
somehow owed to them by virtue of ‘socialist duty’, but they were not certain whether it would
ever  happen.  This was the East  German sentiment  as late  as July 1957.163 Therefore,  Tito’s
concession offered some certainty to the East Germans.
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The eastward shift in Yugoslav foreign policy became apparent soon after the meeting in
Romania.  A Polish  delegation,  led  by  Władysław  Gomułka  was  set  to  visit  Belgrade  on
September 10. Ambassador Pfleiderer approached state undersecretary Iveković and voiced his
concerns about the possible outcome of the Polish visit. Pfleiderer argued that German-Polish
relations were developing in the right direction and that any disturbance from the outside could
jeopardize  them.  Pfleiderer  referred  to  the  communiqué  of  the  latest  East  German-Polish
meeting, in which there were some accusatory formulations regarding the FRG. In addition,
Bonn would have preferred it if there was to be no public endorsement by either delegation of
the  Oder-Neisse  border.  Pfleiderer’s  concerns  were  not  completely  unfounded.  Iveković
answered that there would probably be no attacks on the FRG in the communiqué, but that in his
personal opinion the Oder-Neisse border was a reality, and that he could not guarantee that the
communiqué would not contain a formulation to this effect.164
Gomułka arrived in Belgrade at the tail-end of his reformist period. Just a few weeks
later he would begin a crackdown on all dissent that was brewing in Poland under his watch.165
At the time of his meeting with Tito in September 1957, Gomułka no longer presented any
danger for East Berlin – whose rocky relationship with Warsaw was beginning to steady around
this time – or Moscow, but it did worry Bonn. Gomułka’s visit took place just days before the
Bundestag elections, so any negative news coming from Belgrade was bound to have an effect
on Adenauer’s bid for the chancellorship. Bonn’s fears were justified. Tito endorsed the Oder-
Neisse border twice, during a toast and in the final communiqué of his meeting with Gomułka.
Pfleiderer met with Iveković to protest Tito’s first endorsement, citing the delicate timing of the
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toast. Iveković rebuked the German ambassador for interfering in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy,
especially in matters that were well known, such as the Oder-Neisse border or the recognition of
the GDR, which was going to happen, according to Iveković, “sooner or later.” That last remark
seemed to have broken Pfleiderer. He replied that he imagined a different path for the FRG-
Yugoslav relations, and that it seemed that Yugoslavia only wanted to “receive West German
machinery and to trade and – nothing else.” What more could the FRG do for Yugoslavia to
believe that Bonn would never start another war, he asked. Iveković suggested that the FRG
needed to decisively end all ambitions of creating a nuclear arsenal and to do more in their
rapprochement  with Poland.  Arguably,  these two issues were not at  the top of Yugoslavia’s
concerns, and Iveković most likely produced them simply as a counterargument.166 Pfleiderer
attempted to intervene with Iveković once again later that day, but was unable to elicit a promise
that  an  endorsement  of  the  Oder-Neisse  border  would  not  be  included  in  the  final
communiqué.167 
This was to be the last meeting between Pfleiderer and Iveković. Bonn had withdrawn
Pfleiderer for consultations after the final communiqué, which included the endorsement of the
Oder-Neisse border, was published. Unfortunately, Pfleiderer had fallen gravely ill during his
last days in Belgrade. He had wanted to take leave and to convalesce in the Serbian countryside,
but the recall to Bonn meant that he would have to keep working. The illness caught up to him
on October 15, when he died. With his death, the West German circles that opposed the full
implementation of  the Hallstein Doctrine had lost  one of their  most  vocal  advocates in  the
FRG’s diplomacy.168
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In hindsight, Gomułka’s visit to Belgrade did not make a big splash in West Germany.
The  West  German  government  met  two  days  after  withdrawing  Pfleiderer.  At  the  meeting,
chancellor Adenauer tried to play down the effect of Tito’s statements. He could afford to do so
since his party, the CDU, managed to win the Bundestag elections. However, Brentano warned
the cabinet that Yugoslavia might immediately recognize the GDR. Adenauer declared that this
matter would have to be addressed by the new cabinet, so no position could be taken until then,
not even in the press. Regardless of Adenauer’s attempt to calm his cabinet, his Foreign Office
feared that, in face of recent events, Yugoslavia was about to recognize the GDR, and that the
West German hands were tied due to the transition period in Bonn.169 It seemed that their timing
could not have been worse, but in fact it was already too late for any kind of effective action on
their part.
The Yugoslavs and the East Germans were also aware of the window of opportunity
offered by the cabinet formation in Bonn, in addition to the Yugo-Soviet thaw. Otto Grotewohl
had written to Tito on August 21 with an indirect request to establish diplomatic relations. In his
opening paragraph,  Grotewohl  congratulated Tito on the recently  agreed-upon dates  for  the
fulfillment of the tripartite aluminum treaty. This was the GDR’s prime minister’s reminder that
since the East Germans have agreed to sign the treaty, it would only be fair that Yugoslavia
agreed to establish closer relations. Grotewohl suggested that since the negotiations regarding
the  trade  agreement  –  which  was  less  significant  than  the  aluminum treaty  and which  the
Yugoslavs had abandoned earlier that year – were about to be resumed, it would be of interest to
both governments to discuss and negotiate the steps necessary to improve their relations.170 The
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letter  was  delivered  to  the  Yugoslavs  by  the  East  German  deputy  foreign  minister  Georg
Handke, who visited Belgrade at the same time as the Polish delegation. Interestingly enough,
Ulbricht himself wrote to Tito to ask for his permission for the letter to be delivered, which Tito
allowed. The East German decision to first seek approval through party channels indicated that
this initiative was of primary importance to them. The Yugoslav answer to Grotewohl followed
shortly  thereafter,  first  in  the  form  of  a  verbal  note  to  Handke.  As  far  as  the  Yugoslav
government  was  concerned,  the  letter  was  interpreted  as  an  East  German  call  to  establish
diplomatic  relations  between  the  two  countries,  and  the  Yugoslav  response  was  positive.
Nothing stood in the way of recognition.
However, the wording of the note was cautious and subdued. The Yugoslavs wanted to
avoid a special ceremony with high ranking delegations from either side, something that East
Germany suggested. The East German desire to make this event as conspicuous as possible was
understandable,  since  they  aimed  to  maximize  its  international  exposure.  However,  Tito’s
decision to forego “exaggerated publicity” seemed to be taken with the West Germans in mind,
although he did not fear drastic repercussions from Bonn.171 This opinion was likely informed by
Adenauer’s  lukewarm  reaction  to  Tito’s  statements  on  the  Polish-German  border  that,  as
William Glenn Gray argues, emboldened him to proceed, but with caution.172 
The official letter from Tito mirrored the verbal note, including the lack of enthusiasm.173
In addition, Tito preferred that the two countries opened legations – one rung below an embassy
– in their respective capitals, to which the East Germans agreed without any argument.174 In
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further evidence of Yugoslavia’s desire not to upset its already precarious relations with the
FRG, the Belgrade foreign office developed, and Tito signed off on, a plan by which Poland
would  ask  to  establish  full  diplomatic  relations  with  the  FRG.  Bonn  was  on  the  verge  of
proposing to Warsaw to establish consular relations. The Yugoslavs planned to convince the
Poles to delay any decision regarding this proposal, and to announce their own plan at the same
time as the Yugoslav recognition of the GDR became public.175
This Yugoslav plan came to nought, but it spoke to the nature of Yugoslavia’s foreign
policy. As many other times since 1948, Yugoslavia was willing to make decisions that placed it
at  odds  with  either  of  the  two  blocs  –  and  sometimes  with  both  –  with  considerable
consequences.  Tito’s  foreign  policy  was  a  tightrope  act  between  economic  and  ideological
considerations, but his audiences abroad were not always appreciative of the feat.
Yugoslav discordant behaviour was most obvious after the two key Yugoslav decisions
since 1948. In the aftermath of the split with Stalin, Tito’s only chance at maintaining Yugoslav
independence  was to  cooperate  with  the  West  in  exchange for  aid,  which  then  earned him
endless and vitriolic criticism from Moscow and its satellites.176 For Tito, and the rest of the
Yugoslav leadership, the denouncement by communism’s ideological authority was the bitterest
of pills. Conversely, after Stalin’s death and the rapprochement with Khrushchev, the Americans
did not look kindly on Yugoslavia’s potential return to the Soviet bloc. The American reaction
was punishment in the form of a decrease in military aid.177 Since the early rapprochement with
the USSR hardly brought with it strategic relief for Yugoslaiva, Washington’s decision had a
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long term effect on Yugoslavia’s national security.178 The idea that Yugoslavia would most likely
alienate one bloc with each one of its foreign policy decisions was clear to Tito. It was also clear
to him that he would have to keep taking some of these decisions to stay on course, regardless of
the risk. For this reason, he preferred not to enact these decisions alone, since they would leave
him  exposed  and  vulnerable  internationally.  While  this  line  of  reasoning  lead  to  Tito’s
investment into non-alignment, the same rationalization informed his foreign policy decisions
before  Yugoslavia’s  complete  immersion  in  the  non-aligned  movement.179 The  case  of  the
GDR’s recognition followed the same pattern. The recognition was surely going to antagonize
the West, but if Yugoslavia could convince Poland to establish diplomatic relations with the
FRG at the same time, then the international community would have seen the Yugoslav decision
as the first step toward a peaceful resolution of the German question, and quite possibly the
catalyst for ending the Cold War. But without a corresponding move from Warsaw, Yugoslavia
again had to take action without the support of other actors.
The recognition and its immediate aftermath
Just two days after Tito wrote the letter to Grotewohl confirming Yugoslavia’s decision
to  recognize  the  GDR,  an  East  German  delegation  visited  Belgrade  to  negotiate  a  trade
agreement. Yugoslav state undersecretary Dobrivoje Vidić received Fritz Grosse, the intended
GDR ambassador to Yugoslavia, and Eleonore Staimer, the head of the foreign trade delegation.
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However, the meeting lacked any sense of occasion. Vidić began the meeting by bringing up the
“anti-Yugoslav campaign from the East” after the Tito-Stalin split, and lamented the damage the
recognition would cause to economic relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia. Staimer and
Grosse replied that they did not expect any retribution from Bonn, since this recognition has
been  anticipated  for  quite  some  time,  and  that  the  FRG  seemed  to  be  more  focused  on
improving its relations with the Soviet Bloc.180 This reasoning was presumably not the actual
opinion  of  the  East  German  delegation,  and  only  meant  to  assuage  Vidić.  The  state
undersecretary would not be assuaged. In his report he added that he purposefully emphasized
the gravity of the situation, lest his interlocutors assume that it was a frivolous affair, “like an
operetta.”181 Regardless of the tone of the meeting, the upshot was that the technicalities for the
actual  act  of  recognition  were  decided  upon,  and  that  the  East  German  delegation  left  the
Foreign  Office building  content.  On October  8,  Tito signed off  on the decision to  publicly
announce  the  recognition  on  October  12.  It  was  important  for  the  Yugoslavs  to  make  this
decision public several days before Marshall Zhukov’s visit to Belgrade. Namely, Tito did not
want  the international  press to assume that  his  decision was made under  Soviet  pressure.182
Unfortunately,  since  Yugoslavia  needed  to  inform  several  foreign  governments  about  their
decision, the date of the announcement had to be postponed until October 15, when Zhukov was
already  in  Belgrade.  The  Yugoslav  need  to  dispel  the  image  of  Soviet  pressure  over  the
recognition was so strong that they amended the announcement to include the dates of the letters
exchanged between Grotewohl and Tito.183 East German representatives in Belgrade spent the
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following days fine-tuning the details of the recognition together with their hosts. In accordance
with the Yugoslav wish, there was to be no ceremony, and the only document signed by the East
German ambassador and the Yugoslav government would be the joint announcement.184 
The disparity between the Yugoslav and East German perceptions of the recognition was
evident  not  only  in  the  attitude  of  their  respective  representatives,  but  also  in  the  internal
justification of the recognition. The East Germans indicated a consensus between the two states
on all significant international issues. According to the East Germans, as far as the German
question  was  concerned,  diplomatic  relations  with  both  Germanies  could  help  German
reunification. In the case of Yugoslavia, the establishment of diplomatic relations did not only
help their bilateral relations, but was also a recognition of the socialist efforts in the GDR, the
“bulwark of freedom.”185 This internal rationalization focused on the validation of the GDR’s
existence. If outwardly the East Germans claimed that the recognition was Yugoslavia’s socialist
duty, this document showed, perhaps inadvertently, that this act was a coup for East Berlin.
The Yugoslav view was more nuanced, and more importantly, restrained. The foreign
office, in a statement they intended to publish on October 15, repeated the Yugoslav mantra that
the existence of two Germanies was a reality. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs placed their decision
within their broader foreign policy, so that “in the spirit of [their] non-bloc policy of active
coexistence, [they could] build equally good relations with both German states.”186 Again, this
was a  wish divorced from reality.  When the  Yugoslav  ambassador  in  Bonn,  Dušan Kveder
sought out Walter Hallstein on October 14 to inform him of his government’s decision, Hallstein
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reminded him of  Brentano’s  statement  from August  1956,  which held in  it  the  core  of  the
Hallstein  Doctrine,  namely  that  any  recognition  of  the  GDR by  a  third  country  would  be
interpreted by the FRG as an unfriendly act, and that the relations between the FRG and this
country had to be reviewed.187 Immediately after the meeting, Hallstein travelled to Paris to meet
with  the  NATO  council  and  seek  its  approval  for  breaking  off  diplomatic  relations  with
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavs were not expecting a complete break in diplomatic relations because the West
Germans never explicitly warned them about it. However, the Yugoslavs did expect some sort of
sanctions of some sort for ignoring Bonn’s wishes. Later that same day, a West German official
warned the Yugoslav embassy that the FRG would suspend an economic cooperation agreement
worth  240  million  marks  if  Yugoslavia  sent  an  envoy  to  East  Berlin.  This  was  Hallstein’s
initiative – not an official decision – and it was not an effective deterrent.
On October  15,  Yugoslavia and the GDR made the recognition public.  In the GDR,
Neues Deutschland lauded it as a “contribution to the consolidation of peace in Europe,” and
called the West German public to stand up against the voices which call for reprisals against
Yugoslavia.”188 The West Germans were facing one of the biggest diplomatic challenges of their
postwar history, and the voices calling for reprisal were indeed very vocal. Several high ranking
FRG officials, including the ambassador to NATO Herbert Blankenhorn, opposed a diplomatic
break with Yugoslavia, but the Adenauer-Brentano-Hallstein axis prevailed, and on October 17
the  West  German cabinet  decided to  break off  diplomatic  relations  with Yugoslavia.  At  the
187 “Jugoslawien. Deutschland (Ost-) (West-)” (October 19, 1957), Archiv der Gegenwart, p. 11294.
188 “Beitrag zur Festigung des Friedens in Europa” Neues Deutschland (Berlin, GDR), October 16, 1957, p. 1. 
http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/index.php?purl=SNP2532889X-19571016-0-1-5-0
65
cabinet meeting,  Adenauer cited the “overall  global situation” as a determining factor.189 He
estimated that ignoring the Yugoslav recognition could result in as many as thirty five other
countries  recognizing  the  GDR.190 In  addition,  there  are  indications  that  his  decision  was
informed  not  only  by  the  immediate  West  German  concerns  such  as  the  right  to  sole
representation, but more with the ‘Sputnik shock’, the feeling that the Soviets might be gaining
the upper hand in the Cold War,  symbolized by the launch of their Sputnik satellite.  It was
important to show to the Soviet Bloc and the rest of the world that the FRG would not be idle in
the  face  of  Communist  advances.191 At  the  same  cabinet  meeting,  Brentano  advocated  the
inclusion of economic sanctions in this decision. He argued that if severing diplomatic ties was
the  harshest  punishment  possible,  then  surely  the  economic  ties  had  to  be  cut  as  well.192
Although Yugoslavia was not a significant West German trade partner in general terms, it was a
leading  supplier  of  wood  and  bauxite,  the  latter  being  especially  difficult  to  procure
elsewhere.193 
These,  and  other,  economic  considerations  prevented  an  even  harsher  West  German
reaction. On October 19, ambassador Kveder was summoned to the foreign office in Bonn and
notified of the West German government’s decision. The West German note was an unequivocal
denunciation of the Yugoslav decision and the policy that lead to it.194 At the same time, the West
German chargé in Belgrade Müller-Roschach met with state undersecretary Vidić to hand him a
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copy of  the  same document.  The meeting  was  courteous,  but  ironically,  Vidić  told  Müller-
Roschach that the Yugoslav government saw the decision as an “unfriendly act.”195 
Yugoslavia had little reason to be pleased with the recognition. In Moscow, ambassador
Mićunović lamented, “it seems that Yugoslavia has lost more from one side than it gained from
the other.” Western diplomats were either aloof around Mićunović or confronted him over the
recognition. At the same time, he found that “the Russians have not become more open.” His
meeting with Khrushchev also failed to fill him with confidence. The Soviet leader did not seem
to “attach any significance to Yugoslavia’s decision” nor did he have any specific comments on
the situation. Mićunović concluded that both the GDR and the Soviet Union saw the recognition
as a right – rather than a concession – that was long overdue.196 To add to Yugoslav misery, even
Bonn was aware of the lack of enthusiasm in the Soviet Bloc for Belgrade’s decision.197
Elsewhere in the West, Yugoslavia’s actions seemed to prove that, to a large extent, Tito
had aligned himself  with the  Soviets.  NATO analysts  were  correct  in  pointing  out  that  the
recognition  had little  to  do  with  the  “bilateral  relations  between Yugoslavia  and the  Soviet
Zone,”  but  rather  with  Yugoslavia’s  relations  with  the  Soviet  Bloc,  meaning  Moscow.198
American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated in a meeting with his British counterpart
Selwyn Lloyd that the US had no intention of dissuading the West Germans from breaking off
diplomatic relations with Belgrade, since “in our opinion, the Yugoslavs have already proceeded
too far into the danger zone in their relations with the USSR” by siding with the Soviets over
Hungary.  Now,  with  this  decision,  there  was  almost  no  difference  between  the  USSR and
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Yugoslavia as far as foreign policy was concerned. While the US was not willing to give up on
Yugoslavia completely, Dulles pointed out that their latest decision would result in a decrease of
US military aid. Lloyd agreed, gleefully noting that the German decision to cut off diplomatic
ties would be a “slap in the face for Tito.”199 Americans had warned the Yugoslav ambassador in
Washington Leo Mates that there would be consequences to their actions, and also made it clear
that they would support Bonn’s reaction.200 On October 24, Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs Clarence Dillon summoned ambassador Mates to explain the US decision to
reconsider  the  amount  of  aid  earmarked  for  Yugoslavia,  since  their  “closer,  if  not  total,
alignment with Soviet positions on major international issues created a very difficult problem
for us in providing aid to Yugoslavia.” Although Mates tried to separate Yugoslavia’s foreign
policy from the Soviet one, arguing that the US was focusing on particular issues rather than the
whole policy, Dillon replied that Yugoslavia’s decisions on these issues have tipped the balance
of power toward the Soviets.201 
As much as the Americans disagreed with Yugoslavia’s decision, they did not want to tip
the balance any further by rash decision-making. The deliberations over the curtailment of aid
were  drawn out,  and  while  in  progress,  the  aid  programs  already  underway  carried  on  as
planned.202 A few  days  later,  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Political  Affairs  Robert
Murphy  wrote  to  State  Secretary  Dulles,  stating,  “there  are  numerous  indications  that
Yugoslavia miscalculated the force of the West German reaction, and wishes now to avoid any
further deterioration of relations with Bonn.” Furthermore, Murphy suggested that Tito might
199 FRUS, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI, Eds. Roberta L. DiGangi, Lorraine Lees, 
Aaron Miller, Charles S. Sampson, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 309. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v26
200 Ibid., Document 132.
201 Ibid., Document 315.
202 Ibid., Document 316.
68
have realized “that he may have gone too far in his rapprochement with the USSR.” As a result,
some of the American objectives had already been reached, and Tito was most probably not
inclined to continue along the path of rapprochement with the USSR.203 
The American assessment was correct. The Yugoslavs spent the rest of the year dealing
with  the  fallout  following  the  recognition.  Even  as  early  as  mid-October,  the  Yugo-Soviet
rapprochement was beginning to unravel. Ambassador Mićunović noted that the Soviets seemed
to revel in the triggering of the Hallstein Doctrine, which gave them a good excuse to attack the
FRG and the United States.204 Furthermore,  the Soviets  had to be pleased with the fact that
Yugoslavia lost a considerable amount of Western support and good will. 
The next hurdle in the Yugo-Soviet relations was the meeting of the twelve Communist
parties  in  Moscow  in  early  November.  In  late  October,  the  Soviets  released  a  draft  of  a
declaration that was intended to be signed by all attending parties. The declaration’s content was
an affront  to  Tito,  since  it  practically  annulled  the  Belgrade  and Moscow Declarations.  He
decided not to sign the declaration, nor to attend the meeting.205 A Yugoslav delegation did make
the trip to Moscow, where they faced harsh criticism from Khrushchev. Refusing to sign the 12
Party  declaration,  the  Yugoslavs  did  sign  another,  watered-down version  of  the  declaration,
signed by sixty-four Communist and worker’s parties.206
While in Moscow, the Yugoslav delegation also met with Ulbricht and the rest of the
East  German delegation  and discussed  future  cooperation.  The East  Germans  seemed more
eager to capitalize on the recognition, rather than focus on the unsigned declaration.207 They
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picked Eleonore Staimer, the head of the trade delegation that had just visited Belgrade, for the
position of the East German envoy in Yugoslavia. Although Staimer had no previous diplomatic
experience, she was the daughter of the East German president Wilhelm Pieck, which showed
the importance the GDR assigned to the posting.208 The East Germans also intended to send a
sizable embassy staff to Belgrade – altogether 52 employees. The Yugoslavs did not seem to
appreciate this, as a disproportionately large staff would certainly irritate Bonn, but also draw
unwanted  attention  from other  observers,  when  the  Yugoslavs  wanted  nothing  more  but  to
minimize the negative effects of its recognition of the GDR.209 The matter, however, did not
seem to interfere with the legation’s establishment.
After the disappointment of the Moscow meeting, the Yugoslavs also had to face the
American ambassador in Belgrade, James Riddleberger. Visiting Tito at his Brioni residence,
where the Yugoslav president was recovering from illness, Riddleberger repeated Washington’s
main  concerns  regarding  Yugoslavia’s  recent  foreign  policy  decision,  emphasizing  the
implications  these could  have  on the availability  of  US aid  to  Yugoslavia.  Tito adopted an
ambivalent  stance.  He  asked  for  American  understanding  of  Yugoslavia’s  delicate  position
between the two blocs. He argued that the recognition was a result of this position, and was not
aimed at damaging Adenauer. Nor was it part of an agreement with Khrushchev.210 These two
points  are  only  partially  correct.  The  Yugoslavs  knew  that  the  East  Germans  wanted  the
recognition to inflict maximum damage on Adenauer’s position, and they agreed to time the
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recognition accordingly. It was true that the recognition was not part of a deal with Khrushchev,
because the Soviets offered nothing in return. Riddleberger was concerned about the effect that
the recognition might have on other Cold War territorial disputes. He asked Tito whether this
prejudiced Yugoslavia’s position regarding China and Taiwan or North and South Korea, but the
Yugoslav president seemed flustered, and could not provide a clear answer.211
The conversation with Riddleberger must have left Tito feeling burdened by the lopsided
relations with the US – caused by Yugoslavia’s reliance on American aid – since a few days later
he  instructed  his  ambassador  to  Washington,  Leo  Mates,  to  call  on  deputy  undersecretary
Murphy to  inform him that  the  Yugoslav  government  decided to  terminate  the  military  aid
program, since the “political difficulties caused by [it] now outweigh the value of the military
equipment involved.”212 By doing so, Belgrade hoped to improve its relations with the US.213
Furthermore, the Yugoslavs could not be accused by the Soviets of depending on American aid;
a  timelier  manoeuvre  considering  Moscow  had  given  up  on  any  pretense  of  socialist
comradeship with Yugoslavia after the Moscow twelve party meeting.
The East Germans,  however,  were still  confident that Yugoslavia was heading in the
right direction – as evidenced by the recognition and the subsequent signing of a new trade
agreement – and were hoping for an even closer relationship in the future.214 The initial contacts
between  the  East  German  diplomats  in  Belgrade  and  their  hosts  reflected  East  Berlin’s
assessment.  They were  grateful  for  Yugoslav  support,  which  they  deemed  necessary  in  the
current  situation,  when  it  appeared  that  Yugoslavia  was  less  then  enthusiastic  about  its
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recognition of the GDR.215 The Yugoslavs  were pleased with the way their  legation in East
Berlin was settling in as well, although they did not immediately send an envoy. At the same
time, attacks aimed at Yugoslavia were still being published in the GDR. For example, an East
German economics professor published an article criticising Yugoslavia’s economic policy, and
the man behind it,  Edvard Kardelj,  which reflected the ambiguity towards Yugoslavia in the
GDR.216 
The West German Socialist Party (SPD), traditionally on good terms with the SKJ, found
Tito’s decision difficult to accept. In a personal letter to Mladen Iveković, one of the SPD’s
leading  functionaries,  Herbert  Wehner,  decried  Yugoslavia’s  recognition  of  the  GDR.217
According to Wehner, it signalled the retreat of real socialists from a pan-European dialogue.
“Should the field be dominated by the Mollets?” asked Wehner, referring to the French prime
minister  Guy Mollet,  whose  active  role  in  escalating  the  Suez  Crisis  earned him plenty  of
criticism from the European Left.218 At home, the SPD criticized Adenauer and his government
for implementing the Hallstein Doctrine, which it saw as the failure of the chancellor’s East
European policy. For the most part, the West German press also criticized the move, and only a
minority of the public supported it.219
Suffering losses on almost all sides, the Yugoslavs found some solace in the response of
the German business community. According to one report, German companies were not pleased
with  their  government’s  decision.  Some of  them,  however,  were,  informed  (presumably  by
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contacts in the government) that the business connections between the two countries would not
be affected.  Given the threat  of economic repercussions  from the Bonn government,  it  was
comforting for Belgrade to know that the trade between West German and Yugoslav companies
was  seemingly  proceeding  unhindered  by  the  Hallstein  Doctrine.220 Furthermore,  it
foreshadowed the future of the relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia for the duration of the
Hallstein  Doctrine,  with  sanctions  at  the  highest  levels  of  bilateral  relations,  but  otherwise
normal flow of goods and people.
Conclusion
Yugoslavia’s recognition of the GDR, the watershed moment in the triangular relations between
Belgrade, Bonn, and East Berlin, carried a multitude of consequences for all three sides. The
GDR had achieved an unprecedented diplomatic victory over the FRG. On October 16, 1957, an
anonymous  Neues Deutschland  editorial boldly proclaimed that “every government which in
fact wants to embrace the interests of its own country and those of the peace, will come to the
inevitably  necessary  conclusion  and  normalize  their  relations  with  the  German  Democratic
Republic, just as was done by the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.”221 
But for all the East German optimism, the recognition was more a byproduct of Yugo-
Soviet relations than a triumph of the GDR’s diplomacy. In fact, the latter had proved to be quite
ineffectual, to the point of being counterproductive, as demonstrated during the trade agreement
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negotiations in East Berlin in January 1957. If Ulbricht had success in forcing the Soviet hand,
as Hope Harrison argues,  the evidence showed that  this  was not  one of those occasions.  If
Khrushchev told Ulbricht in 1960 that “your needs are our needs,” there is nothing to show that
he entertained the same belief in 1957, at least not in the case of Yugoslavia.222 If anything,
Ulbricht had wisely adapted to the new diktat from Moscow.223
It was the second thaw between Yugoslavia and the USSR, this one taking place in the
summer of 1957 following the fallout over the Soviet intervention in Hungary that had enabled
the recognition. In addition, it was a gesture of Yugoslav good will towards the Soviets, and not
a result of direct Soviet pressure, although the Soviets did lobby the Yugoslavs to this end. The
East Germans hoped that Yugoslavia’s recognition would trigger a domino effect among the
non-aligned countries, but there were no signs of this happening in late 1957. Most importantly,
there was no other country outside the Soviet bloc which aligned itself with Soviet values as
much as Yugoslavia did, to the point of choosing the GDR over the FRG.
The West German decision to break off diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia carried with it an
aura of a necessary evil. For all the uncertainty about its stages and trigger mechanisms, and the
flexibility regarding trade and transit regulations, in the final analysis the Hallstein Doctrine was
a fundamentally rigid set of policies. Hence, the Bonn government could only act in one way, as
long as the Doctrine’s creators had the upper hand in the Foreign Office and the cabinet.
Yugoslavia had lost the most out of all involved. While the recognition of the GDR was
aimed to bolster its relationship with the USSR, no reciprocal measure was offered by Moscow
at  the  time,  and  by  late  October  their  relationship  began  to  sour  again,  thus  making  the
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likelihood  of  any such  measure  in  the  future  minimal.  As expected,  the  Yugoslav  decision
afforded them no sympathies in the West. Tito’s balancing act between the blocs, which had
hitherto yielded disproportionate success for the small Balkan state, had faced its first major
failure. The reason behind this miscalculation was Tito’s ideological world view. Tito was a
Communist,  and  regardless  of  all  past  conflicts  with  the  Soviets,  he  still  desired  a  close
relationship with them. However, his concern about Yugoslavia’s independence – and therefore
its position in the international order – superseded his personal feelings about the Soviets, and
1958 would mark the beginning of the next phase of Yugoslavia’s non-aligned policy after the
explorations of the mid-1950s.
In  December  1957,  a  State  Department  report  on  Germany  stated  that  “the  Berlin
situation calls for the utmost vigilance of the Western Powers” due to its location, where it is
“exposed to constant Communist pressures and harassment.”224 The Berlin situation would in
fact become the focal point of the German question in the next few years for both Germanies. It
would also test the strength of Yugoslavia’s relations with the GDR, but also the West German
resolve to uphold the validity of the Hallstein Doctrine.
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Chapter 3
The Second Berlin Crisis and Yugoslavia (1958-1960)
Following the initial  shock of Yugoslavia’s recognition of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR)  and  the  implementation  of  the  Hallstein  doctrine,  it  seemed  that  the  long  term
consequences of Belgrade’s decision – as far as the two Germanies were concerned – were not
catastrophic,  but  neither  were  they  cathartic,  nor  groundbreaking  for  any  of  the  countries
involved. To be sure, all three countries had to make diplomatic adjustments in the recognition’s
aftermath, but none resulted in a tectonic shift in relations. The Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) maintained a diplomatic presence in Yugoslavia by retaining the general consulate in
Zagreb,  and  France  agreed  to  represent  West  German  interests  in  Yugoslavia  through  their
embassy in Belgrade (in fact, several of the West German diplomatic staff remained in the FRG
embassy in Belgrade, but had merely replaced the West German flag and plaque on the building
with the French ones). In Bonn, the Swedish embassy took on the same role for Yugoslavia.225
Much of the trade between the two countries continued unhindered, as per previously signed
agreements.226 Conversely, the relationship between the GDR and Yugoslavia also seemed to
retain  some of  the  qualities  it  held  before  the  recognition,  namely  the  mutual  distrust  and
animosity. This state of affairs pointed to a lack of substance in their relations, which in turn
showed that the recognition was not only an anomaly, but one which occurred due to external
factors, namely the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. As they entered
225 Bogetić, Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike, p. 124.
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another  hostile  phase  of  relations  in  late  1957,  Yugoslavia  found  no  reason  to  develop  its
relations with the GDR at a rate faster than before the recognition. The Berlin Crisis, which
began in November of 1958, added to Yugoslavia’s strained relations with the Soviet Bloc. 
After the disappointment of yet another breakdown in Yugo-Soviet relations, Tito turned
his attention to improving and creating new contacts in the non-aligned world. His numerous
trips abroad between 1958 and 1961 were also partially inspired by the Hallstein doctrine and
the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the FRG which, although not exceedingly severe,
left a bitter taste in his mouth. These trips, planned for 1957 but postponed due to the diplomatic
difficulties – namely the decrease in American aid and the conflict with the Soviet Union – were
always meant to strengthen Yugoslavia’s international position, but now the stakes for Tito were
much higher.
Conversely,  the East  Germans characterized their  relations with Yugoslavia since the
recognition as satisfactory.  However,  they recognized that all  initiatives to improve bilateral
relations were coming from East Berlin,  which worried them. Moreover,  it  seemed that the
Yugoslavs  were  invested  in  minimizing  any  activity  that  might  jeopardize  their  already
precarious relationship with the FRG.227
The Yugoslavs indeed did not want to irritate the West Germans by building up their
relations with the GDR even further,  and were actually hoping that Bonn would reverse its
decision in the near future.228 The Bonn government was still unsure on how to proceed with the
trade relations, but regardless of Belgrade’s hopes, it was steadfast in upholding the Hallstein
227 “Der Stand der Beziehungen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur Föderativen Volksrepublik 
Jugoslawien” (March 20, 1958), PA AA, MfAA, A 5072, pp. 10-17.
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doctrine.229 Incidentally, the FRG and Yugoslavia found themselves embroiled in the same Cold
War crisis around this time, namely Algeria. France, which had been at war with the Algerian
independence movement National Liberation Front (FNL) since 1954, was trying to eliminate
the  FNL’s  supply  shipments  from abroad,  including  weapons. The  French  government  was
especially angered by the supplies coming from the FRG, its NATO partner. While the weapons
recovered by French officials were West German, the FRG argued that these weapons could
have originated from Eastern European sources, either from old WWII stock, or modern replicas
produced by a Czech manufacturer.230 Even though some FNL supplies were indeed coming
from the  FRG,  Bonn felt  vindicated  when the  French seized  a  Yugoslav  ship  containing  a
weapons shipment so large, it  would have constituted a half of all weapons currently in the
FNL’s possession.231 The West Germans tried to shift the blame for the illegal shipments on
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, even though the Bonn government was still unable to control its
illegal  exports  to  Algeria.232 Needless  to  say,  this  affair  did  not  help  Yugo-West  German
relations, even though there were no serious repercussions.
Meanwhile, the difficulties surrounding the establishment of respective East German and
Yugoslav legations best symbolized the less than ideal relations between the other Germany and
Yugoslavia. As late as February 1958, the East Germans were still not able to procure a building
for their legation. In a conversation with the state undersecretary Srđa Prica, envoy  Eleonore
229 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
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Staimer complained about this delay. She claimed that the Western press wrote about her “sitting
in some castle and waiting” because no one in the Yugoslav government was willing to meet
with her to accept her accreditation letter, and now she expected them to write about her “sitting
in a hotel,” because the Yugoslavs were not in a hurry to accommodate the legation’s opening.233
The  Yugoslavs  had no such complaints  regarding their  legation  in  East  Berlin.234 This  was
partially due to the disparate sizes of the personnel in the legations. While the Yugoslavs sent
only four persons to East Berlin, Staimer informed Iveković that the GDR was planning to man
the Belgrade legation with eighty-five employees, a number which “stunned” her interlocutor.235
Although it  was  an  unconventionally large number – Iveković argued that  even the  largest
Yugoslav embassies number around thirty employees – the main Yugoslav concern was that it
would be too conspicuous to international observers, but according to Iveković, Staimer did not
even seem to acknowledge his remark.236 
As much as the Yugoslavs tried to impede the East German advances, they could not, nor
did they want  to  completely ignore them. In fact,  in  some areas,  such as  trade,  there were
indications  that  cooperation  between  the  two  countries  was  improving  as  a  result  of  the
recognition.237 In April, the East German Minister for Foreign and Inner-German Trade Heinrich
Rau even predicted, rather optimistically, that the trade volume could reach 200 million USD
233 “Zabeleška” (February 4, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 184.
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within two to three years.238 This was a far cry from the unfulfilled four million dollar trade
agreement signed by the GDR and Yugoslavia in 1954. 
Even though the outlook for Belgrade’s  relations  with Moscow seemed positive,  the
latent conflict between the two flared up again in April. The cause for this latest clash was the
draft of the new League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) party program that was supposed
to be adopted at its 7th party congress in May. At the core of the program was the reinforced idea
of  Yugoslavia’s  unique  geopolitical  position  as  a  non-aligned  country,  but  it  also  included
conciliatory tones aimed towards the West. The Yugoslavs presented the Soviets with the draft
of the program, and soon thereafter Moscow and its satellites launched a vitriolic attack on
Belgrade. Not by chance, the Soviet attacks on the SKJ program coincided with Khrushchev
completing his consolidation of power by becoming the prime minister of the USSR in March
1958.239 The Soviets saw the program as a direct attack on the USSR, especially regarding its
foreign policy. The Soviet embassy in Belgrade relayed Moscow’s concerns about the program.
One of the main criticisms was the use of the term ‘hegemony,’ which the Soviets believed was
aimed at them. The Soviets found this term, normally reserved for capitalist countries, extremely
offensive.240 According to the Soviets, the fact that the Yugoslavs published the SKJ program as
a book, and even translated it to other languages, was evidence of Yugoslav bad faith.241 
After Belgrade showed no intention of changing the program’s contents,  Soviet Bloc
countries decided to boycott the SKJ congress.242 As a result, the Yugo-East German relations
also stopped improving. In his official note to the SKJ, with which he informed the Yugoslavs
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that the GDR would also not be sending a delegation to the congress, Ulbricht repeated the
Soviet line that the SKJ program was in direct opposition to Marxist-Leninist principles, and
warned the SKJ that it undermined the struggle against NATO.243 While Ulbricht’s protestations
were sincere,  they had their  limits.  For example,  When the GDR president Otto Grotewohl
visited Beijing in 1959, he was confronted with a Chinese proposal to break off diplomatic
relations with Yugoslavia – presumably by all socialist countries – over the SKJ program.244 The
aggressive Chinese position on Yugoslavia was well known to the East Germans, as they had
complained in 1958 to the GDR’s foreign minister Johannes König about Yugoslavia paying lip
service to non-alignment, but in fact “working against the socialist camp.”245 This latest outburst
was too much even for the East Germans. Grotewohl had to vehemently decline this suggestion,
as it would have greatly devalued the GDR’s international standing.246
Some diplomats from socialist countries, including the GDR envoy Staimer, did attend
the SKJ conference but left during an intermission. As in the past, this latest falling out between
Moscow and Belgrade also had an effect on the relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia, and
envoy Staimer felt that her biggest complaint about the speeches at the Congress was not the
criticism of the Soviet Bloc parties per se, but rather the lack of self-critique in the SKJ. Staimer
conveyed her thoughts to Mitja Vošnjak, who had been selected as Yugoslavia’s envoy in East
Berlin and was about to fly to the East German capital.247 Vošnjak arrived in East Berlin six
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months after the Yugoslav legation opened its doors, but the East German welcome was friendly,
and his hosts even offered to organize a study trip for a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation.248
Diplomatic  niceties  aside,  the  Yugoslavs  did  not  have  to  wait  long  for  the  Soviet
retribution for the 7th SKJ congress. On May 28, Khrushchev informed the Yugoslavs that the
payments for the fulfillment of the aluminum treaty were going to be postponed until 1963.
Furthermore,  the  GDR government  was consulted  about  this  decision  and was  in  complete
agreement with it.249 For all the ideological discord between the Soviet Bloc and Yugoslavia,
which affected Tito personally, it was the economic punishment that hurt Yugoslavia the most.
On June 10, 1958, Yugoslav foreign minister Popović summoned Staimer and suggested that, if
the GDR felt bound by the treaty to act in unison with the USSR, then perhaps the GDR and
Yugoslavia could find a way towards a new arrangement.250 It is unclear whether this was an
honest proposal or a provocation, but the Yugoslavs could not realistically expect the GDR to
directly disregard Soviet foreign policy. Three days later, the East Germans presented a verbal
note to the Yugoslav legation in East Berlin, by which the East Germans rebuked the Yugoslav
change in policy, arguing, “[t]he treaty is based on the principle of proletarian internationalism.
In opposition to that, the Yugoslav side has now announced that economic relations must be
based on the principle of mutual advantage.” The East German government saw no reason to
reverse its policy and accept a bilateral treaty.251 The end of the aluminum treaty thus marked the
end of Yugoslavia’s rapprochement with Moscow, and weakened its already fragile relations
with the GDR.
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The damage Yugoslavia suffered from the withdrawal of Soviet and East German funds
was compounded by the nadir reached in its relations with the US, as discussed in the previous
chapter. Left without crucial financial support from both Blocs, Yugoslavia’s relations with the
GDR entered a period that resembled a truce more than a lull. As a result of this near isolation,
Tito probed the West Germans through his ambassadors in Brussels, Rome, and Jakarta to see
whether they would consider reestablishing relations.252 According to West German reports, the
Yugoslavs “urgently wanted” the renewal of bilateral relations.253 Adenauer was aware of Tito’s
dire situation and agreed to secret talks, which took place in Rome in September. The optimism
surrounding  the  meetings  dissipated  almost  immediately,  as  it  became  clear  that  each  side
wanted the other  one to  make the first  concession.  Yugoslavia believed that  by exchanging
envoys instead of ambassadors with the GDR it had already done all it could without further
damaging its relations with Moscow, while the West Germans did not want to compromise the
Hallstein doctrine by making concessions before Yugoslavia even downgraded its relations with
the GDR.254 The two countries abandoned the talks soon thereafter.
With the Eastern and Western avenues exhausted, Tito again turned towards the Global
South to bolster his international position. An internal Yugoslav report noted that the Soviet
attacks on Yugoslavia only improved Belgrade standing in the non-aligned world.255 With this in
mind, the Yugoslav president planned a tour of several non-aligned countries beginning with the
United Arab Republic in December. However, the approaching Berlin Crisis would pull him
back into the maelstrom of the European Cold War.
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The beginning of the Berlin Crisis
On November 10, 1958, Khrushchev made a speech that began a three year crisis centred
on the status of Berlin in the divided Germany. To be sure, Berlin had been a point of contention
since the beginning of the Allied occupation in 1945. The city had already experienced one
Superpower  confrontation  in  1948,  and  had  been  living  in  the  shadow of  constant  tension
between the US and USSR ever since. Khrushchev, on the other hand, had not been prone to
lashing out  like his  predecessor,  and he aimed to  use  Berlin  in  order  to  rid  himself  of  the
albatross that was the German Question. The Soviet leader explained: 
The time has obviously arrived for the signatories of the Potsdam Agreement to ...
create a normal situation in the capital of the German Democratic Republic. The
Soviet Union, for its part, would hand over to the sovereign German Democratic
Republic the functions in Berlin that are still exercised by Soviet agencies. . . . Let
the United States, France and Britain themselves ... reach agreement with [the GDR]
if they are interested in any questions concerning Berlin. As for the Soviet Union,
we  shall  sacredly  honor  our  obligations  as  an  ally  of  the  German  Democratic
Republic.256
Khrushchev’s speech could have been interpreted as mere posturing, but it was accompanied by
a twenty page memorandum published and distributed by the East Germans, which hinted at the
seriousness of the Soviet initiative.257 Khrushchev’s speech alarmed even the Yugoslavs, who
had a military mission in Berlin and were concerned with his intentions. When the East German
envoy Staimer delivered her government’s memorandum to the Yugoslav state undersecretary
256 As cited in Taubman, Khrushchev: The man and his Era, p. 396.
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Prica, she assured him that Khrushchev was not threatening unilateral action, but was merely
stating Soviet readiness to relinquish the last of its control in the GDR.258 Yugoslav concern was
significant enough for its  foreign ministry to request from its legal department an assessment
regarding  possible  ramifications  of  Khrushchev’s  latest  actions.  Their  conclusion  was  that,
judging by the speech, Khrushchev’s intentions were inconclusive, but that any unilateral action
would  not  be  a  violation  of  international  law  –  since  the  current  situation  outgrew  the
parameters set by the Potsdam agreement – as long as the rights of the other Powers and West
Germany  were  respected.259 Judging  by  this  assessment,  there  was  no  immediate  cause  for
Yugoslav action at this point, which probably suited Tito after the difficult year behind him.
However, on November 27, Khrushchev followed up his speech with a more concrete proposal
for solving the Berlin question. His plan was to force the Powers to sign a German peace treaty
wherein Berlin would become a free and demilitarized city. The deadline for the peace treaty
was six months, after which the Soviets would unilaterally transfer their authority in Berlin to
the East Germans.260 The Yugoslavs were now faced with a tangible problem, but they were still
avoiding taking a decisive stance, and when they finally did give a statement on the Berlin
situation to the foreign press, it seemed evasive. From a Soviet and East German point of view,
the  Yugoslav  press  was  even  less  supportive  of  their  cause,  since  their  content  allegedly
reflected a Western point of view, which the GDR saw as openly siding with the “imperialist
states.”261
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The Yugoslav  reaction  may have  irritated  the  East  Germans,  but  it  should  not  have
completely surprised them. Namely, an anti-Yugoslav campaign was simultaneously under way
in the GDR, which probably did not encourage Belgrade to offer its support over the Berlin
question. Started in early summer, following the termination of the aluminum treaty, the anti-
Yugoslav campaign in East Germany had intensified by mid-October. One of the criticisms was
that Yugoslavia’s policy of non-alignment was dangerous, since it allegedly equated the socialist
with the “imperialistic” bloc, and that the criticism of Yugoslavia in the 1948 conflict with the
Cominform  was  justified,  since  the  same  anti-socialist  tendencies  were  still  present  in
Yugoslavia’s  policies.  The  campaign  also  included  personal  attacks  on  Tito,  calling  him
“arrogant” and “conceited,” and a “leader of a small country that pretended to a leading role in
the international worker’s movement.”262 While the East Germans published these attacks using
the usual channels – the press and low-level party officials – the campaign also included attacks
from the highest levels of the SED. At a conference of fifteen Communist parties held in East
Berlin  in  July,  it  was  the  SED  leadership  which  suggested  that  a  “strong  judgment  of
revisionism, especially Yugoslav revisionism” be included in the final communiqué, and it was
only due to the Italian Communist Party delegation’s intervention that a milder assessment of
Yugoslav policies was included.263 By mid-December it became clear to the East Germans that
they would have to  change their  approach if  they were to  garner  support  from Yugoslavia,
especially in the public sphere. One of the issues was that all Yugoslav reports from Berlin were
filed by a correspondent for Tanjug (the Yugoslav national news agency) who was based in West
Berlin, and who seemed to only repeat the writing of the West German press. Thus the East
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Germans planned to focus their attention on this correspondent in order to change the GDR’s
image in the Yugoslav press. In Yugoslavia itself, part of the plan was to distribute propaganda
material  directly  to  the  major  national  newspapers,  organize  meetings  with  journalists  and
cultural circles, as well as show films dealing with the Berlin question. The East Germans hoped
that these measures would clarify to the Yugoslav public that Soviet proposal would lead to a
détente  rather  than  the  aggravation  of  the  German  question,  as  well  as  the  international
situation.264 
Envoy  Staimer  also  participated  in  the  East  German  charm  offensive.  During  a
conversation with the Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović, she praised the cleanliness of
the Yugoslav sleeper cars – “unlike the Bulgarian ones” – and pledged to visit all six Yugoslav
republics. Popović, on the other hand, was more concerned about an incident in East Berlin,
where a visiting Albanian delegation, lead by Enver Hoxha, had engaged in open criticism of
Yugoslavia during a reception in his honour.265 The Albanian tirade took place in the presence of
the  Yugoslav  envoy,  Mitja  Vošnjak,  who found this  outburst  offensive  enough to  leave  the
ceremony.266 Staimer  tried  to  brush  the  incident  aside,  blaming  the  Albanian  southern
temperament, and assured Popović that none of what Hoxha said would be included in the final
communiqué.267 It is true that Albania belonged to the group of socialist countries that were the
most critical of Yugoslavia (the others being China and Bulgaria).268 The Albanian criticism was
that much more jarring given the broken relationship between former allies Hoxha and Tito.269
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Nevertheless, the incident was a serious gaffe by the East Germans, especially in the midst of
their  propaganda  campaign  in  Yugoslavia,  and  pointed  towards  a  dissonance  in  the  GDR
structures that could not seem to reconcile their need for Yugoslav support and their animosity
towards Tito’s foreign policy.
Tito’s travels
On December 2, Tito embarked on a several month long journey throughout the non-
aligned world on his presidential yacht, Galeb (The Seagull).270 The motivation behind the trip
was not only to strengthen Yugoslavia's relations with other non-aligned countries, but to also
test the waters for the institutionalization of non-alignment. Drawing on experiences of the most
current events, it was clear to Tito that Yugoslavia’s precarious position in the bipolar world
order could only be strengthened by creating an organization of like-minded countries outside
the two Blocs.271 His first meeting was an unofficial one with Abdul Gamal Nasser, during the
Galeb’s passage through the Suez Canal. Speaking about Yugoslavia’s relation with the Soviet
Bloc, Tito shared his frustration with the Egyptian president: “...[E]conomic relations with W.
Germany are developing normally. They are fulfilling their commitments, so one can even say
that  they  are  acting  more  decently  than  the  USSR regarding  their  economic  commitments
towards us.”272 When discussing the latest  developments regarding Berlin  and Khrushchev’s
initiative, however, Tito was less prone to criticism. During the Indonesian leg of his trip, Tito
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told  the  Indonesian prime minister  Djuanda Kartawidjaja  that  Khrushchev’s  intentions  were
good and that the West should try and reach a solution of the Berlin question. Although the
Soviet proposal was flawed, it was up to the Western Powers to take advantage of Khrushchev’s
gesture.273 Throughout his Afro-Asian tour, Tito avoided discussing the GDR directly, opting to
refer only to the USSR as the party of interest in the Eastern half of Germany. He had no qualms
talking about the FRG.
Tito’s next stop was India, and here his aversion to acknowledging the GDR reached a
new level. Otto Grotewohl, the GDR’s prime minister who was on an unofficial state visit to
India at  the same time,  proposed a meeting with Tito,  which he declined.  In  addition,  Tito
requested that Grotewohl be “kept busy” outside New Delhi while the Yugoslav president was
visiting the Indian capital.274 The East Germans were aware of Tito’s relationship with Nehru,
and his attitude to Grotewohl probably did not help the East German prime minister’s mission,
which was to lobby for India’s recognition. Conversely, Grotewohl was most likely aware of
Tito’s current attitude,  and did not introduce Yugoslavia’s recognition as an argument in his
conversation with Nehru.275
It seemed that the incident in India did not encourage the East German leadership to
adopt a friendlier position regarding Yugoslavia. Upon his return from the 21st Congress of the
CPSU, Walter Ulbricht accused Yugoslavia of depending on “imperialistic” countries and for
being  a  member  of  the  NATO-sponsored  Balkan  Pact.  Ulbricht  was  only  repeating
Khrushchev’s words, but the intent to malign Yugoslavia’s foreign policy was mutual.276 At the
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same time, Siegfried Hoeldtke of the GDR’s Belgrade legation was reporting back to East Berlin
about the lack of affirmative reporting on the GDR in the Yugoslav press. The main complaint
was that all  the news items pertaining to the East German activities, numerous though they
were,  comprised only wire stories.  Hoeldtke gave as an example Grotewohl’s  tour  of Asia,
where the newspapers reported on his travels in a dry, factual manner, whereas the West German
reactions and opinions on this event were more detailed and given more space in the Yugoslav
press. The report lamented the general pro-Western bias in the Yugoslav press. This, according
to Hoeldtke,  was especially evident  in  the Yugoslav coverage of the German Question.  His
explanation was that the Yugoslavs neglected to separate their position on the GDR with the
international issue of a divided Germany, and failed to openly engage with the content of the
Soviet proposal.277
Khrushchev’s note also influenced the state of Yugoslavia’s relations with the FRG. The
West Germans understood that they could not count on Yugoslavia’s support without loosening
at least some of the constraints of their diplomatic break up. In early December of 1958, the
chairman and the editor-in-chief of the German national news agency DPA visited Belgrade for
negotiations  with  the  Tanjug  agency.  During  their  stay,  they  requested  a  meeting  with
undersecretary Prica, with the aim of finding out Yugoslavia’s position regarding the renewal of
diplomatic relations with the FRG. Prica answered that Yugoslavia was open to all possibilities,
and would welcome the reversal of the Hallstein doctrine, but that previous attempts – such as
the talks in Rome – did not build confidence for a mutually beneficial solution. Prica added that
the biggest obstacle was the West German demand for Yugoslavia to recall their envoy from
277 “Haltung der jugoslawischer Presse zur DDR und zum Deutschlandproblem.” (February 10, 1959) PA AA, 
MfAA, A 5071, pp. 31-33.
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East  Berlin.278 Yugoslavia  was  open  to  compromise,  but  after  the  lessons  learned  after  the
implementation of the Hallstein doctrine, it was not inclined to be reckless in their decision-
making. Therefore, while a reversal of the recognition was out of the question, the Yugoslavs
were less clear on “putting to sleep” their relations with the GDR, as Adenauer phrased it.279
This left room for optimistic speculations in Bonn.280 Thus, without a clear agenda, but with
both sides keen on improving relations, delegations from Yugoslavia and the FRG met in Venice
in February 1959, and attempted to assess their current relations and explore options for a way
forward. The circumstances were promising, but in the course of the talks it transpired that their
success again hinged on Yugoslavia’s willingness to venture beyond the limits of what they
thought was prudent. ‘Putting to sleep’ their relations with the GDR was a step too far.281 
Despite  the  Venice  talks  not  yielding  any  results,  they  did  at  least  show Bonn that
Belgrade was willing to discuss their bilateral issues. This was especially encouraging given
Yugoslavia’s general aversion towards forging closer ties with the GDR. This, in combination
with the new low in Yugo-Soviet relations, allowed Adenauer to maintain the status quo, which
was certainly more preferable than a deterioration in relations. It is also important to note that
the West Germans were not making an exception by offering a compromise to the Yugoslavs.
Privately,  Adenauer  was  equally  open  to  a  de  facto  recognition  of  the  GDR  –  a  de  jure
recognition was out of the question – which hinted towards a possible shift in Bonn’s German
policy.282 For the time being, the West German-Yugoslav relations would continue on the current
path. Not having to worry about Yugoslavia turned out to be a boon to Adenauer, who focused
278 “Zabeleška” (December 4, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 1324/i.
279 This figure of speech was used by Adenauer to symbolize any degree of a downgrade in Yugoslavia’s and the 
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his attention on the next Geneva conference of foreign ministers, to be held in May 1959. 283 The
East German-Yugoslav relations followed the same pattern, but East Berlin found little comfort
in the status quo.
An East  German assessment  of  the  Yugoslav  position  on  the  ‘West-Berlin  question’
found  that,  although  Yugoslavia  hailed  the  Soviet  plan  as  a  positive  development,  the
identification of “superpower bloc politics” as the root of the problem indicated that Yugoslavia
was  “trying  to  hold  a  hybrid  position”,  which  should  be  monitored  very  closely  in  future
negotiations  with  the  Yugoslavs.284 Again,  the  East  Germans  simply  could  not  accept
Yugoslavia’s non-alignment. As soon as Belgrade’s position did not align perfectly with that of
Moscow and East Berlin, the officials in the GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MfAA) saw it as
a dangerous deviation that needed to be remedied.
The interactions between Yugoslav diplomats in East Berlin and their hosts attested to
the icy relations and mistrust between the two countries. In February, the East Germans banned
a showing of a Yugoslav film, citing its “inappropriateness” for local audiences, and argued that
they wanted to spare the Yugoslavs the embarrassment of audience members walking out. In
another interaction, the East Germans berated envoy Vošnjak for displaying in open sight the
program of the 7th SKJ congress on their book stand at the Leipzig Trade Fair, “where it could
have been taken by anyone.” The Yugoslavs pleaded ignorance, but it later transpired that the
publishing  companies  displayed  the  programs  on  their  own and  only  gave  them out  when
someone requested them. To Vošnjak it seemed that the East German reaction was exaggerated,
283 The three Western powers agreed on February 16 to hold the conference as a response to the Soviet draft of a 
peace treaty for Germany, published on January 10.
284 “Verhalten Jugoslawiens zum Abschluß des Friedensvertrages mit Deutschland und zur Lösung der West-
Berlin-Frage” (April 27, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A C 369/75, pp. 50-55.
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since he believed that the people who did take a program were all secret police agents, since
regular citizens would have been too afraid to ask for one.285 These incidents, while small, were
not  insignificant.  They were symptomatic  of the state  of  cultural  relations between the two
countries: generally very poor, and sporadic at best.286 They also exposed the unwillingness of
the East Germans – and to an extent the Yugoslavs as well – to mend their crumbling relations.
However,  the East  Germans were far  from nonchalant  about  Yugoslavia’s  contacts  with the
FRG. 
The East German deputy foreign minister Sepp Schwab attempted to extract information
about the Yugo-FRG Venice talks from Vošnjak, who promised to inquire about the matter with
Belgrade.287 Staimer and her staff tried to find out more in Belgrade, but it seemed that the only
source  available  to  their  contacts  was  a  Social  Democratic  Party  of  Germany  (SPD)
correspondent, who was willing to share only the most general information about the talks.288
Vošnjak returned a couple of weeks later, and almost teasingly informed Schwab that he now
had more information, but was unable to share more than he did during their last conversation.
However, Vošnjak was willing to discuss other matters in more detail, namely the visit of a SPD
delegation in Belgrade.289 
Led by deputy Bundestag fraction leader Fritz Erler, the SPD delegation was welcomed
with  open arms,  and their  talks  with  SKJ officials  were  friendly.  The  SPD delegation  was
285 Interestingly, the East Germans omitted any mention of Yugoslavia in the Leipzig Trade Fair program. “Pregled
pošte iz DR Nemačke” (April 2, 1959), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 237/i.
286 There were, however, some improvements. A Yugoslav report from 1960 noted that a plan of cultural 
cooperation was in the works, mostly due to the East Germans finally showing some interest for its 
establishment. Also, according to the report, cooperation in sports was satisfactory. “Informacija o Nemačkoj 
demokratskoj republici” (April 20, 1960), KPR I-3-a/82-2, doc. no. 271/i.
287 “Vermerk” (March 20, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5072, pp. 21-22.
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289 “Vermerk” (April 3, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5072, pp. 24-32.
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returning from Moscow, where they met with Khrushchev and presented their  new plan for
solving the German Question. They introduced the plan to their Belgrade hosts as well, and told
them that they supported the unconditional renewal of diplomatic relations between the FRG
and Yugoslavia, while criticising Adenauer as “reactionary.”290 However, the two delegations
found  little  common  ground  as  far  as  the  current  division  of  Germany  was  concerned.291
Nevertheless, Erler also invited a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation to West Germany, where he
“would secure for the delegation contact with the government in Bonn.”292
After Vošnjak informed Schwab about this visit, the latter argued that it remained to be
seen whether the SPD was simply paying lip service to German reunification.293 The discussion
was immaterial, since the SPD was not able to gain Khrushchev’s support for their plan. East
Berlin was equally loathe to consider the SPD plan, which proposed a German confederation,
but the Soviets instructed the East Germans to feign interest, in order to stimulate the SPD left
wing’s support for the SED. However, this campaign fizzled out with the Geneva summit a few
months later, and its death was confirmed with the change in SPD’s direction in late 1959.294 On
November 13, at its congress in Bad Godesberg, the SPD had decided that the party should
“modernize” and become a catch-all party, which meant leaving behind its traditional goal of
building socialism, which also meant distancing itself even more from Moscow.295
A much more urgent issue for Belgrade was the anti-Yugoslav campaign in the Soviet
Bloc that began at the 21st CPSU Congress in February, but showed no signs of abating. Vošnjak
290 “Zabeleška” (March 26, 1959), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 213/i-59.
291 The SPD believed that the USSR intended to make the division of Germany permanent with their latest 
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asked the East Germans for support in this matter, but was rudely interrupted by Schwab, who
told him that this was not an East German concern, and that Vošnjak “knew the address” where
he should direct his complaints, alluding to the source of the campaign in the Kremlin. From
that point on, the tone of the meeting escalated, with both sides demanding support for their
policies, which they both believed was unreciprocated. At the end of the conversation, Vošnjak
attempted to unofficially solicit the GDR’s support for Yugoslavia’s bid to expand the number of
participants at the Geneva summit, but Schwab berated him, saying that the GDR is presently
concerned only with its own participation.296 
The  truth  about  the  anti-Yugoslav  campaign,  of  course,  was  somewhere  between
Yugoslavia’s  and  East  Germany’s  respective  positions.  The  East  German  government  was
following the direction set  by Khrushchev at  the CPSU Congress, albeit  in a less ferocious
manner than some other Soviet satellites. A possible reason for this was that they did indeed
require Yugoslavia’s help in the international arena. The East Germans were probably relieved
when they read former Yugoslav ambassador in the FRG Mladen Iveković’s editorial in the SKJ
party organ Borba. Iveković criticized Adenauer’s government for effectively trying to use the
Venice talks to take advantage of the alleged precarious relations between Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Bloc – including the GDR – to reaffirm the Hallstein Doctrine. Iveković went on to
condemn Adenauer for doing so months before the Geneva Conference, and for failing to work
together  with  the  SPD  regarding  German  reunification.297 Iveković’s  editorial  smacked  of
defensiveness.  Yugoslavia  was feeling  vulnerable  as  a  result  of  Khrushchev’s  anti-Yugoslav
campaign,  as  evidenced  by  Vošnjak’s  meeting  with  Schwab,  and  it  did  not  appreciate
296 Ibid.
297 “Mißerfolge einer ‘Doktrin’” (April 1, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5701, pp. 46-48.
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Adenauer’s proposal for Yugoslavia to ‘put to sleep’ its relations with the GDR. At the same
time,  Belgrade was not  inclined to improve its  relations with East  Berlin  as long as it  was
participating in attacks on Yugoslavia. Temporary relief came in mid-1959, although not from
Yugoslavia’s own strength or diplomatic prowess, but from Moscow.
The 1959 Geneva summit
In late  spring of  1959,  the  Soviets  were  preparing  for  the  Geneva Summit,  and the
continuation of attacks on Yugoslavia in their current form and intensity, would have reflected
poorly on Khrushchev and even weakened his position at the summit, which would force him to
go on the defensive in front of the other Powers. Therefore, Khrushchev decided to deescalate
the  conflict  with  Belgrade.  Some  Soviet  statements  around  this  period  did  indicate  a
considerable deescalation of the Yugo-Soviet conflict,  but the Yugoslav leadership dismissed
Kremlin’s overtures. The Yugoslavs believed that the Soviets had no real intentions to improve
relations.298 
Rather, Belgrade saw these olive branches, and rightly so, as part of the Soviet charm
offensive. This mini-thaw, however, did allow the GDR and Yugoslavia to discuss the Summit
under somewhat less strained circumstances. In a conversation with the MfAA Yugoslav section
head Otto Becker, the Yugoslav press attaché in East Berlin, Veselin Lazović, attempted to gain
some  clarity  on  the  GDR’s  position  before  the  summit,  in  particular  regarding  the  GDR’s
position on Yugoslavia’s efforts to expand the circle of participants at the conference. After a
prolonged discussion about mass organization cooperation, Lasović finally addressed the issue
298 Đoko Tripković, Jugoslavija - SSSR: 1956-1971 (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2013), pp. 102-103.
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at hand. The East Germans could offer no satisfying answer, and directed Lasović to the earlier
conversation between Schwab and Vošnjak. Given the way that particular conversation ended,
one  can  conclude  that  the  East  Germans  were  not  inclined  to  lobby  for  Yugoslavia’s
participation,  especially  after  Lazović  conceded  that  there  was  not  much  interest  in  the
conference among Yugoslav workers.299 The lack of support for this bid bothered the Yugoslavs,
but the East Germans brushed their grievances aside, arguing that the Geneva summit was not a
peace conference, and that not anyone could attend it, and, after all, it was only due to Soviet
intervention that the GDR was able to attend the summit. As for Poland and Czechoslovakia,
who  did  receive  support  in  this  matter  from  the  GDR,  well,  they  were  East  Germany’s
neighbours, and as such did have a direct interest in the summit.300 Not wanting to press the
issue further and escalating it to a formal complaint, the Yugoslavs backed away. 
The GDR’s and Yugoslavia’s  inability  to  come to an agreement  stemmed from their
disparate foreign policies, and ultimately, their ideological differences and allegiances. The East
Germans denied the Yugoslavs their support because they rejected Belgrade’s apparent desire to
barter for favours. The GDR understood that the Yugoslavs offered a quid pro quo arrangement,
where  the  Yugoslavs  would  support  the  East  German  foreign  policy  in  exchange  for  their
support for participating at  the summit.  East Berlin assessed this  offer as disingenuous,  and
essentially antithetical to socialist internationalism as practised by the Soviet Bloc countries.301
From the Yugoslav perspective,  there was no obligation to  obey the Bloc code of  conduct.
Belgrade’s  proposal  slotted  neatly  in  their  active  coexistence  policy,  which  advocated
cooperation  between  countries  that  did  not  depend  on  bloc  alliances,  but  in  fact  aimed  to
299 “Aktenvermerk” (May 11, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5701, pp. 55-58.
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overcome them.302 The Yugoslavs were ultimately unable to obtain a seat at the table in Geneva
after failing to secure Western backing as well, since the rest of the Powers saw no reason why a
country, which from their perspective, was aligned with the USSR on this matter, should be
allowed to participate at the summit. This constituted a considerable setback to Yugoslavia’s
foreign policy, since Belgrade saw itself as a natural intermediary between the blocs.
The Geneva summit began on May 11, 1959, and ended three months later. The circle of
participants remained small as initially intended, with the Four Powers, represented by their
foreign ministers seated at the large, central table. In addition, there were three smaller tables,
which the West German press dubbed the Katzentische, the children’s tables (literally the ‘cats’
tables’). On the central small table sat the summit’s secretariat, to their left sat the East German
delegation headed by the foreign minister Lothar Bolz,  and on their  right the West German
delegation, led by the state secretary Wilhelm Grewe.303 The seating arrangement showed that
the delegations from the two Germanies were treated as equals for the first time since 1951, no
small victory for the East Germans.304 However, the three Western powers were also quick to
point out that the GDR’s participation was not an unofficial act of recognition. Naturally, the
USSR saw it as just that.305 Western observers understood that Khrushchev’s intention – in the
face of the fast approaching deadline he himself imposed on the other three powers regarding
Berlin – was “the confirmation of the status quo.”306 Thus, they did not expect too much from
the conference, especially with the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko on the other side.307
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Ultimately, the summit yielded no real results in terms of solving the German question, but it did
bring the powers together in order to probe the concerns on both sides, and temporarily ended
the tense situation over Berlin. Khrushchev reneged on his Berlin ultimatum, agreeing to the
other three powers staying on in Berlin for the time being. 
Conversely, the East Germans were initially far more enthusiastic about their debut on
the global diplomatic stage. The West German press even reported that the Soviets reprimanded
the  delegation  from East  Berlin  because of  its  aggressiveness  during  the conference’s  early
days.308 Therefore, the staff of the GDR’s Belgrade legation was understandably irritated by the
lack of summit coverage in the Yugoslav press. They reported back to East Berlin that there was
little  content  on  the  summit  in  general  and  when  there  was  any,  it  was  void  of  editorial
commentary. Even worse was the coverage of the GDR’s delegation’s activities. The Yugoslav
correspondent from Geneva chose to write about the “essentially identical” positions instead of
“the great differences” between the two German delegations.309 At the same time, Tito stated in a
speech that he expected the powers to de facto recognize the GDR, since the existence of two
Germanies with two different social and political systems could not be overlooked, and that the
reunification was a problem that had to be solved by Germans alone.310 
Since the East Germans did not believe the Yugoslavs supported them in earnest and had
made clear to Belgrade that any sort of exchange of favours was unlikely, Tito’s statement could
most likely be attributed to the lingering Yugoslav desire to participate in the discussion over the
German Question. In one internal report which outlined Yugoslavia’s foreign policy’s approach
308 “GENF / DEUTSCHE FRAGE: Die Birne,” Der Spiegel, May 20, 1959, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-
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99
to the GDR, one MfAA analysts even went as far as to describe it as “petty bourgeois,” and, as
such, failed to acknowledge the differences between the socialist and capitalist societies, which
made Belgrade’s wish to treat Bonn and East Berlin as equals a simple fig leaf for its self-
serving  interests.311 Since  the  GDR believed  that  Belgrade’s  statements  of  intent  were  not
sincere, it was up to the GDR to inform the Yugoslavs of the dangerous tendencies in West
Germany.312 However, the report concluded, due to the potential benefits of Yugoslav support
during the Geneva conference, the Soviets were willing to overlook the negative aspects of their
foreign  policy.313 Disregarding  actual  Soviet  policy  toward  Yugoslavia  during  the  Geneva
summit, this report indicates that the East Germans were less inclined to strike out on their own
as far as Yugoslavia was concerned, and that in East Berlin Soviet considerations were still
given precedence when creating the GDR’s Yugoslav policies.
When the  Geneva summit  ended  on August  5,  1959,  Germany  was  nowhere  nearer
reunification.  For  the  most  part,  the  status  quo  was  maintained.  Khrushchev’s  visit  to
Washington  in  September  failed  to  deliver  the  great  breakthrough  regarding  the  German
Question, although the Americans promised Khrushchev a summit meeting in the spring of next
year. And as the year drew to a close, chancellor Adenauer stated – and the Berlin mayor Willy
Brandt agreed with him – that no change in the current status of Berlin would be preferable, and
that Berlin should be integral to any future talks about the German Question.314 The relations
between  Yugoslavia  and  the  two Germanies  were  likewise  generally  unchanged.  Bonn and
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Belgrade continued their economic cooperation while at the same time keeping their diplomatic
relations  broken  off,  while  the  relations  between  East  Berlin  and  Belgrade  followed  the
oscillating Yugo-Soviet relations. Within this framework, however, there were some significant
changes in each of the relations.
New positions
In November of 1959, the SPD adopted a new party program with which they broke
away  from their  Marxist  revolutionary  past,  but  equally  as  important,  changed  its  German
policy,  since  giving  “priority  to  German  reunification  over  the  Federal  Republic's  Western
integration  seemed  to  lead  the  party  even  further  along  a  dead  end  road,  and  doom it  to
additional years of stagnation.”315 The rejection of Marxian foundations was most likely not
welcomed in Belgrade, and the SPD’s turn towards Western integration definitely meant that the
Yugoslavs lost a reliable and sympathetic interlocutor in Bonn. In a speech given at a party rally
in  Zagreb  on December  14,  Tito  criticized  Adenauer’s  refusal  to  recognize  the  reality  of  a
divided Germany, but hoped that “there will be found people in West Germany who, sooner or
later, will realize this as a fact which they have to take into account.”316 Given the SPD’s shift
towards the centre and thereby closer to Adenauer, it is unclear who Tito had in mind when he
gave this speech.
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The economic relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia also seemed to have been
suffering during this period. The trade agreement extension for 1959 was only signed after the
deadline had passed, and the position of the economic advisor at the Zagreb consulate was left
vacant between November 1959 and February 1960.317 Although the economic relations were
undoubtedly better than the diplomatic ones for obvious reasons, due to the lack of political
support they too were beginning to suffer under the strain of the Hallstein doctrine.
The deterioration of one set of relations did not imply the improvement of the other.
After  the  Geneva  summit,  the  GDR’s  foreign  policy  became  more  rigid.  East  German
disappointment with the Soviet fumbling over the German question, combined with the ever
growing numbers of refugees fleeing to the West, spurred the SED to change course.318 Ulbricht
demanded not only support, but also action from Khrushchev, while simultaneously escalating
attacks on the FRG, especially the SPD. The GDR and Yugoslavia were unable to build on the
mutual  aversion  to  the  SPD’s  transformation,  since  the  SED  found  more  similarities  than
differences between the SKJ and the SPD than differences, and openly criticized them for this
imagined overlap.319 The East  German indictment  was familiar:  Yugoslav “revisionism” and
anti-bloc position were no better than anything coming out of the FRG, echoing East Berlin’s
position in the early 1950s.320 As a result,  at the beginning of 1960 the Yugoslav pendulum
between the two Germanies was faintly swaying around the centre. Having failed to insert itself
in the international discussion over the German Question, Yugoslavia had reached a new nadir in
European politics. 
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The bickering between the GDR and Yugoslavia continued throughout the spring of 1960
but was mainly limited to the press.321 Then, a brief respite occurred in the mid-1960. First, a
group  of  East  German  observers  from the  National  Front  attended  the  5th Congress  of  its
Yugoslav counterpart the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ), which
was the largest mass organization in Yugoslavia.  Its  goal was the ideological education and
political participation of the Yugoslav population without the burden of actual membership in
the SKJ. During their stay, the National Front delegates met with a number of Yugoslav party
officials, as well as president Tito. Although their meeting with Tito was somewhat awkward –
Tito had indirectly told the East Germans that their attempts at collectivization were bound to
fail, based on Yugoslav experiences – their stay in Yugoslavia seemed to have been a mostly
positive experience.322 This was most likely the result of the absence of contact between the
delegates and the Belgrade GDR legation that, according to a Yugoslav report,  was actively
avoiding meeting them. Being members of an organization that had only the most rudimentary
ideological  education,  and  having  no  instructions  from  the  East  German  diplomats,  they
probably decided not to engage in political debate with Tito, and limited their comments on the
more technical aspects of their particular field of expertise.323 
Later, after finally meeting with the Belgrade legation staff, the delegates did engage in
discussion with local officials on Yugoslavia’s social system, as well as its foreign policy, but
without the vitriolic tone so familiar to Yugoslavs from their previous contacts with the East
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Germans.324 Regardless  of  the circumstances,  this  was a  clear  improvement  in  the  relations
between East Berlin and Belgrade. On the heels of the National Front delegation came the visit
of an East German parliamentary delegation led by the People’s Chamber’s president Johannes
Dieckmann. In their conversation with Tito, which was conducted in a friendly atmosphere, the
East Germans thanked him for his speech at the SSRNJ congress, wherein he indirectly attacked
the FRG, and made pro-Soviet remarks.325 Apart  from that,  the conversation centred on the
GDR’s and Yugoslavia’s respective achievements, with both sides openly discussing various
aspects of socialist state building and the economy.326 The relations Belgrade and East Berlin
had not been this friendly since the recognition, but they were not to last more than a few weeks.
Again, the international situation obstructed the reconciliation.
The failed Paris summit and the 15th United Nations General Assembly
On May 1, an American U-2 spy plane crashed in the USSR while on a reconnaissance
mission.  The  pilot  survived  and  was  captured  by  the  Soviets.  Khrushchev  was  rightfully
incensed, but decided to keep the pilot’s capture secret from the public while he deliberated his
future course of action. An event worthy of an international scandal in itself, the damage done to
the US-USSR relations by this incident was compounded by its timing. A new Four Power
summit was to take place in Paris on May 16, and while Khrushchev decided to attend it despite
324 For example, the East Germans indicated that Yugoslavia’s non-alignment could be discussed, and refrained 
from rejecting it. “Zabeleška” (April, 1960), 507/IX 86/I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.
325 FRUS, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 155. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/ch4
326 “Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika republike Josipa Broza Tita sa članovima parlamentarne delegacije DR 
Nemačke s predsednikom parlamenta Johanes Dikmanom na čelu” (April 29, 1960), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-2, doc. 
no. 2196/2.
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the  incident,  the  crash  was weighing too  heavily on the  Soviet  leader.  He felt  betrayed by
president Eisenhower, who had authorized the mission. Just days before his departure to Paris,
Khrushchev decided to sabotage the summit with the revelation that the pilot was in Soviet
hands.327 From the Soviet perspective, the only thing that could have saved the summit was an
apology from Eisenhower,  but  the  American  president  refused to  do so,  thereby effectively
ending the talks.328 The news of the U-2 plane and the collapse of the Paris summit also set in
motion a series of events that stopped the GDR-Yugoslav rapprochement.  On May 17, Tito
touched upon the failed summit in a speech at a rally in Subotica. In the speech, Tito blamed the
US for authorizing the spy plane missions,  but concluded that this incident did not warrant
Soviet withdrawal. Holding a non-aligned position inevitably earned Tito a salvo of criticism
from Socialists. Leading the charge were Albania and China, who derided Belgrade for “serving
imperialism.”329 
China, which had been one of the most vocal critics of Yugoslavia ever since the Tito-
Stalin split, had by 1960 become heavily entrenched in an ideological conflict with the USSR.
Beijing questioned Moscow’s leadership of the socialist camp, and the U-2 incident provided
more fodder for the Chinese leader, Mao Tse-Tung, who not only felt vindicated for his mistrust
of Eisenhower – thereby indirectly criticizing Khrushchev’s perceived gullibility and weakness
– but also used the incident to pursue stronger influence among socialist countries.330 The East
327  Taubman, Khrushchev: The man and his Era, pp. 459-460.
328 See William B. Pickett, “Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair: A Forty-Six-Year Retrospective” in 
Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), Presidents, Diplomats, and Other Mortals: Essays Honoring Robert H. Ferrell 
(University of Missouri Press, 2007); For two recent assessments of Eisenhower’s tenure, including his 
handling of the U-2 incident, see Louis Galambos, Eisenhower: Becoming the Leader of the Free World 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017); William I. Hitchcock, The Age of Eisenhower: America 
and the World in the 1950s (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).
329 “Yugoslav-Soviet Skirmish over Broken Summit” (May 23, 1960), HU OSA 300-8-3. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:80cd3923-27d7-4447-91de-1c2f1ae3d5e4
330 Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008), p. 165.
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Germans were trying to keep a low profile in the Sino-Soviet conflict, believing that improved
relations with China could aid their foreign policy in Asia, and found common ground with the
Chinese in criticizing Yugoslavia.331
The East Germans found that Tito had reverted to his “old tendencies.”332 Tito’s position
was truly reflective of Yugoslavia’s non-alignment, but it was peculiar that it came just weeks
after he voiced support for Khrushchev at the SSRNJ congress. It is possible that that speech
was  tailored  to  his  audience,  namely  the  representatives  of  various  foreign  socialist  mass
organizations,  but  the  speech  in  Subotica  represented  Tito’s  endorsement  of  a  non-aligned
policy, which he would soon take to the global stage.
Around the time of the Paris summit, Tito began preparations for the United Nations
General Assembly in September.333 After the failure of acquiring an invitation to the Geneva
summit,  the General  Assembly presented  itself  as  an even better  substitute  for  a  chance to
promote Yugoslavia’s foreign policy. Unlike during the buildup to the summit, Yugoslavia did
not have to lobby for an invitation, and would also have a larger, global audience. Furthermore,
Tito  had  secured  the  Egyptian  president  Nasser’s  support  prior  to  the  conference,  thereby
amplifying  his  message  of  non-alignment.334 Between  the  breakdown  of  talks  between
Khrushchev and Eisenhower and the escalation of the crisis in Congo, the German Question was
going to be pushed to the side at the 15th UN General Assembly, even though the West German
331 In a rare example of willful divergence away from Moscow’s control, the East Germans’ were able to send a 
delegation to Beijing in 1961, without Moscow’s approval, to discuss the Berlin crisis and the political status of
Taiwan. Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, p. 168.
332 Letter from Vosseler to the MfAA, Sektion Jugoslawien, (May 17, 1960), PA AA, MfAA, A 5130, p. 12.
333 Tito had sent an envoy to several African nations in May 1960 as part of these preparations. Petrović, Titova 
lična diplomatija, p. 167.
334 Bogetić, Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike, pp. 342-343.
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weekly  Die Welt  claimed that Tito was planning to address it on the East River.335 The East
Germans also dismissed this claim as a provocation, since such a bold move would have to be
coupled  with  a  proposed  solution,  or  at  least  a  strong  position  on  the  German  Question,
something that Yugoslavia had been stubbornly refusing to do for years.336 However, the East
Germans were concerned with the FRG’s military’s recent request for nuclear armament. With
this  in  mind,  the  East  German  counsellor  in  Belgrade  Walter  Vosseler  met  with  Veljko
Mićunović, who had taken the position of the state undersecretary after his return from Moscow,
and informed him that the GDR would be initiating a campaign for nuclear disarmament for
both Germanies in front of the General Assembly. Vosseler, an experienced communist who had
survived  the  Spanish  Civil  War,  Stalin’s  purges,  and  German  concentration  camps,  did  not
divulge the  details  of  the  East  German campaign,  but  Mićunović professed that  Yugoslavia
shared the same position, saying that “the GDR activity in New York, as part of general activity
against nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr [...] was a desirable and positive measure that will
enjoy the support of everyone who condemns this militaristic conception of [the FRG] as a
dangerous threat  to  peace.”337 Mićunović  concluded that  the  Yugoslav position  towards  this
campaign would, in general terms, be positive.338 This was as close to a complete endorsement
that the GDR had received from Yugoslavia since the recognition in 1957, but it was more an
indication of Yugoslav non-alignment than an olive branch offering to the East Germans. In fact,
the  East  Germans  acknowledged  the  sincerity  of  this  statement  because  they  believed  that
Yugoslavia was indeed extremely worried about West German nuclear armament.339 Another
335 “Tito und Nasser beraten über UNO-Lösung für Berlin,” Die Welt, May 24, 1960, in PA AA, MfAA, A 5130, p. 
23.
336 Letter from Vosseler to Becker, June 14, 1960. PA AA, MfAA, A 5130, pp. 25-26.
337 “Zabeleška” (September 9, 1960), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 544/i.
338 Ibid.
339 Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin, pp. 100-101.
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indication that the Yugoslavs were actually supporting the East Germans was that there was no
reaction from Belgrade when the East Germans introduced special passes for West Berliners
wishing to travel outside the three Western Zones.340
In  the  midst  of  the  Yugoslav  preparations  for  the  General  Assembly,  Tito  met  with
George Kennan, the former US ambassador to  the USSR, who at  the time was working at
Princeton and was attending an academic conference in Belgrade.341 According to Kennan, Tito
believed the Soviet plan for Berlin as a free city made no sense if it did not include East Berlin
as well, which was a concession the Soviets – or the East Germans – were not willing to make.
As for Yugoslav relations with the FRG, Tito “laughed about the German break with Yugoslavia,
saying that it had hardly affected the course of events at all.”342
The Yugoslavs truly did not seem to be overly concerned about the lack of resolution
between them and the FRG. As long as the cogs of their economic relations were oiled and
moving at a satisfactory rate, the diplomacy could wait. Such was the Yugoslav confidence that
their plans for a foreign exchange reform relied partially on the availability of a West German
loan.343 Therefore, there was realistically no danger of Tito bringing up the German Question at
the UN. During his speech to the General Assembly, Tito addressed a wide range of subjects.
340 “DDR-Behörden erkennen bei Westberlinern nur noch Westberliner Personalausweis, nicht aber Bundespaß, als
legitimes Dokument an” [Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: September, P. 60. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv 
der Gegenwart, P. 14789 (cf. AdG Bd. 3, P. 2698)]
341 Kennan was the US ambassador to the USSR for several months in 1952, and was the author of the “Long 
Telegram,” an outline of a containment strategy aimed at stopping Communist expansion in Europe, which 
informed much of president Truman’s Soviet policy. He would become the US ambassador in Yugoslavia in 
1961. See John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life, (New York: Penguin Books, 2012); For 
Kennan’s time in Belgrade see Dragan Bisenić, Mister X - Džordž Kenan u Beogradu (1961-1963) (Klub Plus, 
2011).
342 FRUS, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 161. 
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The  majority  of  his  speech  was  dedicated  to  the  developments  in  Africa  and  the  end  of
colonialism, but he also touched upon the “revival of militarism” in the FRG.344 The decision to
focus on the FRG was conspicuous. On September 13, just over a week before the UN General
Assembly, Ulbricht had introduced visas for West Berliners entering East Berlin.345 However,
Tito’s speech in New York did not reflect his actions, because his efforts behind the scenes were
focused on rapprochement between the Superpowers. Supported by a coalition he formed with
Nehru,  Nasser,  Sukarno  and  Nkrumah,  Tito  sponsored  a  resolution  that  called  for  the
superpowers to resume talks. Despite the resolution narrowly losing the vote at the General
Assembly due to opposing votes from US-aligned countries (the socialist bloc was sustained),
Tito’s five state initiative was a bold statement by the non-aligned leaders. In a conversation
with Tito during the Assembly,  US president Kennedy said,  “that he understood the neutral
position of Yugoslavia, but expressed the hope that as the old saying went, it would be neutral
on our side.” It seemed that Kennedy was not pleased with Tito’s initiative.346 Although the
international press falsely was this campaign as a founding moment of a third Cold War bloc,
there was no denying that a new, strong voice in global politics, which challenged both the
Soviets and the Americans, had emerged at the UN.347 
As much as Yugoslavia’s new role at the UN grabbed the world’s attention, it did little to
improve its relations with the GDR and the FRG. This was most likely due to the Yugoslav
decision to focus on other matters in New York, but even Tito’s activities in general did not elicit
a response from the German press. The competition between the two Germanies in Yugoslavia
344 “Tito's Speech in the General Assembly of the United Nations,” (September 24, 1960), HU OSA 300-8-3. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:a8ab6fc7-418d-4af1-8263-061924a7b961
345 Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, p. 133.
346 FRUS, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 170.
347 Bogetić, Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike, p. 343.
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manifested itself even as Tito was forging new alliances at the UN. The Zagreb Fair, the largest
in the country, hosted exhibits from both countries, and the East German press informed the
public of the prominence of the GDR exhibits and the success they enjoyed at the fair, from Tito
visiting their pavilion and inquiring about the achievements of the Carl Zeiss-Jena works, to the
‘Day of the GDR’, attended by 300 Yugoslav dignitaries and foreign diplomats.348 But the East
German legation reports to East Berlin were marked with concern about the FRG’s presence at
the fair. Reportedly, they had their own brand new pavilion, as well as an information stand
staffed with West German officials. It worried the East Germans that the West Germans might
have an even larger presence at the fair than they did.349 Although this seemed like a relatively
insignificant issue, the East Germans were most likely aware that the Zagreb Fair dwarfed the
GDR showpiece fair in Leipzig – which took place earlier that month – at least in terms of non-
Eastern Bloc participants, a fact even the West German press picked up on.350 Hence, avoiding
being outdone by the FRG in Yugoslavia (of all countries) was indeed an issue worth fretting
over  for  the East  Germans,  however  inconsequential  to actually  making a  difference in  the
GDR’s  international  prestige.  A small  contribution  to  the  latter  arrived  in  December,  when
Yugoslavia and the GDR finally signed a new four-year trade agreement, which ambitiously
proposed that the economic exchange in 1961 increase by almost 160 percent in comparison to
1960.351
While this new agreement was still  just a fraction of the economic exchange volume
between the FRG and Yugoslavia, it clearly showed that the economic relations between East
348 “Raum für Frühjahrsmesse is bald vergeben” Berliner Zeitung (Berlin, GDR), September 14, 1960; “Tag der 
DDR in Zagreb” Neues Deutschland (Berlin, GDR), September 22, 1960.
349 Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin, p. 99.
350 “Schwarze Messe in Leipzig” Die Zeit, September 16, 1960. http://www.zeit.de/1960/38/schwarze-messe-in-
leipzig
351 Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin, p. 101.
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Berlin  and Belgrade  were  moving  along,  however  slowly  and  meanderingly.  In  this  sense,
Yugoslavia’s relations with the GDR began to look increasingly like the ones with the FRG.
That is to say, the economic element was developing independently from the political one, and
for the most part, the former was more advanced than the latter. However, as was typical for
these relations, the current situation would not be maintained as status quo. In the spring of
1961,  following  the  moderate  success  of  a  non-aligned  coalition’s  debut  at  the  UN,  the
Yugoslavs announced that a conference of the non-aligned countries would take place later that
year. The conference would provide another arena for the GDR’s attempts at breaking through
the Hallstein doctrine, with Yugoslavia playing a key part, not as an ally, but as a defensive host.
Conclusion
After the initial shock of Yugoslavia’s recognition of the GDR wore off, it seemed that not much
has changed in the relations between Belgrade, East Berlin, and Bonn. Yugoslavia retained the
crucial economic ties with West Germany, while the recognition did little to diminish Soviet and
East German antipathy towards Yugoslavia’s brand of socialism. However, between 1958 and
1960, the German question did have an effect on how Yugoslavia conducted its foreign policy.
Khrushchev’s November 1958 decision to instigate the Berlin Crisis had a far reaching
effect on how Tito viewed the world. The resulting diplomatic standoff between the USSR and
the US over Berlin put the Yugoslav leader in a precarious position. The reasons for this were of
ideological nature. The gains of the post-Stalinist rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the
USSR had melted away by early 1958, mostly over the contents of the new SKJ program, which
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did not align ideologically with the CPSU. The Soviets launched an anti-Yugoslav campaign
soon thereafter, and the Yugoslavs responded in kind. In June 1958, after Khrushchev criticized
Yugoslavia for accepting US aid, Tito famously retorted:
Comrade Khrushchev often repeats that Socialism cannot be built with American
wheat. I think it can be done by anyone who knows how to do it, while a person who
doesn't  know  how  to  do  it  cannot  build  Socialism  even  with  his  own  wheat.
Khrushchev says we live on charity received from the imperialist countries … What
moral right have those who attack us to rebuke us about American aid or credits
when Khrushchev himself has just tried to conclude an economic agreement with
America?352
The poor relations between Moscow and Belgrade naturally precluded any outright Yugoslav
support for Khrushchev’s Berlin plan. The matter was hardly helped by Ulbricht's participation
in Moscow’s anti-Yugoslav campaign. Although the East Germans attempted to deviate from the
course set by Moscow, their efforts were not enough to entice Tito to assume their position.
Tito’s  initial  reaction  to  the  Soviet  Bloc  attacks  was  to  seek  rapprochement  with  the  West
Germans,  but  here  Yugoslavia  stumbled  on chancellor  Adenauer’s  first  and most  important
requirement, namely the ‘downgrading’ of relations with the GDR. 
Aware that any such ‘downgrading’ would only worsen his relations with Moscow, Tito
turned his attention to improving Yugoslavia’s international status by forging even closer ties
with the non-aligned countries, with a long term goal of institutionalizing non-alignment. In
1959 Tito visited several non-aligned leaders, and it seemed that finding interlocutors interested
in developing relations outside of the two Blocs appeared to have renewed Tito’s commitment to
non-alignment. Tito criticized both Superpowers after the failed Paris Summit in May 1960, and
352 Jasper Godwin Ridley, Tito (London: Constable, 1994), p. 348.
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helped organize a non-aligned voting group at  the United Nations General Assembly whose
intent  was  to  bring  the  US  and  the  USSR  back  to  the  negotiating  table.  Yugoslavia’s
reinvigorated non-aligned role earned it more criticism from both Moscow and East Berlin, but
Tito no longer felt as isolated as he did just a year earlier.
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Chapter 4
The Two Germanies and the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference
In the spring of 1961, Tito and the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced that a
conference of the non-aligned countries would take place in Belgrade on September 1-6. The
announcement of the Conference of Head of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries
was welcomed by the GDR. The East Germans saw it as a unique opportunity to influence a
group  of  countries  that  the  East  German  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  (Ministerium  für
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten,  MfAA) had been trying to lobby for recognition for years. The
GDR was interested in being recognized by the non-aligned countries as a group, which they
saw as  carrying  more  weight  than  recognition  by  various  countries  individually.  While  the
MfAA had attempted a similar operation in 1955 during the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung,
the campaign to influence the Belgrade Conference was on a scale larger than any recognition
campaign they had previously tried.353 In this chapter I examine the GDR campaign to influence
the  Belgrade  Conference  and  the  West  German  response.  Their  manoeuvrings  around  the
conference  showed  that  both  Germanies  recognized  that  Yugoslavia  was  a  valuable  and
influential  gatekeeper  to the non-aligned world.  This analysis  serves as an example of how
Yugoslavia was positioned to play a role in the German question beyond its bilateral relations
with both Germanies.
For the East German regime, 1961 was shaping up to be a year almost as disastrous as
1953, when Soviet  tanks had to  crush the popular  uprising that threatened its  survival.  The
353 See various MfAA reports on Bandung operations in PA AA, MfAA, A 9623.
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Socialist Unity Party’s (Sozialistische Einheits Partei, SED) leadership could no longer ignore
the  problem of  the  porous  Berlin  demarcation  line  between  the  Soviet  and  Western  zones,
through which millions of East Germans escaped to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
Not only did the population  loss  weaken the  SED’s position at  home and abroad,  but  also
seriously damaged its already weak economy, and the SED chairman Walter Ulbricht was aware
that no incentive the party could provide was strong enough to stop this  flight.354 The East
German leader had urged the Soviets to approve the construction of a physical barrier in Berlin
that would finally close this escape route. However, the Soviets were reluctant to sanction this
request, since their policy did not coincide with East German wishes. While East Germany saw
the Berlin Crisis as a matter of sovereignty, the Soviets considered it a key segment in their
strategy against the United States, and as such wanted to avoid any unilateral action by East
Berlin.355 However, the Soviets had no issue with the East German campaign for international
recognition, as long as it did not encroach on Soviet European strategy. 
For Yugoslavia, the Belgrade Conference was the crowning achievement of its foreign
policy over the past six years.  Tito,  along with Nasser,  Nehru, and others,  had been slowly
building the foundations for smaller nations to be heard. As Svetozar Rajak argues, the non-
aligned wanted to make “the resolution of global crises a concern for all nations and extricate
this  privilege  from  the  two  Superpowers  who,  in  their  opinion,  had  proven  incapable  of
constructively working toward the easing of international tensions.”356
354 Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989 (Univ of North Carolina 
Press, 2000), p. 44.
355 Bernd Bonwetsch and Alexei Filitow, “Chruschtschow Und Der Mauerbau. Die Gipfelkonferenz Der 
Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten Vom 3.-5. August 1961,” Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte 48, no. 1 (2000): 155–
98, p. 157; See also Chapter 2 in Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall.
356 Svetozar Rajak, ““Companions in misfortune” From passive neutralism to active un-commitment”: The critical 
role of Yugoslavia” in Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?, 1st 
edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 85-86.
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The preparations for the Belgrade Conference
Compared to Bandung in 1955, it seemed that the GDR would have a much easier task
ahead of them in Belgrade. The MfAA was a much better organized ministry than it was in
1955, and it had developed a network of diplomatic outposts throughout the non-aligned world,
mostly in the form of trade missions, and as mentioned, the host was the only country outside of
the Soviet Bloc which had recognized the GDR, so the conditions seemed objectively far better
than in Bandung.
However, the relationship between the GDR and Yugoslavia was hardly friendly, and
Belgrade’s recognition had failed to cause a domino effect among the non-aligned countries.357
In fact, the East German officials continued to criticize Yugoslavia’s policy of non-alignment,
which  they  considered  to  be  decidedly  bourgeois:  “self-serving”  and  “self-aggrandizing.”358
Furthermore, East Berlin accused Tito of attempting to create and seize the leadership of a third
Bloc, comprising “young, politically relatively inexperienced” and therefore “easily influenced”
countries.359 In addition,  the SED felt  that,  despite the recognition and the triggering of the
Hallstein Doctrine, Yugoslavia still perceived the FRG as the ‘real’ Germany.360 The Yugoslavs,
on the other hand, were irritated by the constant anti-Yugoslav sentiment voiced in the East
German public sphere.361 In spite of strained relations with Belgrade, East Berlin was aware of
357 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 24.
358 “Über die Jugoslawische Haltung zur Deutschlandfrage” (August 29, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, C S69/75.
359 “Vorlage für das Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischer Einheitspartei Deutschlands” (July 7, 1961), 
PA AA, MfAA, A 13346, pp. 22-28.
360 As illustrated by the sign on the building of the defunct FRG embassy in Belgrade, which claimed that 
henceforth the French embassy would represent all German interests. This angered the East Germans enough to
devise a strategy to incite its removal, including invoking international law. “Werter Genosse Hoffmann!” 
(April 6, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, C 440, pp. 40-41.
361 Various reports in AJ, 507/IX, 86/I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.
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the effect close ties with the ‘young nation states’ could have on their international standing.
Indeed, it was a policy the SED had been pursuing for years, and would not let their antipathy
towards Yugoslavia stand in the way of a broad diplomatic offensive aimed at  the Belgrade
Conference.
The announcement  of the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade naturally  drew some
interest in the West as well. The United States did not view the conference favourably. In July,
while  recovering  from  illness  at  his  Brioni  Island  residence,  Tito  informed  the  American
ambassador in Belgrade,  George Kennan, that he did not intend to “exacerbate” the current
global political  situation,  but that  regarding the German Question he “had no choice but to
support the Russian bid for recognition of the East German regime.” Kennan noted that the
Yugoslavs “were sorry if this inconvenienced us; [but] foreign policy was something one had to
be consistent about.”362 Nevertheless, Kennan, accompanied by State Undersecretary Chester
Bowles, again met with Tito at the end of July to ask him to consider representing the American
position  at  the Belgrade Conference.  The American duo did not  make much headway.  Tito
argued that although Khrushchev was responsible for the Berlin Crisis, but that his aim was to
solve this issue, not humiliate the Americans. This conversation also revealed that Tito still held
Ulbricht in  low esteem, claiming that he was “not  denying the depth of Ulbricht’s  political
failure,” but that the GDR’s recognition “lay at the heart of difficulty with Russia.”363
In the months leading up to the conference, the MfAA created two working groups: one
dealing  with  the  political  and  organizational  aspects  of  the  conference,  the  other  with  the
362 FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 93.
363 Ibid., Document 94.
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international  propaganda.364 As  their  strongest  diplomatic  weapon,  East  Berlin  sent  special
envoys  to  India,  Indonesia,  Burma,  Egypt,  and  several  other  non-aligned  countries.  Their
mission was to convince the non-aligned leaders to lend their support for the GDR’s actions in
Berlin and their German policy in general. Kurt Hager, the GDR’s special envoy to India, later
argued that the special envoys were not able to secure an endorsement from their hosts, who
were “non-aligned and neutral” in their stance. In some instances, the special envoys were not
even able to arrange a meeting in time for the conference.365 The special envoys also faced other
obstacles in their missions. For example, Hager himself had difficulties successfully explaining
the East German position to prime minister Nehru.366
With East Berlin’s two-pronged strategy in mind, the GDR legation in Belgrade took a
proactive  role  in  developing  its  own  contribution  to  influencing  the  conference.367 In  an
exchange with the MfAA, the legation’s second-highest diplomat counsellor Walter Vosseler
offered several suggestions for the legation’s activities.368 The MfAA seemed to have accepted
some of these suggestions, because the Belgrade legation went ahead and developed a more
detailed plan for the conference. Its most important segment was the preparation, which aimed
to steer the conference in a “positive course.” This included collecting information regarding the
participants’ intentions  and  the  contradictions  between  delegations,  creating  and  fostering
contacts  which  could  be  exploited  during  the  conference,  and  detecting  disruptive  Western
364 Letter from Jacobs to Vosseler (July 24, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295.
365 Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989. 
Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Walter de Gruyter, 2007), p. 276.
366 Lorenz M. Lüthi, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973,” Journal of Cold War Studies 
18, no. 4 (January 13, 2017): 98–147, p. 107.
367 This was likely the result of criticism received earlier in the year for poor results in forging connections with 
the diplomats from nonaligned countries. Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 119.
368 Letter from Vosseler (June 26, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, 74-75.
118
actions, as well as developing and suggesting countermeasures.369 At times, however, limitations
in the resources of the MfAA proper curbed the Belgrade legation’s efforts. In one example, the
MfAA charged them with compiling a list of potential contacts at the conference, and in turn the
legation requested from the MfAA’s Yugoslav department detailed information regarding the
participating  countries’ political  positions  on  key  questions  to  help  with  this  task,  but  this
request was denied. The MfAA argued that the request “by far exceeded their capabilities.” The
same letter, perhaps as a form of consolation, also included news of a reinforcement in expert
personnel for the duration of the conference operations.370
For  all  their  planning,  the  GDR legation  in  Belgrade  had a  difficult  time achieving
positive results. In addition to coordination issues between the East Berlin headquarters and the
Belgrade legation, the East Germans also had to deal with the uncooperative Yugoslavs. On
August 2, envoy Eleonore Staimer met with state undersecretary Veljko Mićunović, to whom
she  delivered  a  note  with  the  request  for  approval  of  a  GDR  observer  delegation  at  the
conference. Mićunović informed her that only those countries that were invited but declined to
send a delegation would be allowed to send observers, and denied that the German question or
the  Berlin  Crisis  would  be  on  the  conference's  agenda.371 In  his  report  on  the  meeting,
Mićunović noted that a coordinated Communist attempt to introduce the issue of Berlin could
not be ruled out. Like in Bandung, Cuba would most likely be the conduit for this action. He
added that a memorandum from Ulbricht addressed to the conference concerning Berlin could
also be expected.372 Mićunović was correct in his assumptions. Yugoslavia saw Cuba as a part of
369 “Vorlage für die Dienstbesprechung” (July 7, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 80-81.
370 Letter from Jacobs to Günther (August 18, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, p. 145.
371 “Vermerk über die Besprechung der Genossin Staimer mit dem Amtierenden Staatsekretär fur Auswärtige 
Angelegenheiten der FVRJ, Genossen Mićunović” (August 2, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 17171.
372 "Zabeleška o razgovoru drž. potsekretara Veljka Mićunovića sa poslanikom NDR E. Štajmer" (August 2, 
1961), AJ, KPR, I-5-b/81-2.
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the “radical group” at the organizational meeting in Cairo – alongside Mali and Guinea – that
represented Soviet views.373 Ulbricht sent a letter to the Cuban leader Fidel Castro on August 10
urging him to actively represent the East German standpoint and pursue the open discussion of
the Berlin Crisis at the conference.374 Although the MfAA still hoped that their observers would
be allowed to participate, a few days after her meeting with Mićunović Staimer met with the
state undersecretary Leo Mates, who confirmed that no observers from uninvited states would
be  accredited  in  Belgrade.375 However,  if  the  East  Germans  had  difficulties  accessing  the
conference’s agenda prior to August 13, the events of that day made the discussion of the Berlin
Crisis inevitable.
The construction of  the  Berlin  Wall  on August  13 created a  new, more  complicated
problem for Ulbricht.376 On the one hand, it ended the mass emigration to West Germany. On the
other, the Berlin Wall was perceived in the West as irrefutable evidence of the GDR’s moral
bankruptcy,  and even Nasser  and Tito  were  appalled  by its  construction.377 The  fact  that  it
happened just weeks before the Belgrade conference undoubtedly increased the magnitude of an
international backlash. Paradoxically, the Berlin Crisis was now more than likely to be discussed
in Belgrade. Both the East Germans and the Soviets seized this opportunity and increased their
373 Bilten Državnog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove o Konferenciji neangažovanih zemalja br. 3, AJ, KPR, I-4-
b/2 K-202.
374 Draft of a letter from Ulbricht to Castro (August 10, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, G-A 425, pp. 120-124.
375 “Vermerk über die Besprechung der Genossin Staimer mit dem Gehilfen des Staatssekretär für Auswärtige 
Angelegenheiten der FVRJ, Genossen Mates (August 5, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 17171.
376 For the Berlin Crisis and the Berlin Wall see Rolf Steininger, Berlinkrise und Mauerbau. 1958 bis 1963, 4th ed.
(München: Olzog, 2009); Gerhard Wettig, Band 3 Kulmination der Berlin-Krise (Herbst 1960 bis Herbst 1962)
(Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2011); Gerhard Wettig, Band 2 Anfangsjahre der Berlin-Krise (Herbst 1958 bis 
Herbst 1960) (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015); Gerhard Wettig, “Der Höhepunkt der Berlin-
Krise 1961,” Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen 23, no. 1 (January 1, 2016); For Western Alliance politics and 
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377 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 115.
120
diplomatic activities, even before the construction of the Wall began.378 Generally speaking, the
Soviets  wanted  to  avoid  the  participants  drawing any equivalency between the  Eastern and
Western bloc at the conference. They could accept non-alignment only if it was more critical
towards the West. But now the main aspect of their diplomatic campaign was to gather support
for their actions in Berlin. The Soviets put pressure on leading non-aligned states, either through
meetings with their diplomats, or by sending messages to their leaders, as Khrushchev did to
Nasser and Nehru. The Soviet leader also addressed the situation in Berlin in his speech on
August 7, insisting that neutral states in particular could not stand on the sidelines during the
crisis.379 
The West German diplomats, on the other hand, did not seem as concerned with the
prospect of a non-aligned conference. A West German Foreign Office report written on August
18 condescendingly argued that  the “neutralist  movement”  was fraught  with weakness  and,
given that the conference would bring together many divergent views, one must question the
possibility of it producing any conclusion that could be taken seriously. Bonn was wondering
whether the German question would even be included in the conference’s agenda, although the
West German government  saw it  almost as a certainty following the latest  developments in
Berlin.  According  to  the  author,  the  real  danger  coming  from the  German  question  being
discussed at the conference was that most of the participants were insufficiently educated on the
matter, and that the “resentment” – assuming towards the former colonial powers – and their
“general mentality” offered fertile soil for Soviet interference. Especially worrisome were the
378 Khrushchev and Ulbricht agreed on closing the border between East and West Berlin on August 1, 1961. 
"Notes on the Conversation of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W. Ulbricht on 1 August 1961," 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110206.
379 “Bilten br. 6.” AJ, KPR I-4-a/2 K-202.
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staple  concepts  in  socialist  messages  regarding  Germany:  the  “peace  treaty,”  “occupying
regime,” and “securing the international peace.” These, the author argued paternalistically, had
found traction among many non-aligned countries due to their “blurry worldview.” However, the
West Germans seemed to believe that not having a discussion would have been more damaging.
The report  argued that  it  would be a  mistake to try  to  suppress  the debate on the German
question. Instead, Germany should be open to discussion and promote its own position, namely
that the only approach to solving this question was by self-determination, a policy which many
of the non-aligned countries themselves supported. The report concluded that it was impossible
to predict whether it could count on a positive or negative outcome of the conference, but that it
was also likely that regardless of the outcome, one should not expect bombastic statements or
concrete demands.380
The Yugoslavs were hardly going to break from their current German policy, although
there were some indications that Tito would address some uncomfortable issues. For example,
on August 31,  his  foreign minister  Koča Popović hinted that  the Yugoslav president  would
include in his speech the issue of the Polish-East German border along the Oder-Neisse line,
which would undoubtedly upset Bonn.381 Popović was referring to the fact that even fifteen
years after the end of World War II, the West German government did not accept the new border
between what they called the ‘Soviet Occupation Zone’ and Poland, which ran along the Oder
and Neisse rivers. According to Adenauer, German borders were still the ones from 1937, and
380 “Aufzeichnung” (August 18, 1961), PA AA, AA, B 12 896.
381 FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 95.
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any agreement between the GDR and Poland on the border was illegitimate, a position which
was firmly planted in the FRG’s sole representation claim.382
Although  Bonn  did  not  expect  the  Non-Aligned  Conference  to  produce  a  mass
recognition of the GDR, it did mount a campaign to inform the non-aligned countries about their
position  on  the  German  question,  with  direct  messages  from the  Bonn  government  to  the
participants. The message, in the form of an aide-mémoire, carried the central idea of the West
German plan, namely the right to self-determination for all of Germany. This idea permeated the
whole document, attempting to expose the East German entity as void of any popular support
and afraid of allowing its inhabitants any say in the way the country was run. Following the idea
proposed  in  the  August  18  report,  the  aide-mémoire  played  to  the  non-aligned  own recent
history, reminding them that they too exercised the right to self-determination in order to gain
independence.383 The  Bonn government  sent  out  another  aide-mémoire  regarding the  Berlin
Crisis at the same time. In it, the West German government accused the Soviets of creating in its
occupying zone a concentration camp with sixteen million prisoners. In general, the document
focused mostly on the Soviet actions and policies, mentioning the East Berlin government only
to point out its dependence on Moscow. The aide-mémoire ended with a plea to the participants
to ask the Four Powers to “respect the existing agreements concerning the problem of Germany
and Berlin and to abstain from any unilateral act that might render agreement by negotiation
more difficult.”384
382 Adenauer staked the FRG’s claim on its eastern territories during his first speech in front of the Bundestag in 
1949. “Ausgangslage der Bundesrepublik” in Bettzüge (ed.), Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
pp. 170-175. On the Oder-Neisse Line as a foreign policy issue, see Debra J. Allen, The Oder-Neisse Line: The 
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383 “Aide-mémoire”, (Undated), PA AA, AA, B 26 152, pp. 214-218.
384 “Aide-mémoire”, PA AA, AA, B 26 152, pp. 219-222.
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In the final week before the conference, Ulbricht attempted to persuade the Yugoslavs
one last time to grant his diplomats some sort of access to the delegates. On August 24, his
special envoy, the Minister of Construction Ernst Scholz, along with Deputy Foreign Minister
Johannes König and envoy Eleonore Staimer met with Tito at  his  summer residence on the
Brioni Islands. Officially, Scholz’s mission was to deliver Ulbricht’s letter to Tito. The letter
explained the GDR’s position regarding the finalization of the Peace Treaty and the solution of
the West Berlin question. Indirectly, the meeting was very much about the Belgrade Conference.
In his report, Scholz argued that, given the circumstances (short preparation period, Yugoslav
refusal to allow GDR observers at the conference, and the refusal to comment on the GDR’s
positions), the visit should be assessed accordingly, meaning that it went as well as was possible.
Scholz added that they were under the impression that Tito was interested, “without too much
engagement,” in helping other nonaligned states normalize their relationship with the GDR.385
Despite Scholz’s positive perspective,  the meeting was underwhelming. The Yugoslav report
shows that Scholz did in fact directly ask Tito for support at the upcoming conference, to which
Tito did not commit, saying that he would address the German question at the conference, but
not  before.  Tito  also  wondered  whether  the  East  Germans’ latest  action  could  lead  to  an
escalation  in  the  East-West  conflict.  Finally,  he  questioned  the  lack  of  coverage  of  the
conference in the East German press. Scholz’s explanation that the press could comment only
after  seeing  the  conference’s  results  was  as  noncommittal  as  Tito’s  position  on  the  issues
important to the East Germans.386 
385 Unsigned report (September 4, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 17171, pp. 74-84.
386 “Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika republike Josipa Broza Tita sa specijalnim izaslanikom predsednika 
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After the meeting with Tito, Scholz and the rest of the East German delegation had lunch
with  Tito’s  general  secretary  Bogdan  Crnobrnja,  with  whom  they  also  travelled  back  to
Belgrade. The unproductive nature of the meeting with Tito was underlined when Scholz asked
Crnobrnja whether the official press release could include a line about the “open and friendly”
nature of the conversation with the Yugoslav president. Crnobrnja replied that since the relations
between the two countries were far from friendly, such wording would not reflect their true
state, a statement that displeased Staimer. Crnobrnja went on to criticize the contradictions in the
East German position on the non-aligned conference. He asserted that in their meetings with the
Yugoslavs, the East Germans agreed that the conference was a “significant and major event” but
then their press practically ignored it. Crnobrnja saw this as counterproductive for East Berlin’s
agenda, as it undercut the support among the participating states. König responded cynically,
saying that the conference’s historical significance will manifest itself regardless of whether it is
reported by the press.387 
During  their  layover  in  Belgrade,  the  East  German  delegation  met  with  the  Soviet
ambassador  Alexei  Yepishev.  He  informed  them  that,  contrary  to  what  Crnobrnja  said  in
previous  conversations  with  the  East  Germans,  the  delegates  would  have  some freedom to
choose what they wanted to discuss during the conference. Furthermore, Yepishev argued that
they must outmanoeuvre the West by working closely with the participating delegations, and by
distributing propaganda material. He added that the Soviet embassy would do all it could to
influence  the  participating  countries  through  contacts  with  their  diplomats  in  Belgrade.388
387 “Zabeleška iz razgovora Generalnog sekretara Predsednika Republike Bogdana Crnobrnje sa ministrom 
gradjevinarstva E. Scholzom...” (August 24, 1961), AJ KPR -3-a/82-3.
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Despite this encouraging meeting, the East German delegation returned to East Berlin having
accomplished nothing except confirming the status quo of their relations with Yugoslavia. 
The Soviets  did little to further the GDR’s cause before the Conference,  contrary to
ambassador Yepishev’s promises. In their contacts with the Yugoslavs in August, the Soviets
addressed both the conference and the Berlin question, but failed to make a connection between
the two, discussing them as two separate issues. They also did not press the Yugoslavs to change
their position on Berlin.389 Tito complained to the Soviets that the East Germans saw everything
in absolutes, that “they demand from us a position that is either-or, and that is not how things
stand.” There was nothing the Soviets could do for the Yugoslavs, or vice versa. Besides, more
pressing were the recently announced Soviet nuclear tests.390 After the breakdown of talks with
Kennedy in Vienna, Khrushchev’s position on the nuclear weapons test moratorium changed,
and the Soviet leader decided to resume nuclear tests in the fall, culminating with the detonation
of the ‘Tsar Bomb,’ the most powerful nuclear weapon ever detonated.391 For Tito, Khrushchev’s
decision  seemed  like  it  was  intentionally  timed  to  coincide  with  the  start  of  the  Belgrade
Conference, which the Soviets denied. Nevertheless, Soviet timing left a bitter taste in Tito’s
mouth. Tito had already had a brush with Khrushchev’s cavalier approach to discussing nuclear
weapons.392
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The  West  Germans  used  the  last  days  before  the  conference  to  send  out  personal
messages  from  chancellor  Adenauer  to  the  leaders  of  the  participating  states.  Adenauer’s
message repeated the earlier points of the two distributed aide-mémoires, but with a direct and
personal plea for support at the Belgrade Conference.393
Two days before the start of the conference, the GDR’s foreign minister Otto Winzer
wrote envoy Staimer with his final instructions. He informed her that because Yugoslavia would
allow neither East German observers nor reinforcements for the GDR legation, the current staff
would have to  bear  the burden of  the operation alone.  Their  task was to  deliver  Ulbricht’s
memorandum to each of the delegations as soon as possible.  Furthermore,  unless Ulbricht’s
greeting telegram was not read or acknowledged during the opening session, it was their duty to
deliver its text to the delegations. These were the only two actions to be carried out in the name
of the Berlin leadership. However, Winzer also instructed Staimer which delegations to contact
during the conference. Since the legation’s staff was limited in numbers, they were to direct
their efforts to particular countries. The ones which special envoys already visited were to be
avoided. The focus of their attention was to be the countries that had some sort of diplomatic
relations with the GDR but have not received envoys or messages from Berlin. Here, the highest
ranking  staff  members  were  to  hand  over  copies  of  Ulbricht’s  memorandum.  Winzer  also
instructed Staimer to encourage the legation staff to establish contacts with delegation members
on all diplomatic levels.394 Winzer’s letter to Staimer exposed the failure of the first phase of the
GDR’s diplomatic campaign. But the efforts of the East Berlin leadership to send observers and
reinforcements to the Belgrade legation also reflected the low level of trust the MfAA had in
393 Draft of Adenauer’s message, PA AA, AA, B 26 152, pp. 210-213.
394 Letter from Winzer to Staimer (August 28, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, C 1571/72, pp. 4-8.
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Staimer’s staff. However, since the GDR was cut off from the conference’s inner workings by
the organizers, the absence of experts from Berlin did not constitute a major setback, as there
was no room for a proactive approach. All the East Germans could do now was to analyze the
information published in the press, passed on to them by their allies among the delegations, or
hope for positive reactions to Ulbricht’s memorandum.
Ulbricht’s  memorandum  was  a  conventionally  brutal  attack  on  the  FRG.  Alongside
accusations  of  unfinished  “Hitlerite”  ambitions  among  the  German  politicians  and  the
government, Ulbricht blamed the nuclear arming of West Germany on the unsigned peace treaty.
Without it, he argued, there were no set stipulations for curbing military expansion and left the
door open for the Western powers and Bonn to arm West Germany. The peace treaty would also
allow the German people to express their self-determination, which Ulbricht suggested would
not  be favourable to  the West  German government.  On the matter  of  the Berlin  Crisis,  the
memorandum called for a “demilitarized and neutral Free City,” something that a signed peace
treaty would also guarantee. Ulbricht saw this as a compromise and the sign of East German
good will. He also addressed the construction of the Berlin Wall, repeating the argument that it
was a defensive measure against “subversive activities” such as human trafficking, and that it
was necessary to create an environment in which the peace treaty could be signed.395
395 “Memorandum,” AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-204.
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The German Question at the Belgrade Conference
The  first  non-aligned  conference  was  a  truly  historic  moment  for  Yugoslavia.  One
Yugoslav newsreel boasted (incorrectly, of course) that never before have there been so many
heads of state in one place. The newsreel also showed Tito welcoming a long procession of
guests at the Belgrade airport,  welcoming them with firm handshakes and in some cases an
awkward embrace. His meeting with Gamal Abdul Nasser was the exception. The two statesmen
flew into each other’s arms in a show of sincere friendship.396 Tito and Nasser were the driving
force behind the conference, and this was their achievement. The world would be watching and
listening to what they had to say about the global affairs.
As  expected,  the  German  question  figured  prominently  during  the  conference.  The
Yugoslav delegation convened several days before its start to finalize its strategy. The delegates
acknowledged that, although the Berlin Crisis was not part of the conference’s official agenda,
most participating countries showed “first rate interest in the Berlin problem and the crisis it
created.”397 They identified the need to recognize the reality of the current situation, meaning the
existence  of  two  Germanies,  as  the  starting  point  to  the  solution  of  the  problem.  While
discussing  the  draft  of  a  final  conference  document,  the  Yugoslavs  recognized  that  a  more
specific formulation was necessary, but that it was also important to avoid suggesting a concrete
solution, since this was to be formulated only by the parties at the conference.398
396 YU 0 Laki / Jugoslovenski partizani, “Prva konferencija Pokreta nesvrstanih (1961) - Dokumentarni Film,” 
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Another departure in the Yugoslav view was the idea that the Berlin crisis was not only a
localized byproduct of the Second World War, but that it could also possibly foment a new war.
Thus, the severity of this prospect permitted the non-aligned countries to give their opinion on
the  crisis,  which  justified  the  discussions  at  the  conference  on  the  matter.  However,  the
Yugoslavs  took into  account  the precarious  position  of  non-alignment.  Although Yugoslavia
supported the signing of a peace treaty in principle, the delegates warned against making any
such claims during the conference. According to them, because Yugoslavia recognized the GDR,
the treaty represented the consolidation of the  status quo. This meant that the GDR would be
recognized  internationally.  Following  this  line  of  argument  at  the  conference  would  not  be
politically wise. In that sense, it would be best not to profess any type of opinion on the peace
treaty.399 Nevertheless, another internal Yugoslav report suggested the possibility of exploring
some concrete ideas to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The report suggested that the
conference  might  consider  sending  Nehru  to  Washington  and  Moscow  as  a  mediator.400
Presumably,  this  was because Nehru himself  saw his role  in  the Cold War as  the mediator
between the two blocs.401 
Discussions about the German Question began on the first day of the conference. Several
delegates, including Nasser, pointed to the necessity of solving the Berlin crisis. Nasser’s about-
face surprised Western observers, who expected the Egyptian president to avoid addressing this
subject, since he had opposed its inclusion during the preparatory meeting in Cairo earlier that
year.402 Generally, however, there was little substance in these discussions. Most delegates spoke
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in platitudes and forewent blaming either Bloc for the current crisis. Even the Afghan prime
minister Daud Khan’s speech was measured, despite the fact that Afghanistan had supported the
Soviet solution in Cairo. The Indonesian president Sukarno was the only one to broach the idea
of recognizing the GDR, but even he argued for merely a de facto recognition.403
 On the  second  day of  the  conference,  some of  the  speakers  brought  slightly  more
diverse views to the fore. President Makarios of Cyprus supported the West German plan (a
plebiscite under UN supervision and unification),  but only if  both sides agreed to it.  Prime
minister of Ceylon Sirimavo Bandaranaike was critical of the Western solution, but asked from
both  sides  to  avoid  a  military solution.404 The  mild diversity  of  the positions  regarding the
German question notwithstanding, not a single delegation pushed for the full recognition of the
GDR, nor were there positive message towards the East German leadership.  Some of these
speeches were to be expected, since some countries were known to be closer to the West, as was
the case with Cyprus.  It  was difficult  for  the East  German diplomats  to seek support  from
Nicosia for the outright recognition of two separate German states, since the goal of the Greek
Cypriots  was  to  keep  Cyprus  united.405 The  MfAA’s  analysis  was  critical  of  Nasser’s
performance  in  Belgrade.  His  backtracking  on  several  aspects  of  the  German  question
disappointed the East Germans. The main reason for the weakening of his previous position was
a West German loan, which he received just prior to the conference. Although initially adamant
in maintaining the idea of two German states, consequent pressure from Bonn did make his
403 “Pregled istupanja šefova delegacija na Konferenciji prvog dana zasedanja” (September 1, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-
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statements  on  the  matter  more  cautious  and  vague.  The  East  German  report  on  the  UAR
delegation at the conference specifically cited Nasser’s statements as problematic. He avoided
attacking  either  side,  and  he  also  avoided  mentioning  the  existence  of  two  German  states.
Furthermore, he tried to prevent, especially behind the scenes, the acknowledgement of the two
German  states,  and  its  inclusion  in  the  conference  resolutions.  The  East  Germans  were
disappointed that Nasser decided to side with the “reactionary forces,” but were pleased that he
did  not  cause  a  domino effect  among  the  other  delegations.  Surprisingly,  the  East  German
analyst concluded that in the final analysis the UAR contributed to the “preservation of world
peace” and echoed the Soviet positions in key questions.406 
According to  another  East  German report,  Yugoslavia’s stance on the German peace
treaty and the solution of the West Berlin question came close to the position of the socialist
countries, but then unfortunately it avoided being unequivocal in its opinion. Specifically, this
meant  that  there  was  no  support  from  Tito  for  the  GDR’s  position  on  the  West  German
“militarism and revanchism,” or for its “constructive suggestions for the solution of the German
question and European security.”407 The East German sources were only partially correct. In his
speech on the first day of the conference, Tito did in fact describe West Germany as a “typically
capitalist  social  system,  fraught  and  interwoven  with  remnants  of  fascist  and  revanchist
conceptions and tendencies, which give cause for grave concerns.” He continued with a warning
that such tendencies could possibly spark a new conflict. The ones responsible for this conflict,
according to Tito, would be the ones opposed to the signing of a separate peace treaty between
406 “Zur Haltung der VAR zu einigen Hauptproblemen der Konferenz der “nichpaktgebunden” Staaten in Belgrad 
von 1.-6. 9. 61” (September 18, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 12618, pp. 11-23.
407 “Einschätzung zur Belgrader Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten – Haltung Jugoslawiens auf der 
Grundlage der Rede Titos am 3. 9. 1961,” (September 9, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 286-288.
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the GDR and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he saw the Oder-Neisse border as an “already
settled question.” In comparison, Tito only mentioned that East Germany was developing within
a socialist system, without going into further analysis or criticism. Perhaps more importantly, he
was the only statesman, beside Nehru, who referred to East Germany by its full name.408 Still,
the East Germans believed that, in an effort to break through the Hallstein Doctrine, Tito had
exercised some influence over the non-aligned states in a way that would damage the GDR. One
of  the  possible  reasons  why the  East  Germans  had such a  relatively  unfavourable  view of
Yugoslavia’s position during the conference was because they expected more support from the
only state that had recognized them.
The East Germans were more content with the Afghan delegation’s performance. Even
though prime minister Daoud’s speech was not an endorsement of the GDR’s position, the East
German  sources  at  the  conference  informed  them that  the  Afghans  did  suggest  an  explicit
recognition of the existence of two German states in the conference’s declaration. It was only
after they were confronted by other states that they withdrew this proposal. This was enough for
the East Germans to identify Afghanistan as a progressive country. One of the countries that
opposed the Afghans in the closed sessions was India. According to the East German sources,
Nehru maintained his position that only the superpowers could solve the German question, and
that India did not have the right to offer any suggestions for its solution. Due to this position,
Nehru also did not mention the necessity of signing a peace treaty.409 This did not surprise the
408 Tito’s speech (September 2, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-203.
409 “Einige Bemerkungen zur Haltung der auf der Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten vertretener 
Staatsmänner zur Deutschlandfrage” (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 11040, pp. 20-29.
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East Germans, who had already criticized India for not expressing any sort of opinion that might
have been construed as a critique of the United States foreign policy.410 
A further disappointment to the East Germans was the president of Mali, Modibo Keïta.
Special envoy Gerald Götting, who was visiting West African states in a damage control mission
regarding the Berlin Wall,  met with Keïta in August. The Malian president was receptive to
Götting’s argument and agreed to support the GDR’s policies at the Belgrade Conference.411 The
East Germans must have been taken aback after Keïta’s statements during the open debates. He
saw  the  peace  treaty  as  a  potentially  dangerous  development  supported  the  West  German
definition of self-determination. Keïta continued with the anti-GDR stance in the closed session,
where he pushed for the recognition of the FRG as the only legitimate German state.412 It is
unclear why Keïta decided to take a position that was completely in line with the West German
one, but it is most likely that Bonn applied enough pressure on him to make him reconsider the
pledge he made to Götting.
The Ghanaians led by President Kwame Nkrumah, on the other hand, took a decisively
pro-GDR position. Nkrumah argued for the recognition of two German states, which had now
developed into states with “two very different social systems,” and that it was “only reasonable”
that the international community should recognize this fact. Furthermore, Nkrumah spoke out in
favour of the Oder-Neisse border, asserting that it has been a fact for sixteen years now, and that
any attempt to change it should be viewed as a provocation.413 He also argued for the signing of
a peace treaty, which would involve both Germanies’ withdrawal from their respective military
410 “Die Haltung Indiens zur Aggression in Kuba” (May 19, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, C 1738/76, pp. 2-3.
411 Lüthi, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973,” p. 107.
412 “Einige Bemerkungen zur Haltung der auf der Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten vertretener 
Staatsmänner zur Deutschlandfrage” (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 11040, p. 27.
413 Nkrumah’s speech (September 2, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-203.
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alliances. This was perfectly in line with the GDR policies outlined in Ulbricht’s memorandum.
According to the East German sources, the Ghanaian president supported these same ideas in
the closed session.414 The East Germans saw Ghana’s position as one of the true successes of the
GDR’s  diplomacy  at  the  Conference,  and  the  result  of  the  GDR’s  close  relationship  with
Nkrumah.415
Finally, as expected, the Cubans went further in their support for the GDR than any other
delegation, and held an “overall positive stance in regards to the most important problems in the
German question.”416 In his speech, the Cuban president Osvaldo Dorticos asked for the German
borders, as they were drawn in Potsdam, to be respected.417 In addition to endorsing the signing
of  the  peace  treaty,  the  Cubans  also  drew up the  draft  of  a  resolution  that  recognized  the
existence of two German states.418
The “Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries,” the
Belgrade Conference’s final document, reflected the general position of the participants, in that
it refrained from prescribing concrete solutions to the issues discussed during the previous six
days. It included the idea that the “German problem is not merely a regional problem” and
warned that it was “liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments
in international relations.” The Declaration also called on the “parties concerned” to solve the
problem peacefully.419 The  Declaration’s  wording was  mild  in  order  to  bring  the  two blocs
414 “Einige Bemerkungen zur Haltung der auf der Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten vertretener 
Staatsmänner zur Deutschlandfrage” (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 11040, p. 26.
415 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 122.
416 Ibid., p. 28.
417 Dorticos’ speech (September 2, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-203.
418 “Einige Bemerkungen zur Haltung der auf der Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten vertretener 
Staatsmänner zur Deutschlandfrage” (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 11040, p. 29.
419 “Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries” (September 6, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-
4-A-2 K-204.
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together to solve the various Cold War conflicts, rather than pointing fingers and deepening the
crises.  However,  the Conference did not  have the desired effect  in  the case of the German
question.
The aftermath
Yugoslavia’s position at the conference caught the Americans off-guard. US ambassador
Kennan noted that the “[p]assage on Berlin [in Tito’s speech] contains no words that could not
have been written by Khrushchev,” which certainly would force the United States to reconsider
the way it assessed Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement, since it did not expect such
hostility towards its allies in Bonn. Kennan voiced his dismay to Nehru, who was typically
“non-committal,” but Kennan had hoped that the Indian prime minister would adopt the US
position.420 Washington also relayed its disappointment to the Yugoslavs via an aide-memoire,
which the latter interpreted as undue pressure on a small country by a superpower.421 This latest
asymmetry in policies added more pressure on the strained US-Yugoslav relations. After some
deliberation,  Kennan concluded that  the  Yugoslavs  should not  be  allowed to  maintain  their
current  course  without  any  consequences,  but  that  “[t]o  be  forced  to  realize  this  is  highly
disagreeable to Yugoslavs, who are not used to taking political consequences of their own words
and to whom pleasure of eating cake and having it too has become so familiar as to seem a god-
given right.”422 
420 According to Kennan, Berlin mayor Willy Brandt’s envoy at the conference also approached Nehru in regards 
to Tito’s Berlin position, which bolstered the American ambassador’s hopes for Nehru’s change of heart. 
FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 96.
421 FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Document 98.
422 Ibid., Document 100.
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Unlike the disappointment in Washington, the initial reaction in Bonn at the end of the
Belgrade  meeting  was  one  of  relief,  according  to  one  Yugoslav  report.  An  unnamed  West
German Foreign Office official told the Yugoslav diplomats in Bonn that there was a large group
among his colleagues who lobbied for the termination of the Hallstein Doctrine prior to the
conference.  Their position was informed by various reports that claimed that the conference
would endorse a full recognition of the GDR. Given this possibility, they argued, it would have
been  necessary  to  preempt  such  a  decision.  Therefore,  their  detractors  welcomed  the
conference’s  outcome,  which  reinforced  “those  circles  which  were  of  the  opinion  that  the
Hallstein Doctrine can still  be effective.” The West German official also disclosed that West
Germany was not surprised by Yugoslavia’s statements, but that they were disappointed with
those made by other delegations. He singled out Nehru who, from a West German perspective,
just about advocated the recognition of the GDR. In fact, according to the Bonn source, all of
the  countries  seemed  receptive  to  the  FRG  government’s  aide-mémoire  and  Adenauer’s
message, but then most of them failed to propagate these ideas at the conference. The official
concluded  that  there  are  still  fears  of  a  possible  secret  agreement  among  the  non-aligned
countries to recognize the GDR.423
Envoy Staimer’s assessment was similar to the West German one in some aspects. She
too recognized the change in Nehru’s overall position. Initially, she argued, the West relied on
Nehru’s group – comprising India, Burma, Ceylon, and Cambodia – to follow a West-friendly
policy of avoiding the discussion of the German question. Although this did not correspond to
the content of the West German aide-mémoires and Adenauer’s message, Nehru’s actions did
represent an unwanted divergence for the West.  Staimer considered the conference a mixed
423 “Prva Reagovanja na Konferenciju,” (undated) KPR I-4-A/2 K-202.
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success in regard to the German question. Most of the speakers spoke out in favour of signing a
peace treaty and the majority of delegates in the closed sessions advocated for the recognition of
the GDR. This helped raise the profile of the East German demands. However, most of the
statesmen opposed an official  act  of  recognition.  Staimer argued that  this  was the result  of
Western influence, but added that despite the Western interference it became obvious that many
at the conference believed in the existence of two German states.424 At the end of her September
29  report,  Staimer  offered  several  suggestions  for  any  future  conferences,  based  on  the
experiences of the Belgrade staff.425
The  East  German  leadership,  Staimer’s  report  notwithstanding,  found  the  Belgrade
legation’s performance lacking, and initiated a long discussion about the reasons why the GDR
failed to achieve better results in Belgrade. In an exchange with Vosseler, the ministry accused
the Belgrade staff of failing to establish close ties with the non-aligned representatives, which in
turn led to below average reports for the MfAA. Furthermore, the legation failed to give any
“political  guidelines” to  the official  General  German News Service (Allgemeiner  Deutscher
Nachrichtendienst, ADN) correspondent that the MfAA sent to Belgrade, which were necessary
for the completion of his tasks. Finally, the MfAA reprimanded the legation for failing to file a
report after their meeting with the Burmese prime minister U Nu, or sending a superficial and
factually  incorrect  report  about  their  meeting with  Bandaranaike.426 In a  report  to  the SED,
Staimer responded with a detailed explanation of the legations activities. According to her, the
Belgrade  legation  staff  achieved  the  most  it  could,  given  that  there  were  no  observers  or
reinforcements allowed by the Yugoslav authorities. She also pointed out that the allegations of
424 “Zur Konferenz der...” (September 29, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, p. 274.
425 “Zur Konferenz der...” (September 29, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 282-284.
426 Letter from Becker to Vosseler, (October 2, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, 292-294.
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inefficiency from East Berlin were in most part due to time constraints, circumstances beyond
their control or because of mistakes made in East Berlin. Regarding support from the Yugoslav
government,  the  legation  accused  East  Berlin  of  demanding  help  while  at  the  same  time
downplaying  the  conference’s  significance  or  simply  ignoring  it.  This  made  any  kind  of
cooperation  extremely  difficult.427 Staimer  was  correct  in  her  analysis  of  the  Yugoslav
perception.  A Yugoslav  foreign  office  report  supported  this  claim,  indicating  that  the  SED
central  committee  issued  directives  to  the  GDR  press  to  report  only  the  aspects  of  the
conference favourable to them.428 The Belgrade staff did concede that contacts with the non-
aligned representatives were inadequate, and that they were having problems with solving this
issue. An explanation given in the report was that they set goals unattainable by such a small
staff.429 In her conclusion, Staimer addressed the criticism from East Berlin, saying that “it is
good, even harsh criticism, but it must be justified and it must be helpful and constructive.” The
Belgrade staff believed that the ministry as well as the SED should give their final assessment
only after taking their report into account.430 It seems that East Berlin did not agree with Staimer.
The head of the SED Department for Foreign Policy and International Cooperation Peter Florin
complained  to  König  that  the  report  from  Belgrade  looked  “more  like  an  excuse  than  an
evaluation.”431 The discussion regarding the Belgrade legation’s performance spilled over into
1962. In a letter from the deputy Foreign Minister Georg Stibi to the head of the Southeast
European Department of the MfAA Otto Becker, the former conceded that Staimer’s staff was
427 “Bericht für die Einschätzung der Tätigkeit der Gesandschaft...” (November 16, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295,
302-313.
428 “Prva reagovanja na Konferenciju,” KPR I-4-A/2 K-202.
429 Bericht für die Einschätzung der Tätigkeit der Gesandschaft...” (November 16, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, 
302-313.
430 Ibid.
431 Letter from Florin to König (November 27, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, p. 315.
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correct in some of their assertions. Stibi referred to the ministry’s last minute instructions for the
conference, the rushed effort of creating Ulbricht’s memorandum, as well as the oversights in
coordination  between the legation and the  ADN correspondents.432 The issue  was yet  to  be
resolved in  April  1962,  when König was still  demanding further  clarification  from Staimer
regarding  her  criticism  of  the  MfAA.433 There  did  not  seem  to  have  been  any  negative
repercussions for Staimer, who remained at the head of the Belgrade legation, and later became
the first East German ambassador in Belgrade, returning to East Berlin in 1969.434 A possible
reason for the absence of sanctions for Staimer was that she was able to forge a relatively close
relationship with Tito, in spite of the unsteady relations between the two countries, which made
her a most valuable asset for the GDR.435
Conclusion
The  Belgrade  Conference  of  Heads  of  State  or  Government  of  the  Non-Aligned
Countries  brought  about  a  strong diplomatic  effort  by  the  GDR,  the  goal  of  which  was to
influence the conference in a way that would benefit its search for international recognition. The
East  Germans  had hoped that  a  number of  newly  independent  Asian and African countries
would recognize this desire. On the other hand, the West Germans, in an effort to thwart this
campaign, appealed to the non-aligned states’ sense of self-determination.In  many  ways,  the
Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference helped clear up both Germanies’ policies toward the non-
432 Letter from Stibi to Becker (January 3, 1962), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 321-322.
433 Letter from König to Staimer (April 4, 1962), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 342-345.
434 “Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Savezne Skupštine Milentija Popovića sa Staimer sa ambasadorom 
Nemačke Demokratske Republike Nemačke Eleonorom Staimer” (February 1, 1969), AJ, KPR, I-5-B-81-5.
435 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 120.
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aligned states more than it helped to solve the German question. In hindsight, the conference did
nothing to remove or even destabilize the Hallstein doctrine, as the East Germans had hoped and
West Germans feared. After the conference, the West German weekly Der Spiegel argued that
the West German success was a result of Bonn’s generous aid programs, rather than the fear of
the  Hallstein  Doctrine  among  the  Asian  and  African  countries.436 However,  these  two
approaches, while not officially connected, became intertwined, and the West German strategy
prior  to  the  conference  clearly  showed  that  the  Hallstein  Doctrine  had  outgrown its  initial
diplomatic framework, the West German loan to Egypt being the most prominent example.437 
The East Berlin foreign office blamed the weak results of their campaign on the GDR’s
Belgrade legation staff. However, the reasons for such results were to be found in the MfAA’s
inability to provide the legation with ample time to prepare for the conference, which pointed to
the disorganization in East Berlin. Another important factor was the Yugoslavs’ decision to bar
East  German  observers  from the  conference,  and  refuse  entry  to  Yugoslavia  for  additional
legation staff sent from East Berlin. These circumstances were burdensome for the Belgrade
legation,  which was already severely understaffed and lacked diplomats qualified enough to
fulfill set goals, both problems indicative of the general issues plaguing the MfAA. Part of the
blame should also be ascribed to the weak results that the special envoys achieved. However,
contrary to East Berlin’s negative assessment immediately following the Conference, the special
envoys were later seen as a success, in that they forged personal relationships with many non-
aligned leaders, thus increasing the GDR’s diplomatic acumen in the Global South.438
436 “NEUTRALE: Punkt 27,” Der Spiegel, September 13, 1961, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-
43366351.html.
437 Young-sun Hong, Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime, 1st Edition 
edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 239.
438 Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, p. 276.
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Many delegates voiced strong opinions regarding the German question and the Berlin
Crisis,  but  both  Germanies  benefited  more  from  the  agreement  between  the  conference
participants to reach all decisions unanimously. This decision precluded harsh criticisms aimed
at both sides – heard in speeches and during the debates – from being included in the final
Conference documents. If East Germany hoped, and West Germany feared that the non-aligned
movement could be more than a sum of its parts, the Belgrade Conference proved them both
wrong. It also proved that the idea of a new force in the bipolar world order, namely the non-
aligned movement,  did  not  come to  fruition.  The West  Germans  realized  that  the  Hallstein
Doctrine  was  strong enough to  withstand even the  most  intensive  East  German diplomatic
offensive.  Conversely,  the  East  Germans  continued  to  look  for  the  cracks  in  the  Hallstein
Doctrine  in  the  non-aligned  world,  but  were  now  armed  with  the  knowledge  that  the  big
breakthrough might not come in the form they expected.
As for Yugoslavia, the Belgrade conference was a resounding success. Hosting the first
meeting of non-aligned states not only solidified its position as a leading force in the movement,
but also ensured that the message of non-alignment was heard around the world. Regarding its
relations with both Germanies, Yugoslavia was able to come out of their duel mostly unscathed.
Belgrade managed to resist  East German pressure and limited their  diplomats’ access to the
conference participants. While Tito’s position on the German question at the conference aligned
with  the  Soviet  one,  which  irritated  Bonn,  the  final  conference  communiqué  reflected  the
caution of the majority of other delegates.
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Chapter 5
Time of transition (1961-1964)
After  the  failure  of  the  East  German  campaign  to  influence  the  Belgrade  Non-aligned
Conference,  the  Yugo-East  German  relations  remained  strained,  especially  since  Belgrade
contributed  to  the  poor  East  German  results  in  Belgrade.  The  Yugoslavs  barred  entry  to
additional GDR diplomatic staff into the country, and curtailed their legation staff’s activities at
the conference. But it was West Germany that caused the first Yugo-German crisis after the
events  in  Belgrade.  On November 1,  1961,  the  police in  Munich  arrested Lazo Vračarić,  a
Yugoslav salesman, for the murder of two German soldiers. Soon after the arrest, it became
known that the warrant for Vračarić’s arrest was issued in October 1941, that the soldiers were
killed in Wehrmacht-occupied Zagreb, and that Vračarić was a Yugoslav partisan at the time.439
Vračarić was released five days later with an apology from the Munich police, but not before the
Yugoslav government seized upon his arrest  and used the embarrassing incident to  publicly
underline their long-held belief that the national socialist tendencies in the FRG were on the
rise.440 This incident opened another dimension to the contentious relations between Yugoslavia
and the FRG.
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The  Yugoslav  foreign  ministry  (Državni  sekretarijat  za  spoljne  poslove,  DSIP)
distributed notes to (former) Allied diplomatic missions in Belgrade, in which the Yugoslavs
combined their outrage over the arrest with a request for further Allied action. The Yugoslavs
wanted to prevent any future West German attempts at arresting Allied soldiers, which of course
included former Yugoslav partisans.441 The note met with a mixed reception among Western
diplomats.  Most  agreed  that  the  incident  was  unfortunate.  However,  Allied  ambassadors,
including United States’ George Kennan, rejected Yugoslav insinuations that Vračarić’s arrest
was emblematic of the rise of far right extremism in the FRG. Kennan and other ambassadors
outright refused to officially endorse the contents of the note in the name of their respective
governments.442 Nevertheless, Belgrade continued to pursue the matter. Tito himself addressed
this  incident  in  a  speech in  Skopje,  explaining  to  his  audience  that  Yugoslavia  should  feel
“lucky” about the existence of East Germany, which, unlike West Germany was not arresting
Yugoslav citizens who fought against the “barbaric occupiers” during the war. Tito continued:
The arrest of Vračarić is not just a small provocation or a reflection of positions
held by some fascist elements. It is, in fact, something deeper than an individual act
or an act of one small group. And [that means] that it is then a much deeper issue – it
is something that they want make into law, to retaliate en masse against those who
defended their country with their own blood and lives. That’s revanchism! That’s
their policy. That is the gist of it, but that is something those people who arm West
Germany with nuclear and all other kinds of weapons do not want to acknowledge,
not thinking about what will happen tomorrow when the “all hell breaks loose”443
441 Foreign ministry note, (undated), AJ KPR I-5-B/82-4, doc. no. 653/6.
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 Tito’s acerbic reaction might have seemed disproportionate compared to the incident’s severity,
but it soon became clear why Belgrade was extremely sensitive to the matter. The FRG was
indeed a hotbed of far right activity, and although the Bonn government did not directly support
the Croatian Ustashe émigrés, it was nevertheless lenient towards them, turning a blind eye to
them organizing throughout West Germany, and allowing them to become increasingly active.444
A few weeks after Vračarić’s release, on November 25, a group of Ustashe-led Croatian
nationalists  raided  a  Yugoslav  national  holiday  celebration  in  Munich,  which  the  Yugoslav
consulate organized for its citizens, comprising mostly guest workers. Several attendees were
injured  before  the  West  German  police  arrived  and  stopped  the  riot.445 The  next  day,  a
demonstration  disrupted  a  performance  of  the  Croatian  National  Ballet  in  Stuttgart.
Demonstrators held anti-Yugoslav signs, one of them reading “The killer Vracaric belongs in
prison.”446 Then,  on  December  7,  the  Yugoslav  consul  in  Munich,  Predrag  Grabovac  was
deported.  The  Croatian  émigrés  had  alerted  the  local  authorities,  via  a  Bavarian  regional
parliament member, of Grabovac’s alleged wartime activities.447 Grabovac was a partisan officer,
and had reportedly ordered the execution of hundreds of Wehrmacht prisoners.448 Wanting to
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avoid a diplomatic scandal by arresting Grabovac, and unable to guarantee his safety, the West
German authorities convinced the consul to leave the country under the cover of night. 
The Yugoslavs saw these events as an affront. How could those who suffered so much
under  the  Nazi  occupation,  and  who  came  out  of  the  war  as  victors,  be  subject  to  such
treatment? Although such questions might have been on the minds of many Yugoslavs, this
opinion was not universal, or purely natural. In a conversation with ambassador Kennan on
January 5, 1962, the Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović admitted that the Yugoslav press’s
treatment of the Vračarić case spurred much of the anti-German sentiment in Yugoslavia, which
was  especially  egregious  given  the  FRG’s  press’s  balanced  approach  to  the  same  subject.
According to Kennan, Popović also understood that Yugoslav moralizing could have a negative
effect on FRG-Yugoslav relations, especially in the tourism and trade sectors.449 Perhaps due to
Popović’s  realization,  the  Yugoslav  government  attempted  to  influence  the  public  opinion
among its citizens living abroad by issuing short term entry visas, as well as providing a 50
percent  discount  on return train tickets  from Germany to  Yugoslavia in  time for  Christmas
holidays. According to one Yugoslav report, this move was intended to disengage the Yugoslavs
abroad, many of whom felt isolated, from nationalist agitators. The Yugoslavs considered the
visa campaign a resounding success, with almost 1500 visas issued. In addition, the Yugoslav
authorities  saw  the  campaign  as  a  blow  to  the  nationalistic  diaspora,  who  allegedly  felt
demoralized by the number of visa applicants.450 This was,  however,  just  a brief  respite,  as
449 FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: 
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Yugoslavia would continue grappling with the extremists in Germany throughout the 1960s and
1970s.
Because of the latest bout of incidents involving Yugoslav émigres in the FRG, The East
Germans sensed an opportunity to drive a wedge between Belgrade and Bonn, and approached
the Yugoslavs with a gesture that was intended to stoke Yugoslav fears of fascist resurgence in
the FRG. On Christmas Day 1961, envoy Staimer presented Popović with a set of documents
pertaining to this topic. The most important item in the package was a book tendentiously titled
From  Ribbentrop  to  Adenauer,  which  addressed  the  issue  of  numerous  National  Socialist
officials still employed in the FRG government and other official bodies.451 If the East Germans
could  not  make the  Yugoslavs  align with  their  own policies,  they could  at  least  attempt  to
sabotage their chances at reconciling with the West Germans. With this in mind, the GDR’s
Belgrade  legation  staff  also  made  visits  to  Belgrade  newspapers  during  this  period,  and
attempted to influence the coverage of the FRG, but with little success.452 But another issue
altogether would burden Belgrade’s relations with both Germanies even more,  even without
German prodding.
 In  May 1961,  the  Yugoslav  government  presented  the  East  Germans with  an  aide-
memoire concerning several war reparation categories. This was a delicate matter, and the East
Germans most likely deliberately waited until after the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference to
provide an official answer, to avoid irritating the Yugoslavs at a time when their assistance with
accessing the conference was necessary.453 At a meeting in October, the East Germans signalled
451 “Zabeleška” (December 25, 1961), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, doc. no. 732/i.
452 Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin, p. 131.
453 Unofficially, the East Germans were annoyed by the aide-memoir and shifted all of the blame and 
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that they might be ready to begin planning the negotiations, but the Yugoslavs believed this to be
a stalling tactic, since East Berlin wanted to link the negotiations to a separate peace agreement.
The Yugoslavs were vehemently against a separate peace agreement since it was a unilateral
Soviet proposal, and therefore incompatible with non-alignment. The Yugoslavs were correct in
their assessment, because in March 1962 the East Germans rejected any responsibility for the
reparations  in  an  aide-memoire,  arguing  that  West  Germany  was  the  only  German  state
responsible for reparations, according to the Potsdam Agreement.454 That is, the GDR did not
consider itself a successor to the Third Reich, and could therefore not be held responsible for its
crimes. This was a position the GDR had already taken before, for example when confronted
with Israeli demands for reparations in the 1950s.455 The GDR was, however, willing to open
negotiations on some aspects of war damages, such as stolen artwork or real estate, but only
within talks on a separate peace agreement.456 While envoy Staimer, who presented the aide-
memoire to president Tito, reported that he saw this compromise as a good initial effort for
solving the issue of war reparations, later events showed that the Yugoslavs did not accept the
East  German  proposal.457 With  the  East  German  refusal  to  even  acknowledge  Yugoslavia’s
demands  as  legitimate,  the  matter  of  the  reparations  was  shaping  up  to  become  a  major
stumbling block in the relations between the two countries, albeit not the only one.
In the Yugoslav East Berlin legation’s annual assessment of bilateral relations with the
GDR for 1961, the author argued that the GDR was stuck between its position as a member of
the Soviet bloc and its own desire for international affirmation. Therefore, these contradictions
454 “Aide-memoire” (undated, most likely March 13, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, no number.
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also weighed heavily on their relations with Yugoslavia. On the one hand, the author argued,
Yugoslavia could have been useful in legitimizing GDR’s diplomatic forays in the non-aligned
world. On the other hand, bloc allegiances limited the extent of this cooperation. The author
singled  out  two  events  from  the  past  year  that  exemplified  these  two  considerations:  the
Belgrade Conference and the separate peace agreement.458 Paradoxically, the GDR wanted to
take advantage of  Yugoslavia’s non-alignment  in order  to  elicit  recognition from Asian and
African countries, but also draw it closer to the Soviet Bloc, which a separate peace agreement
between Yugoslavia and the GDR would undoubtedly do.
These evaluations occurred in the shadow of the 22nd Communist Party of the Soviet
Union Congress – held from October 17-31, 1961 – where Khrushchev addressed the relations
between  the  USSR  and  Yugoslavia,  but  without  reaching  a  clear  resolution.  Although
Khrushchev  attacked  the  Yugoslavs  for  their  “revisionism,”  he  proposed  better  bilateral
relations.459 Khrushchev  also  announced  a  new  round  of  de-Stalinization,  which  Belgrade
greeted  positively,  although  it  added  to  the  generally  contradictory  messages  coming  from
Moscow.460 Mixed signals from Moscow most likely did not satisfy East Germans, since Soviet
decisions still, for the most part, steered their foreign policy. Moreover, Khrushchev’s address at
the congress tested East Berlin’s own relations with Moscow. The Soviet leader had stated that if
Western Powers were willing to cooperate with the Soviets in solving the German questions,
then the separate peace agreement with the GDR could be postponed. Having expressed this
position, Khrushchev directly reneged his promise to sign the agreement by the end of the year,
458 “Izveštaj: bilateralni odnosi” (January 10, 1962), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, no number.
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40.
149
lest  the  Four  Powers  come  to  a  satisfactory  arrangement.461 The  promise  was  made  in  a
memorandum published after Khrushchev’s meeting with president Kennedy in June in Vienna.
However,  the  construction  of  the  Berlin  Wall  changed  the  circumstances  under  which  the
memorandum was drafted. The Wall might have been Khrushchev’s concession to Ulbricht’s
pressure, but its construction itself was not the East German leader’s ultimate goal. As Hope
Harrison argues, Ulbricht was going to be satisfied only with the annexation of West Berlin.462
He  continued  to  provoke  Western  military  personnel  throughout  the  fall  of  1961,  which
culminated in a military standoff between Soviet and American troops at Checkpoint Charlie in
the last days of October. Kennedy and Khrushchev quickly agreed to diffuse the situation, which
was  the  nearest  the  two  came  to  an  armed  conflict  during  the  crisis.  In  the  aftermath,
Khrushchev naturally took a much more restrictive position towards Ulbricht after realizing that
he  could  not  be  satisfied.  Ulbricht’s  actions  seemed  to  portent  an  even  more  belligerent
approach to the Berlin question he would embrace in the first half of 1962.463
Despite  the complications surrounding the war  reparations,  the relations  between the
Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) did not seem to
suffer during this period, and in fact most of the planned contacts between various party bodies
and  mass  organizations  in  1961  were  fulfilled,  with  the  head  of  the  SED  foreign  policy
department Peter Florin even agreeing to visit Belgrade at some point in the following year.464 In
Belgrade there were some misgivings about several SED initiatives, such as their request for
Nazi-era  documents  in  Yugoslav  possession,  which  could  incriminate  some  West  German
461 Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, p. 213.
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officials.  But even in this instance the Yugoslavs were reluctant to comply.  This reluctance,
however,  was  not  motivated  by  bilateral  concerns.  The  Yugoslavs  merely  wanted  to  avoid
supplying ammunition for the GDR’s attacks on the FRG.465 Although they themselves often
criticized  the  FRG’s  unwillingness  to  address  fascist  tendencies  in  West  German  society,
Yugoslavia decided against positioning itself in the conflict between the two Germanies. This,
then, was a reflection of Yugoslavia’s policy of non-alignment, rather than a desire to undermine
the GDR’s position vis-a-vis the FRG, or to weaken inter-party relations. 
Good party relations notwithstanding, the Yugoslavs were not willing to be lenient in the
matter  of  reparations  due  to  financial  needs  and  in  May  1962  considered  escalating  the
diplomatic exchange by issuing a note, rather than an aide-memoire, which was a considerably
more serious diplomatic statement.466 The note draft’s content clearly showed that Belgrade was
not  ready  to  accept  the  East  German attempt  to  wash their  hands  of  responsibility  for  the
reparations, since there were whole groups of Yugoslav citizens – for example, workers who
contributed to the German social insurance fund while working on German territory now part of
the GDR – whose claims were not addressed in the Potsdam Agreement.467
For Ulbricht, the outlook was less than promising in regards to Yugoslavia’s potential
agreement to East German demands. Stonewalled by Tito, he could hardly rely on Khrushchev
to  apply pressure on the  Yugoslavs.  After  the  22nd CPSU Congress,  the  Soviets  were more
amicable towards Tito than they had been in years, and were very concerned with improving
bilateral relations, as demonstrated when the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko visited
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Belgrade in an atmosphere of mutual friendship. Gromyko invited Tito to visit Moscow, and the
Yugoslavs reciprocated by inviting the Soviet head of state Leonid Brezhnev to Belgrade.468
Although the invitations were for state leaders  rather  than party chairmen,  they nonetheless
represented a considerable improvement in Yugo-Soviet relations. The friendly meeting between
Tito  and  Gromyko  and  the  invitations  for  state  visits  marked  yet  another  thaw  between
Yugoslavia and the USSR. This was a stark contrast to the instability of previous years, when
their relations suffered, mostly due to Soviet frustration at Yugoslavia’s non-alignment, and their
subsequent accusations of Belgrade’s revisionism. 
The Soviets did not want to endanger these relations by leaning on Yugoslavia to sign the
peace  agreement  with  the  GDR,  especially  since  Khrushchev  downgraded  its  importance.
Moreover, Ulbricht could not even count on Soviet assistance domestically. The Soviet Union
had  experienced  a  catastrophic  harvest  in  the  fall  of  1961,  and  the  knock-on  effect  led  to
makeshift  solutions such as increased food prices and tinkering at  the lowest organizational
levels, neither of which actually improved the dire situation. Although Khrushchev promised
massive investments in agriculture, he soon had to go back on his promise, and even pretended
he never gave it. There was simply not enough money for any such endeavour.469 So when the
East Germans approached the Soviets with a request for more financial support – which both
sides had nominally agreed upon earlier in the year – they were turned away with the sarcastic
recommendation to prove to everyone that they were indeed the “socialist showpiece” and help
their  economy themselves.470 Without  the  support  of  their  patrons,  there  was  little  the  East
Germans could do to soften Yugoslavia’s position on the reparations by using their usual tactics.
468 Tripković, Jugoslavija - SSSR: 1956-1971, p. 129.
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The United States, like the GDR, were also monitoring the thaw between Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union with some dismay. Tito’s pro-Soviet statements at the Belgrade non-aligned
conference were only the beginning of a difficult period for US-Yugoslav relations. Ambassador
Kennan was initially very much in favour of some type of punishment in the aftermath of the
conference, preferably by ending one of the economic aid programs. His reasoning was that
there was no danger of Yugoslavia’s returning to the Soviet camp, that US aid was not crucial
for its survival, and that in fact it only provided Tito the opportunity to engage in Third World
enterprises, effectively funding non-alignment.471 The United States Congress was also of the
opinion that a country with such explicit pro-Soviet positions should not be receiving aid from
the  US.  Then,  in  April  1962,  another  incident  occurred  which  burdened  their  relationship
further. The Yugoslav dissident and Tito’s former close associate Milovan Djilas was arrested
after his book Conversations with Stalin was released in the West, with the Yugoslav authorities
insinuating that the US embassy in Belgrade had assisted Djilas in publishing the book.472 Such
allegations angered the State Department, which instructed Kennan to confront the Yugoslavs.473
Since they never offered concrete evidence for US involvement, the incident did not escalate.
The  planting  of  the  idea  was  a  poor  decision,  especially  in  the  light  of  then-current
Congressional debates over the extension of Yugoslavia’s status as a "most favoured nation," as
well  as fate  of some aid programs.474 Finally,  in June,  the Congress decided to  vote on the
matter.  In  the  months  following  the  Belgrade  Conference,  Kennan  had slowly  changed his
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position on Yugoslavia, and had even travelled to Washington to lobby for the status extension,
but he could not overturn the decidedly anti-Yugoslav sentiment in the Congress, which voted
against the extension.475 President Kennedy’s later intervention ensured that at least agricultural
surplus could be sent to Yugoslavia, preventing a total halt of American aid.476 Not surprisingly,
the vote in Congress did nothing to correct Yugoslavia’s foreign policy in American favour. To
be sure, Belgrade’s friendlier rapport with Moscow might have seemed like a slippery slope to
some  observers  in  Washington,  but  George  Kennan  was  right.  There  was  no  danger  of
Yugoslavia returning to the Soviet camp, although a Yugoslav official  did ask him after the
Congress vote whether the Americans wanted them to return to the Bloc.477 The question, of
course, was rhetorical.
Many of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy considerations in the fall of 1962 were influenced
by the Cuban Missile Crisis.478 With the world facing the biggest postwar crisis, Yugoslavia
could ill afford tipping the balance of the US-Soviet stand-off, but it also did not want to refrain
from involvement in Cold War global politics at such a crucial moment. Therefore, Yugoslavia
chose to limit its activities to the United Nations, where it participated in an effort coordinated
with other non-aligned countries to negotiate a favourable outcome to the crisis. Although Tito
475 Jakovina, Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici, p. 172.
476 Bogetić, Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, p. 75.
477 Jakovina, Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici, p. 173.
478 On the Cuban Missile Crisis, see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: 
Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse, 2nd ed. edition (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2002); Sheldon M. Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality, 
Stanford Nuclear Age Series (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); James G. Blight and janet M. Lang, 
The Armageddon Letters: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2015); For a non-binary perspective on the historiography of the Crisis, see Mark Laffey 
and Jutta Weldes, “Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 
(September 2008): 555–77.
154
made some remarks that Washington recognized as pro-Soviet, Yugoslavia managed to come out
of the crisis on relatively good terms with both superpowers.479
Yugoslavia’s position in the Cold War thus remained the same, and while there was much
overlap with the Soviets on many global issues, the non-aligned philosophy made Yugoslavia
wary of unconditionally following Moscow’s lead. A Yugoslav foreign ministry report on the
German question showed Belgrade’s irritation regarding the USSR’s German policy. According
to  the  report,  the  Soviets  ignored  Yugoslavia  as  a  legitimate  participant  in  the  diplomatic
discussions about Germany, even though Yugoslavia had a “sovereign interest” in this matter,
which could have a negative effect on Yugo-Soviet relations.480 While the Yugoslavs wanted to
avoid appearing like one of the Warsaw Pact countries, they saw no danger in continuing on the
path of improved bilateral relations with the Soviets.
The Yugoslavs were also reevaluating their relationship with the two Germanies at this
juncture. They most certainly preferred to mend their relations with Bonn rather than with East
Berlin. In April 1962, the Yugoslav ambassador in Rome Mihailo Javorski told his West German
colleague  that  the  recognition  of  the  GDR was  a  mistake.  Nevertheless,  this  confession  –
sanctioned by Tito – was not a harbinger of any real change, since Yugoslavia never made any
formal (or public) statements to this effect.481 To be sure, the West Germans themselves were not
rushing to extend an olive branch to the Yugoslavs, and they made this clear both privately and
publicly.482 Javorski’s  message,  however,  was  revealing  of  Tito’s  true  sentiment  regarding
479 Bogetić, Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, p. 94.
480 “Nemačko pitanje i naša aktivnost” (July 25, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, doc. no. 492/i.
481 Indeed, Yugoslavia lobbied for the GDR’s membership in the The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development in April 1962. Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin, p. 141.
482 Ibid., 145.
155
Yugoslavia and the two Germanies. Five years after they recognized the GDR, there were still
no tangible benefits for Yugoslavia. 
Conversely,  the  East  Germans  probably  recognized  that  the  latest  Yugo-Soviet
rapprochement was not a temporary blip, especially after Khrushchev travelled to Yugoslavia in
April in order to gain Tito’s support for a summit on disarmament in Geneva.483 Given the state
of the GDR’s own relations with the USSR and Yugoslavia, a course correction was the only
reasonable  option  for  East  Berlin.  This  resulted  in  front  line  reshuffling.  In  July  1962,  the
GDR’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MfAA) dispatched Gerhard Waschewski to Belgrade to
replace the prickly attaché Glückauf.484 Waschewski’s approach was friendlier, and he tried to
insert  the  GDR  in  the  narrative  of  Yugo-Soviet  rapprochement.  After  Brezhnev’s  visit  to
Yugoslavia in September, Waschewski informed his hosts that Yugoslavia’s relations with other
“socialist  countries  were  good,  and  that  there  are  realistic  opportunities  for  their
improvement.”485 A couple of weeks later, Waschewski was even more direct and suggested that
Brezhnev’s visit could have a positive effect on GDR’s relations with Yugoslavia, but he did not
elaborate  on  this  point.486 From  the  Yugoslav  perspective,  East  German  motives  were
transparent. Their advances were meant to take advantage of the Yugo-Soviet rapprochement in
order to increase the chances of Yugoslavia signing a separate peace agreement with them, and
to improve the GDR’s overall international standing. Because of this, the East Germans also
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began evaluating Yugoslavia’s non-alignment more positively, especially in the light of the latest
GDR campaign for a separate peace agreement. Namely, if Yugoslavia signed the agreement, it
would have had a great effect in the rest of the non-aligned world. The East Germans were less
forthcoming in the matter of war reparations, and delayed answering the Yugoslav note from
earlier in the year.487 The West Germans were also facing Belgrade’s renewed claim for war
reparations,  which now included additional victim groups affected by the National Socialist
occupation, such as Jews or the victims of Nazi collaborators. The West Germans believed that
Yugoslavia’s demands were fuelled by its  urgent need for hard currency. What other reason
would the Yugoslavs have for increasing the total number of victims?488 The number of Jewish
WW2 victims was indeed known for years, so for Yugoslavs to have included it only now lent
the German assessment some credibility. 
The Yugoslavs never pursued this claim beyond that initial demand, and by the end of
the year, the issue of the far right Croatian diaspora exploded again and removed the reparations
from the  agenda  of  bilateral  issues,  for  the  time  being.  On November  29,  1962,  the  main
Yugoslav state holiday (Republic Day), twenty-six armed Croats from an organization calling
itself  the  Croatian Brotherhood  of  Crusaders  stormed  the  Yugoslav  mission  in  Bonn’s  Bad
Godensberg neighbourhood. They fatally injured the janitor, a Yugoslav citizen, and detonated
explosive  devices  that  destroyed  the  mission’s  interior.  The  Yugoslavs  were  outraged  and
berated  the  West  Germans  for  allowing  the  Ustashe  émigrés  to  continue  organizing  after
numerous warnings from Belgrade, especially in the wake of the violent incidents in 1961.489
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This latest incident was especially worrisome for the Yugoslavs because of the terrorist group’s
composition. The organizers were well know Ustashe, or Ustashe sympathizers – one of them
was the WW2 Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić’s personal chaplain – but many of the attackers were
recent  immigrants,  including  guest  workers,  whom  the  organizers  had  recruited  in  West
Germany.490 The Yugoslav realization that the Ustashe émigrés had the ability to indoctrinate
new members who were free to return to Yugoslavia at any point was, in the long term, the most
dangerous aspect  of  this  incident.  On the other  hand,  the West  German authorities’ biggest
concern was the escalation of violence. Whereas previously the Ustashe had committed terrorist
attacks, this one surpassed them all in scale of violence and the number of armed assailants. And
although  the  attack  prompted  the  West  Germans  to  concentrate  on  breaking  up  Ustashe
organizations,  they  could  not  prevent  them  from  organizing.491 The  Ustashe  were  able  to
organize a conference in Munich just a month after the attack in Bonn, and the Yugoslav foreign
ministry lamented the influence the Croatian organizations had on the Croatian guest workers,
who accounted for almost two thirds of the Yugoslav guest worker population in the FRG in
1962/1963.492 
Bonn was embarrassed by the incidents and its own inability to prevent them. Initially, it
feared  a  strong reaction  from Tito,  and believed that  he  might  even  break off  all  consular
relations  between  the  two countries,  leaving them without  any  diplomatic  ties.493 However,
Belgrade’s constant criticism was not well received at the West German foreign office, who
rebuked  the  Yugoslavs  for  “not  showing  interest  in  improving  mutual  cooperation,  for
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‘prescribing’ Bonn what needs to be done in regards to the émigrés, and that following the crime
committed in  Bad Godesberg it  has  organized a  campaign against  the [Federal  Republic  of
Germany].”494 This message was the prevalent sentiment in Bonn, but the FRG representative at
the French embassy in Belgrade, Hans Bock, rushed to point out that it was not the official Bonn
position, but rather a hot-headed reaction by some officials. He argued that the arrest of several
émigrés  and  the  ban  of  the  Croatian Brotherhood  of  Crusaders  proved  that  the  FRG  was
proactive in preventing any further incidents.495 Indeed, the Yugoslav foreign ministry saw these
actions as a “positive [...] step.”496
Milan Georgijević, the Yugoslav diplomatic representative in Bonn, gave a presentation
in late April at the Yugoslav foreign ministry on the relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia.
According  to  his  analysis,  they  were  developing  satisfactorily.  He  expected,  rather
optimistically,  that  the FRG would be mindful  of Yugoslavia’s  influence in the non-aligned
world regarding the German question, and that it might gradually move toward solving open
bilateral questions, which would hint at a complete abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine.497
Georgijević’s assessment contradicted an earlier  Yugoslav report  about a meeting between a
West German and a Yugoslav official  in Paris  in November of 1962. The Yugoslav official
complained  about  the  West  German  obstructionism  in  various  international  organizations,
including  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  and  The  Organisation  for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Yugoslav official believed that the West
German actions were part of the Hallstein Doctrine, since dealing with Yugoslavia on an equal
494 “Zabeleška” (March 21, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. 242/i.
495 Ibid.
496 “Fernschreiben” (March 15, 1963), PA AA, AA B 42-39, p. 28.
497 “Neki aspekti politike SR Nemačke” (April 27, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. K-76/55.
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footing in these organizations would have implied a partial lifting of the Doctrine. His West
German colleague, “clearly affected” by these accusations, denied their validity, but also added
that  West  German officials  might  have been operating under  old  instructions  from Bonn.498
Since  this  explanation  is  unlikely,  it  was  clear  that  the  FRG  did  not  want  Yugoslavia  to
participate  in  the  West  European  economic  sphere  as  an  equal.  Nevertheless,  Georgijević
remained optimistic.
Georgijević  (who,  incidentally,  was present  during  the  Croat  attack  on  the  Yugoslav
mission) then moved on to the matter of the Croat émigrés in the FRG. He found this issue to be
less  important  than  others,  acknowledging  that  the  West  German  authorities  were  actively
working on breaking up terrorist cells, even though they were avoiding prohibiting all types of
diaspora  organizing.  It  was  up  to  Yugoslavia  to  keep  reminding  the  West  Germans  of  the
negative  effects  of  allowing  these  groups  to  exist,  while  at  the  same  time  regulating  the
composition of the guest  workers leaving for  the FRG. Georgijević  added that  the issue of
reparations could also be remedied by “systematic action toward the political and social forces
in  FR  Germany  which  can  influence  the  government’s  policies  toward  fulfilling  the  [...]
obligations toward Yugoslavia.” Georgijević had hoped that both the parliamentary opposition
and  the  more  left-leaning  elements  in  the  government  could  be  persuaded  to  lobby  for
Belgrade’s interests in this matter.499 
Khrushchev’s close calls with the Americans in Cuba and Berlin made him aware that
cooperation was better than confrontation, and in the spirit of this realization he informed the
498 “Zabeleška” (December 4, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. 439443, p. 3.
499 Here Georgijević mentions the SPD and FDP, as well as the progressive wing of the CDU as parties which 
might be sympathetic to Yugoslavia’s demands. “Neki aspekti politike SR Nemačke” (April 27, 1963), AJ KPR 
I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. K-76/55.
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Americans that he was ready to discuss the most pressing Cold War issues. Germany was not
one  of  them.  He told  the  Americans  that  the  German  question  was  “practically  solved.”500
Although Kennedy initially ignored his advances, Khrushchev adopted a wait-and-see approach,
and by mid-1963 the two were exchanging reconciliatory messages.501 Accepting the principle
of compromise in diplomacy, Khrushchev was also able to mend his relationship with Tito, who
spent more than two weeks in the USSR in December of 1962.502 
The Americans did not seem to find Yugoslavia’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union
too problematic.  US secretary of state Dean Rusk visited Belgrade in May 1963 to discuss
bilateral matters, but also probe Yugoslavia’s relations with the USSR, and its position on Cuba,
which was still a thorn in America’s side. Yugoslavia’s foreign minister Koča Popović pointed
out the differences in opinion regarding Cuba, but praised Kennedy for his restraint in the matter
during the crisis.503 As for the Yugo-Soviet relationship, Popović assured Rusk that theirs was
“good” and “normal,” but not “brotherly,” and that they were certainly not allies.504 According to
Yugoslav sources, Rusk was satisfied with what he heard in Belgrade.505
Ulbricht  was  left  in  the  lurch  by  his  patron  in  Moscow,  and  he  therefore  chose  to
maintain a foreign policy that was less aggressive, much as it was since late 1962.506 Ulbricht’s
more temperate approach also applied to Yugoslavia. Furthermore, his more benevolent stance
toward Tito’s brand of socialism might have also been partially influenced by the outcome of the
internal ideological shift in Yugoslavia. The struggle between the ‘reformists’ lead by Edvard
500 Taubman, Khrushchev: The man and his Era, p. 582.
501 Ibid., p. 602.
502 Geoffrey Swain, Tito, p. 135.
503 FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 160.
504 Bogetić, Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971, p. 129.
505 Ibid.
506 Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, p. 218.
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Kardelj and the ‘dogmatists’ lead by Aleksandar Ranković was, for the time being, tipped in
favour  of  the  latter  when  he  was  elected  secretary  of  the  SKJ  Central  Committee.  The
rapprochement  with  Moscow  and  the  dogmatist  victory  were  hardly  signs  of  Yugoslavia’s
complete surrender to Moscow, as some Western observers had feared, but they undoubtedly
lessened the East Germans’ apprehension.507
After deciding that Yugoslavia’s deviations were not as dangerous any more, the East
Germans invited a Yugoslavs delegation to the SED congress in January 1963. The Yugoslavs
accepted the invitation and dispatched a delegation,  with positive results.  On their  return to
Belgrade, they reported that the East German treatment of their delegation pointed to a general
reluctance to engage with the SKJ delegates, but that overall their visit was an improvement for
party  relations,  and  that  any  negativity  should  not  be  perceived  as  a  result  of  particular
animosity  towards  Yugoslavia,  but  rather  that  it  was  the  result  of  the  “existing  dogmatic
burden.” The author’s impression was that Yugoslavia was finally “legalized [sic]” as a socialist
country in the GDR, which opened up room for closer relations between the two countries.508
Another SKJ report also noted the positive effect these changes could have on their bilateral
relations,  welcoming  the  “favourable  opportunities”  despite  the  “reserve  and  elements  of
declarativity” still found in East German statements.509 These impressions were not completely
wrong. In the month of the SED congress, the two countries began negotiations regarding the
wartime social insurance payments, a significant part of Yugoslavia’s war reparations demands,
507 A 1963 NATO report warned that Tito might side with the Soviets in case of a new world war. Evanthis 
Hatzivassiliou, “The Puzzle of the Heretical: Yugoslavia in NATO Political Analysis, 1951–72,” in The 
Balkans in the Cold War, ed. Svetozar Rajak (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2017), 89–108, p. 97.
508 “Izveštaj o VI. Kongresu SEDa, održanog pd 15. 1. - 21. 1. 1963.” (February 20, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 
A-CK SKJ.
509 “Bilateralni odnosi u 1963. godini” (undated), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ.
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and the only one for which the East Germans accepted responsibility.510 Then, in March, a GDR
delegation arrived in Belgrade to continue the negotiations. It seemed that East Germans were
becoming more at ease with the Yugoslavs even though the negotiations were difficult, because
at the margins of these meetings Johannes Könnig, GDR’s deputy foreign minister (and chief
GDR negotiator at the meetings), met with his Yugoslav counterpart Dušan Kveder to ask for
Yugoslavia’s assistance regarding an East German delegation’s trip to Africa.511 The Yugoslavs
obliged, and on April 1 the delegation, headed by the GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer, arrived
in Belgrade, where they stayed for a day before continuing on to Africa.512
The early 1960s were a boom period for the GDR in regards to developing relations with
the non-aligned countries in Africa and Asia. The East Germans themselves were not content
with their achievements because they were measuring them against their ultimate goal, namely
breaking through the Hallstein Doctrine.513 The most glaring example of the FRG’s stranglehold
on  African  countries  was  the  case  of  Guinea,  whose  president  Sékou  Touré  seemed  to  be
sympathetic to the East German cause.514 The GDR’s efforts to elicit Guinea’s recognition were
thwarted  in  1960 by Bonn after  a  series  of  close  calls,  including a  verbal  promise from a
Guinean diplomat in East Berlin that Touré authorized him to establish diplomatic relations with
the  GDR.515 However,  considering  the  circumstances,  the  East  German  results  were  not
catastrophic in the long term. While the Belgrade Conference was a failure by all metrics, the
510 Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin, p. 154; “Nota Demokratske Republike Nemačke o našim potraživanjima” 
(November 23, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, no number.
511 “Zabeleška” (March 20, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 194/i.
512 “Zabeleška” (April 1, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 231/i.
513 As noted in the SED ZK report “Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen der DDR zu den Afrikanischen Staaten im 
Jahre 1961,” (February 23, 1962) SAPMO BARCH, DY 30/IV 2/20/53, pp. 11-24.
514 Touré had been active in French communist circles, and Guinea was a single party state, ruled by “a body 
known as the Politburo.” Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 106.
515 Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, p. 95.
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connections  forged with  a  number  of  African  and Asian countries  at  lower levels  –  mostly
through trade missions – seemed satisfactory when compared to the humble results of the 1950s.
The wave of independence that swept Africa from 1960 to 1962, coupled with a larger, more
organized East German diplomacy, formed the foundation for these advances. The nature and
scope of East German operations in Africa and Asia showed that they could not compete with
the FRG economically, and they therefore placed heavy emphasis on cultural diplomacy. Their
aim was to show the Africans that everything that is “good, beautiful and progressive in German
history” had its home in the GDR.516 
Shipping Marxist literature to non-aligned countries and inviting their students to the
GDR were tasks that the East Germans could surmount, at least most of the time.517 But they
needed all the help they could get to make a dent in the FRG’s economic supremacy in Africa
and Asia. This was the reason minister Winzer asked for an audience with the Yugoslavs before
departing for Africa. Winzer flattered his host, deputy foreign minister Marko Nikezić, noting
that the GDR could learn much from Yugoslavs about the African countries because out of all
the  socialist  countries,  they had the most  developed relations  with them. More specifically,
Winzer was looking to meet with a Yugoslav delegation that was already in Africa in order to
learn from them about the local economic situation, which could help them outmanoeuvre the
FRG. The Yugoslavs  saw no reason why the  two should not  meet,  if  their  paths  in  Africa
crossed.518 More to the point, Winzer also probed Yugoslavia’s willingness to aid the GDR in
516 “Orientierung für die Planung der kulturellen Beziehungen mit den afrikanischen, arabischen und 
südostasiatischen Ländern im Jahre 1963” (undated) PA AA, MfAA, A 16837, p. 288.
517 The East Germans did sometimes blunder when shipping propaganda to the non-aligned countries. For 
example, the GDR trade mission in Conakry, Guinea received a shipment of political literature in Swedish. 
“Stenografische Niederschrift: Sitzung des Ausschusses für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der Volkskammer der 
GDR,” (May 16, 1962) PA AA, MfAA, A 14816, p. 143.
518 “Iz zabeleške” (April 1, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, 232/i.
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gaining non-aligned support and “combating the Hallstein Doctrine.”519 The Yugoslavs did warn
the Americans that they would launch a campaign for the GDR’s recognition among the non-
aligned countries as early as February, but it seems that this was a plank of their anti-FRG plans
following the Ustasha incidents, rather than a result of East German lobbying.520
In general, the East Germans seemed to have interpreted these recent manifestations of
Yugoslav goodwill as an invitation to maximize the extent of their diplomatic relations, both
symbolically  but  also  concretely.  MfAA officials  in  East  Berlin  approached  the  Yugoslav
legation  on  several  occasions  with  the  request  to  upgrade  their  legations  to  embassies.  A
relatively small distinction, it was nevertheless a symbol of Yugoslav reluctance – maintaining
legations had been their idea – to irritate the West Germans, diplomatic threats notwithstanding.
Therefore, East Germans would have considered attaining the rank of an embassy a notable
victory  over  the  FRG.  Not  surprisingly,  Belgrade  resisted  these  requests,  despite  numerous
overtures. The reasoning behind Yugoslav resistance was twofold. First, if the upgrade was such
a  desirable  goal  for  the  GDR,  denying  them would  keep  East  Berlin’s  criticism somewhat
subdued,  since  the  only  way  to  achieve  the  upgrade  was  through  cooperation.  Second,
Yugoslavia was still not willing to provoke the FRG and the West in general, especially over a
matter as trivial as this  one (even though they indirectly threatened the West Germans with
doing  just  that  a  few months  earlier).521 Indeed,  Tito  told  the  US ambassador  in  Belgrade
519 “Aktuelna pitanja iz bilateralnih odnosa SFRJ-NDR” (April 9, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 85-
86.
520 These retribution tactics included bringing this matter up in front of the United Nations, upgrading the GDR 
legation to an embassy, and limiting the number of German lessons in Yugoslav schools. “Gespräch des 
Ministerialdirigenten Reinkemeyer mit dem amerikanischen Gesandten Morris” (February 26, 1963), AAPD 
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Kennan that Yugoslavia would not sacrifice its relations with any of its Western neighbours just
to  improve  relations  with  the  USSR.522 This  policy  presumably  extended  beyond  the
neighbouring countries. 
A more consequential issue where the GDR saw Yugoslavia as a useful ally was their
campaign for United Nations membership. Yugoslavia had had a history of proactively working
to include the East Germans into the activities of various UN bodies. For example, the Yugoslav
representative in the Economic Commission had consistently employed East German experts in
its projects, which were open to citizens of non-member states as well.523 In July 1963, the East
Germans asked the Yugoslavs to advocate for their  place as an official  observer at  the UN.
While this was one of many East German campaigns to penetrate the Hallstein Doctrine by
gaining a  foothold  in  international  organizations,  this  one  was  limited  to  lobbying socialist
countries. It was therefore significant that Yugoslavia was the only country outside the Soviet
Bloc that the East Germans approached in this campaign.524 Envoy Staimer did not provide any
reason for this departure, but it was further evidence of East Berlin’s changing attitudes toward
Yugoslavia after years of distrust.
Other areas of bilateral relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia were also showing
signs  of  improvement,  although  perhaps  not  as  fast  as  the  diplomacy.  For  example,  the
economic exchange for 1963 was projected to rise by nine percent over last years trade volume
amounting  to  around  100  million  US  dollars.525 A respectable  increase,  but  according  to
522 FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 154.
523 This practice stopped in September 1963, presumably due to Western intervention. “Zabeleška” (January 27, 
1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 412820.
524 “Iz zabeleške” (July 23, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, 487/i.
525 “Aktuelna pitanja iz bilateralnih odnosa SFRJ-NDR” (April 9, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 86. 
According to the East German annual report, the exact sum was 98 million dollars. Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-
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Yugoslav reports for the previous year, trade between the two countries was suffering due to
solvency issues on both sides. The Yugoslavs also lamented the relatively narrow fields of trade,
with the largest issue for them being the inability to buy machinery from the GDR.526 The least
developed area of cooperation in 1962 seemed to have been scientific and technical exchange.
An agreement  to improve cooperation in  these areas  was signed in  1960, but had not  been
fulfilled. Here the Yugoslavs blamed the East Germans for the agreement’s failure, citing their
unwillingness to even begin its implementation.527 However, due to the thaw in their relations
beginning in  1963,  the  East  Germans  finally  started  showing  some interest  in  reviving the
agreement.528 The reasons for the East German awakening in regard to this agreement probably
owed something to the ‘New Economic System’, a program of reforms announced at the Sixth
Congress of the SED in January, with the first reforms enacted by mid-1963. The NES was a
comprehensive  plan  that  envisioned  a  more  flexible  East  German  economy,  which  would
improve its efficiency as well as technological development.529 Mass organization cooperation
between Yugoslavia and the GDR was also satisfactory,  as demonstrated by the visit  of the
Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ) delegation to the GDR in March
and the GDR’s National Front delegation visit to Yugoslavia in November.530
Cultural relations were the most successful area of cooperation between the GDR and
Yugoslavia in 1962 and 1963. The highlights included the Croatian National Theatre’s guest
526 “Bilateralni odnosi izmedju FNRJ-NDR u 1962. godini” (undated), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 73.
527 Ibid., p. 74.
528 “Aktuelna pitanja iz bilateralnih odnosa SFRJ-NDR” (April 9, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 86.
529  Ralf Ahrens “Debt, Cooperation, and Collapse East German Foreign Trade in the Honecker Years,” in Hartmut
Berghoff and Uta Andrea Balbier, (eds.), The East German Economy, 1945-2010: Falling Behind or Catching 
Up? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 166.
530 “Zabeleška o poseti delegacija Nacionalnog fronta demokratske Nemačke” (undated, but covers the period 
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appearance in East Berlin, and the Dresden Philharmonic concert in Dubrovnik, both of which
were reported on in the East German press devoid of the usual political commentary, to the point
where the praise seemed excessive and “at times spilled over into flattery,” a treatment to which
the Yugoslavs were evidently not used to.531 The only seemingly contentious question remaining
unanswered in the bilateral relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia was the latter’s demand
for  reparations.  Although  Belgrade  agreed  to  lower  its  demand  by  more  than  half,  from a
hundred forty-seven to seventy million Deutschmarks, the East Germans were ready to only pay
fifty million.532 Although the East Germans promised not to drag out the negotiations, there were
no  indications  that  they  were  going  to  be  resolved  quickly,  given  the  GDR’s  issues  with
solvency.  The  matter  of  reparations,  coincidentally,  would  be  the  reason  that  brought  the
Yugoslavs and the West Germans back to the negotiating table in the spring of 1963, this time
under somewhat friendlier circumstances.
The struggle to find a common language
After the dust had momentarily settled on the issue of Croatian fascists  in the FRG,
Belgrade continued its pursuit of war reparations. Back in March, Bonn informed Belgrade that
it was willing to form a joint commission to discuss “Yugoslav wishes in the area of economy.”
In addition, the West Germans were willing to consider increasing the amount of reparations for
the victims of human experiments, but reestablishing talks about general war reparations was
out of the question.  This decision was a compromise,  by which the FRG aimed to improve
531 “Bilateralni odnosi izmedju FNRJ-NDR u 1962. godini” (January 8, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, 
p. 89.
532 “Aktuelna pitanja iz bilateralnih odnosa SFRJ-NDR” (April 9, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 87.
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relations with Yugoslavia, but also show the “fickle neutrals” that the recognition of the GDR
had economic consequences as well.533 
The Americans played a key role in nudging the West Germans to reopen negotiations
with the Yugoslavs. According to the FRG foreign office, the US would welcome new talks,
since they would strengthen the Western, and weaken the GDR’s position in Belgrade.534 It was
not surprising that Washington was the initiator of these talks. President Kennedy was still at
loggerheads with the Congress in May over aid for Yugoslavia.535 A friendly gesture from one of
America’s allies would have certainly helped to keep Yugoslavia closer to the West. Despite
Tito’s proclamations of non-alignment, Washington did not want to rely purely on his word.
Thus a joint West German-Yugoslav commission met in Vienna for two days in mid-May to
discuss the agenda for a future meeting. The outcome reflected the long backlog of economic
issues plaguing their relations. The Yugoslavs wanted to discusses various issues concerning
trade,  industrial  and  technological  cooperation,  as  well  as  the  vague  but  crucial  “financial
questions.” However, the meeting was hardly a West German courtesy to the Americans. Bonn
provided the other half of the agenda, including the contrarian demand for compensation for
German workers in Yugoslavia.536
The negotiations themselves took place over two sessions in Belgrade and Munich, and
the Yugoslavs ended them abruptly on July 12. They justified their  decision with what they
perceived to be a lack of good faith from Bonn. The talks did in fact reveal that there was much
mistrust on both sides. From Belgrade’s perspective, the West German decision to renege on
533 “Vermerk” (July 2, 1963), PA AA, AA B 42-39, p. 134.
534 Ibid.
535 FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: 
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their position on various points in the time between the preparatory talks in Vienna and the first
round of negotiations in Belgrade, and the refusal to seriously consider Yugoslav demands were
reasons valid enough to end the talks. The Yugoslav foreign ministry pinpointed several reasons
for the change in West German attitude: the lack of funds necessary to fulfill Yugoslav demands,
FRG’s foreign minister Gerhard Schröder’s need to placate the CDU’s right wing, and Bonn’s
fear that Yugoslavia and the GDR might finally agree to upgrade their respective legations to
embassies. Whatever the West German reasons may have been, Bonn offered to resolve issues
other than the reparations, which to the Yugoslavs seemed like a compromise which was mostly
cosmetic,  and  not  intended  to  truly  improve  relations.537 The  West  Germans  were  slightly
disappointed, but hardly angry, since these were the first official talks between the two countries
since  1957  and  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations.538 In  fact,  the  West  German
representative  in  Belgrade  Hans  Bock  even  said  as  much  during  his  first  audience  at  the
Yugoslav foreign ministry after the negotiations were broken off. Bock also relayed the FRG’s
readiness to resume negotiations at any moment. Belgrade did not immediately accept this offer,
although the Yugoslavs were pleased with the West German self-criticism, and they did leave
open the possibility of more talks in the fall. Finally, the Yugoslavs agreed to sign one of the
agreements discussed in Munich, namely the reparations for the victims of human experiments
in  the  amount  of  eight  million  Deutschmarks.539 This  particular  agreement  was  especially
sensitive.  The West Germans initially offered only 1.75 million marks for five hundred and
thirty victims, but after the Yugoslavs found out that the FRG paid several times more to the
537 “Prekid ekonomskih pregovora izmedju SR Nemačke i SFR Jugoslavije” (July 17, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-B/82-4, 
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victims in Poland and Hungary, they increased their demand to eleven million marks, before
finally settling for the eight million.540 The West Germans believed that this  agreement was
crucial, since it demonstrated – to Belgrade, but also to Washington – that Bonn was committed
to maintaining contact with Yugoslavia.541
The extent of West German good will was put to the test the same day. At 5:17 a.m., a
powerful earthquake hit the southern Yugoslav city of Skopje. Around eighty per cent of the
capital of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was reduced to rubble. The catastrophe triggered
a massive response from the international community, including West Germany. Bonn approved
an aid package worth over  two million DM – although the FRG government  donated only
20,000 marks, the rest being donations – which certainly helped improve the atmosphere of
distrust that was obstructing the negotiation process.542
Adenauer steps down
However, the bilateral relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia entered a lull during
the summer of 1963, which might have been the result of transition of power in the FRG. On
April 24, Chancellor Adenauer’s own party had voted him out of power in a secret vote, but he
had remained Chancellor until October, when Ludwig Erhard replaced him.543 The transition did
not cause a great stir in Belgrade. From the Yugoslav perspective, Adenauer’s departure was
540 “90. Kabinettssitzung am 11. September 1963” accessed May 23, 2018 at 
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merely a manifestation of a wider transformation of West Germany’s foreign policy, which was
influenced  by  the  global  shift  away  from  “East-West  tensions.”  The  Yugoslavs  believed,
however, that this transformation would be slow, since the FRG would try to maintain its role as
the bulwark against Communism. Belgrade argued that because of this, Yugoslavia should not
have expected a quick solution to the issue of war reparations, and should have aimed to use it
as  leverage against  other  forms of financial  aid.  Belgrade opted instead for economic gain,
rather than undoing the Hallstein Doctrine.544
In hindsight, West Germany, including its foreign policy, was indeed at a crossroads with
Erhard in the chancellor’s office, but at the time it was not very clear – both to the public or the
governing administration – which path it would choose in the post-Adenauer era.545 Adenauer
had steered West Germany through the difficult postwar period and the denazification process,
which, for better or for worse, allowed Western Germans to move forward, or at least postpone
the painful reckoning with their National Socialist legacy.546 It was under Adenauer’s auspices
that the West Germans were able – with American aid, of course – to rebuild their economy and
become a European powerhouse in a very short time. He also negotiated with Khrushchev the
return of the last German prisoners of war from Soviet captivity, long considered his greatest
achievement.547 But Adenauer also oversaw the construction of the FRG’s rigid foreign policy
544 “Informacija” (October 18, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. 609/i.
545 According to a poll published in Der Spiegel, only 51 percent of the respondents believed that Erhard would 
continue Adenauer’s policies. “ERHARD-BAROMETER.” Der Spiegel October 16, 1963. 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46172302.html
546 For an in-depth analysis of Adenauer’s stewardship in this period, see Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and 
the Nazi Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
547 Dominik Geppert, Die Ära Adenauer, 3., Auflage. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012), p. 
59.
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that tied it to the West while at the same time building a wall of its own towards the East. By the
end of his tenure, Adenauer’s achievements were overshadowed by his failures.548
For many West Germans,  however,  Erhard still  retained the cachet of those years of
postwar growth. His name was synonymous with the Wirtschaftswunder, the economic miracle
of the 1950s. The ‘social market economy’ he introduced in 1958 “gradually assumed a political
and cultural significance in West Germany that transcended its ostensible purpose as a set of
economic policies.”549 Since the West German economic successes replaced nationalism as the
social  cohesive  after  1945,  it  was  not  surprising  that  Erhard  still  enjoyed  mass  support.550
However, foreign policy was not Erhard’s forte. He favoured the liberal ideal of the market as
the preferred arena for international relations, but even this was an economic matter and could
hardly  apply  when  dealing  with  the  Soviet  Bloc,  or  even  Yugoslavia.551 Gerhard  Schröder
remained the foreign minister under Erhard, and the two found common ground on some foreign
policy issues, such as preventing the French president Charles de Gaulle from gaining too much
influence in West European politics. However, many in the Bonn foreign office apparatus were
still loyal to Adenauer (who remained in West German politics as the leader of the CDU), which
caused much friction during this period.552 The East Germans expected no changes in the FRG’s
German  policies,  but  Khrushchev  overrode  East  Berlin’s  considerations  and  in  December
548 Fulbrook, A History of Germany 1918-2014, pp. 164-165.
549 James C. Van Hook, Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945–1957 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 1. Van Hook also
550 David F Crew, Consuming Germany in the Cold War (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2003), p. 7.
551 However, Erhard’s plump physique and proclivity for cigars did make him a walking advertisement for German
economic success in the 1950s and 1960s. Young-sun Hong, Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the 
Global Humanitarian Regime, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) (ebook), p. 238. 
552 Alfred C. Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard: A Biography (The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 185.
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initiated closer contact with Bonn, hoping that Erhard would be more inclined to cooperate with
Moscow than Adenauer.553 By doing this, Khrushchev weakened the GDR’s position.
Despite  Khrushchev’s  decision,  East  Germans  could  find  some  consolation  in  their
vastly improved economic relations with Yugoslavia. In 1963 at least 90 percent (around 90
million USD) of the planned trade volume had already been fulfilled by the end of September.
The  only  segment  that  was  still  underwhelming  was  the  scientific  and  technological
cooperation. Overall, however, the Yugoslavs noted that the East Germans were more open than
ever before to consider improving all aspects of economic exchange.554 For good measure, the
East Germans also offered an additional one million USD loan towards the reconstruction of
Skopje.555 The East Germans could also find consolation in the renewed decay of FRG-Yugoslav
relations. Bonn’s refusal to couple their recent economic talks with the Yugoslav war reparation
claims became the main thrust  of a Yugoslav diplomatic  campaign against  the FRG, which
reached its zenith in the spring of 1964, during the preparations for the second Non-aligned
Conference. The East Germans were also able to persuade the Yugoslavs to sign a cooperation
agreement between their respective national journalist associations, through which they intended
to minimize the still lingering negative coverage in the Yugoslav press.556 Envoy Staimer’s last
meeting  of  the  year  with  Tito  also  reflected  the  amiable  state  of  GDR-Yugoslav  relations.
Staimer presented Tito with two film projectors – presumably as New Year’s presents, since
Communists do not celebrate Christmas – well aware of Tito’s love of cinema.557 Staimer and
553 Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, p. 220.
554 “Informacija” (October 19, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, no number.
555 Ibid.
556 Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin, p. 182.
557 For more on the relationship between Yugoslav cinema and politics see Daniel J. Goulding, Liberated Cinema: 
The Yugoslav Experience, 1945-2001, 2nd ed., rev. and expanded (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2002); Pavle Levi, Disintegration in Frames: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav 
Cinema (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). Tito’s personal relationship with cinema was 
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Tito spent the rest of the meeting discussing president Kennedy’s assassination and the identity
of  the  conspirators  responsible  for  his  killing,  a  far  cry  from most  past  meetings  between
Staimer and Yugoslav officials, which were often tense affairs filled with passive aggressive
exchanges and veiled threats.558 The West Germans could only have hoped to achieve this level
of familiarity with the Yugoslav leader.
Their good relations carried on into the new year. On January 4, 1964, Staimer presented
state undersecretary Marko Nikezić with a note from the East German government against the
FRG’s nuclear  armament.  Nikezić  was quick to assure her,  that “even without  knowing the
details in the note” and not being able “to tell [her] in what form we will support this step,” the
Yugoslav public would undoubtedly greet it favourably.559 In previous years, the Yugoslavs were
extremely cautious with giving the East Germans any indication of their position toward their
demands  or  statements.  Therefore  Nikezić’s  reaction  represented  a  notable  departure  from
previous practices and, however minute, this gesture embodied the transformation of relations
during this period. Not surprisingly, the Yugoslav official response to the note was affirmative.560
Then, in February, the two countries signed a consular agreement, which allowed them to open
consulates on their partner’s territory.561 
The positive development of bilateral state relations paved the way for even closer party
relations. As on previous occasions, the initial impulse came from the SED. In March, Walter
Ulbricht wrote the SKJ Central Committee in the name of their SED counterparts, suggesting a
covered in Mila Turajlić’ 2010 documentary Cinema Komunisto.
558 “Zabeleška” (December 2, 1963), AJ KPR I-3-a/82-5.
559 “Zabeleška” (January 6, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 20/i.
560 The Yugoslav diplomat who delivered the answer also informed the East Germans that he will soon be able to 
inform them about their request for Yugoslavia’s support in gaining membership in the World Health 
Organization. “Vermerk” (February 26, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 440, p. 25.
561 “Referat” (February 12, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 300/ii.
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series  of  steps  that  would  strengthen  the  cooperation  between  “the  leading  forces  of  our
peoples.”562 Tito’s answer was equally friendly, and he agreed to most suggestions with some
minor adjustments.563 On April  21,  Ulbricht accepted Tito’s terms.564 It  seemed that the two
countries  were  entering  a  new  phase  of  relations  never  before  achieved,  not  even  after
Yugoslavia’s  recognition  of  the  GDR  in  1957.  Nevertheless,  the  Yugoslavs  harboured  no
illusions about the motives behind the East German openness. Boško Šiljegović, the president of
the SKJ Central Committee’s International Commission, asserted that “the fact that the SED is
the only party from the socialist countries which has established formal contacts with the SKJ is
interpreted, primarily, through political interests of the GDR as a country on the international
scene.” These interests guided the GDR to act out of step with the rest of the Soviet Bloc, but
Šiljegović argued that the SED still made certain to signal to Moscow (and the rest of the bloc)
that it  still  condemned “all types of revisionism.”565 Despite this apprehension, the SKJ was
more than happy do further develop its relations with the SED. 
As  promised,  a  SKJ  delegation  –  led  by  Tito’s  confidant  Edvard  Kardelj  –  visited
Ulbricht in May. But the Yugoslav preparations for the visit encountered one sizable obstacle.
On April 14, just a month before Kardelj’s departure for East Berlin, a distressed envoy Staimer
approached the Yugoslav deputy state secretary Mirko Tepavac at a cocktail party at the Polish
embassy in Belgrade. Staimer “expressed consternation” regarding the Yugoslav version of the
SKJ itinerary, which apparently did not include a visit to the Berlin Wall. Given the value East
562 The suggestions ranged from deepening mass party organization contacts to inviting respective high ranking 
party officials and their families on holiday in the GDR and Yugoslavia. Ulbricht’s letter to the SKJ CC 
(February 8, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-230.
563 Tito’s main concerns were schedule-related, he had no objections to the contents of Ulbricht’s proposal. Tito’s 
letter to the SED CC (March 19, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05230/2.
564 Ulbricht’s letter to the SKJ CC (April 12, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-506.
565 Odnosi između Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije i Jedinstvene Socijalističke Partije Nemačke” (April 25, 1964), 
AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-435.
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Berlin placed on the Wall, this omission undoubtedly angered the East Germans. Tepavac argued
that Yugoslavia just  did not find the Wall  to be as important as they did,  and that a recent
Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ) delegation, led by the SKJ Central
Committee member Veljko Vlahović visited the Wall, which proved that this was not part of an
anti-Wall policy and that Yugoslavia did not need to prove its position against West German
revanchism with small gestures.566 Vlahović did indeed visit the Wall in 1963, but he labelled it
an “embarrassment for humanity” in his report.567 This was Vlahović’s personal opinion, but
others in the Yugoslav leadership probably shared the sentiment. It is unclear whether Kardelj
visited the Wall during his stay in East Berlin, and he did not discuss it during his meeting with
Ulbricht, but he did address the issue in a conversation with a group of city officials. Kardelj
validated Ulbricht’s decision, garnishing his approval with only a lukewarm disclaimer:
We completely understand these reasons [for the Wall’s construction].... Of course,
we, as a socialist country do not care much for isolating ourselves from the outside
world. However, this wall is apparently a consequence of certain power relations
and, above all, the fact that certain circles in West Germany and the West are not at
all ready to recognize the existence of two German states. This is why we believe,
since  that  wall  has  contributed  to  the  stabilization  of  relations  between the  two
Berlins,  that this  was a historically justified decision.  And it  is  simultaneously a
contribution to world peace.568
Regardless of whether Kardelj visited the Berlin Wall or not, it seemed that the Yugoslavs took
East German concerns seriously, and gave their most decisive endorsement of the Wall since its
construction.
566 “Zabeleška” (April 16, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 271/i.
567  “Neka zapažanja druga Veljka Vlahovića o unutrašnje političkim problemima Nemačke Narodne Republike” 
(January, 1963), AJ 507/IX 86/I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-30.
568 “Zabeleška” (May 14, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-847.
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West Germany makes concessions
In the spring of 1964, the Yugoslav foreign ministry took stock of Yugoslavia’s relations
with the FRG. While  the unknown author argued that  the good faith Yugoslavia showed in
economic negotiations with the FRG during the past year was misunderstood as weakness in
Bonn, which decided to focus on forging relations with Soviet Bloc countries while ignoring
Yugoslav interests. The author argued that Yugoslavia had been holding back in its criticisms of
the FRG, especially among the non-aligned countries and suggested a much more aggressive
approach, the main thrust of which would comprise developing closer ties with the GDR.569
Although this  report  did seem rather  harsh,  Western  observers  also  found Bonn’s  Yugoslav
policy to be somewhat unproductive. During a regular consultation between French and West
German diplomats in March, one of the French diplomats suggested that the FRG should be
“more flexible”  with Yugoslavia,  since it  wielded considerable influence  in  the  non-aligned
world. Several West Germans retorted that the FRG was more than lenient, and listed a number
of Yugoslav actions that were to blame for the poor relations between them. Among the present
West German officials who reacted to these suggestions was Herbert Müller-Roschach. Müller-
Roschach worked at  the West  German embassy in  Belgrade between 1956-1957 and was a
direct participant in the events that lead to the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine. Müller-
Roschach boiled down the FRG’s position by arguing that it is “mutually incompatible for a
country to recognize the Soviet Zone and demand reparations from the Federal Republic” at the
569 “Naši stavovi u odnosima sa Zapadnom Nemačkom,” (undated), AJ, KPR I-5-B/82-5.
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same time.570 His statement revealed that the Hallstein Doctrine orthodoxy was alive and well in
the Bonn foreign office.
The claims of West German leniency, however, were not unfounded. West German and
Yugoslav delegations resumed their economic talks on February 20 after a four month hiatus,
and the West German chief negotiator Oskar Schlitter presented a number of concessions that
were more agreeable to the Yugoslavs, yet the reparations were not one of them, which the
Yugoslavs found “unacceptable.”571 Considering the state of Yugoslavia’s economy during this
period, this reaction was understandable. After a period of growth in the 1950s, the Yugoslav
economy began experiencing serious problems in the 1960s.572 An injection of hard currency –
in the shape of war reparation payments  – would have helped with the issues arising from
uneven growth and the somewhat unpredictable self-management system, not to mention the
constantly underperforming agricultural sector.573 Following the difficult negotiations, Schlitter
also met with state undersecretary Marko Nikezić the same day, and attempted to convince him
that the FRG was acting in good faith. Nikezić welcomed the West German efforts to move their
relations forward,  and while the reparations remained the one obstacle which the Yugoslavs
could not overlook, he believed that solving every other issue on the table could clear the way to
solving  even  that  problem.574 Nikezić,  who was  part  of  the  liberal  current  in  the  Yugoslav
leadership, framed Schlitters’s visit in positive terms, especially since Schlitter arrived as an
official representative of the Bonn government, which was not the case in previous meetings.
570 “Deutsch-französische Konsultationsbesprechungen” (March 18, 1964), AAPD 1964, p. 75.
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Nevertheless,  the  reparations  were  an  issue  where  the  Yugoslavs  refused  to  meet  the  West
Germans half way, and the Yugoslav foreign ministry instructed its diplomats to continue their
campaign against the FRG in their respective host countries.575
The  anti-West  German  campaign  was  indeed  causing  a  headache  for  the  Bonn
government,  but  not  because of  the  reparations,  which the West  Germans considered to  be
inconsequential to Yugoslavia’s negative attitude to their German policy.576 The real issue was
that  Belgrade  was  also  encouraging  those  non-aligned  countries  (that  were  considering
recognizing the GDR) by arguing that the FRG was not really losing anything with the GDR’s
recognition,  which  was  a  “blemish”  at  best.577 It  appeared  that  Yugoslavia  was  no  longer
restraining  itself  regarding  the  German  question,  which  given  the  upcoming  non-aligned
conference in Cairo, posed a problem for Bonn. By summer, not much headway was made, as
both sides continued reiterating their well known positions. At that point, diplomatic efforts of
both Germanies turned to the non-aligned conference in Cairo.
Second chances: The 1964 conference of the non-aligned States in Cairo
From East Berlin’s perspective,  the timing of its rapprochement with Belgrade could
hardly have been better. Tito and Gamal Abdel Nasser, two old friends and the driving force
behind non-alignment, released a communiqué in the spring of 1963 calling for the second non-
aligned conference.578 The non-aligned leaders  had decided to  hold their  next  conference in
575 “Kabinetu Predsednika Saveznog Izvršnog Veća” (February 24, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-5.
576 The West Germans believed that Yugoslavia was going to adapt the Soviet position regardless of the status of 
reparations. “Runderlaß des Ministerialdirektors Krapf” (March 23, 1964), AAPD 1964, p. 77.
577 Ibid.
578 “Potsjetnik” (October 27, 1964), AJ KPR I-4-a-5.
180
October 1964 in Cairo, and this time the number of invited participants had swelled to almost
fifty  and  Latin  American  countries  participated  for  the  first  time  as  delegates  rather  than
observers. While still not a formal organization, the non-aligned countries had grown both in
numbers and stature in the time since the Belgrade non-aligned conference.
 The German Democratic Republic’s plans to influence the 1961 conference in Belgrade
had floundered for several reasons, not least due to poor relations with Yugoslavia. Although
Yugoslavia was not  the host  of  this  conference,  its  healthy  relationship  with the GDR was
certainly a  boon for  East  Berlin’s potential  plans to  influence the conference in  Cairo.  The
GDR’s  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  (Ministerium  für  Auswärtige  Angelegenheiten/MfAA)
retained the same goals as in 1961, namely to elicit recognition from non-aligned countries,
preferably with a joint statement  at  the conference.  The GDR wanted to convince the non-
aligned countries that they had a common interest pertaining to the German question, namely its
peaceful solution. Apart from the goals, the MfAA’s methods also resembled the ones they used
in 1961.579 According to an MfAA report, the GDR considered Belgrade an ally in this campaign
since only Yugoslavia and Cuba were listed as the countries with which MfAA officials were
supposed to consult about the conference’s agenda, but the report provided no more details.580
During Edvard Kardelj’s East Berlin visit in May – discussed in the previous chapter – he and
Ulbricht also touched on the Cairo conference.  Ulbricht expressed his understanding for the
numerous African countries that did not recognize the GDR because they were economically
dependant on “imperialistic powers,” but that it was crucial for them to see through the West
579 These included sending special envoys to various non-aligned countries, sending an observing delegation to the
conference, and drafting a memorandum explaining the East German position. “Entwurf: Konzeption und 
Maßnahmen des MfAA im Hinblick auf die geplante Gipfelkonferenz neutraler Staaten” (February 19, 1964), 
PA AA, MfAA, C 440, pp. 124-126.
580 Ibid.
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German  sole  representation  claim.  “And  it  is  our  request,”  Ulbricht  continued  without
mentioning the conference directly, “that [our] Yugoslav friends support our efforts,” since they
held a “completely correct position” on this issue. Kardelj could not offer much encouragement
in this respect. He argued that these countries had also already agreed with the East German
position in that they had developed economic relations with the GDR. However, the fact that
they depended on the West – including the FRG – meant that they did not want to jeopardize
this relationship by recognizing the GDR. Kardelj added that, although even the more influential
non-aligned  countries  like  India  and  Egypt  understood  and  privately  agreed  with  the  East
Germans, the stakes for them were too high to disregard the warnings from Bonn.581 Kardelj’s
assessment was correct. Perhaps the best example for this was India, whose president Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan visited Moscow in September,  which  resulted  in  a  joint  communiqué which
mentioned “the  fact  of  the existence of  two German states.”582 A bold statement,  it  had  no
bearing whatsoever on the Cairo Conference because India made no effort to repeat it in the
final conference documents. Kardelj specifically cited the Hallstein doctrine as the key deterrent
for  non-aligned  states.  Therefore,  there  was  “no  chance”  that  the  Cairo  conference  could
engender a change in position among such a large group of countries. The only remedy Kardelj
could suggest was for the socialist countries to focus on the economic aspects of their relations
with the non-aligned countries if they wanted to make an impact, since this would be the only
way to break through the Hallstein doctrine.583 Kardelj’s analysis was incisive. The FRG was
more worried about the diplomatic than the economic aspects of containing the GDR. Therefore,
581 “Zabeleška” (May 13, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-845.
582 As cited in Lorenz M. Lüthi, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973,” Journal of Cold 
War Studies 18, no. 4 (January 13, 2017): 98–147, p. 113.
583 “Zabeleška” (May 13, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-845.
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even though the chances of disrupting the FRG’s economic dominance in the Global South were
low, they were still higher than convincing one of the non-aligned countries to recognize the
GDR. The Hallstein doctrine was still proving to be effective.
An earlier MfAA report on the positions of leading non-aligned countries also concluded
that it was unlikely that any of them would advocate the German question’s inclusion in the
conference agenda, and that not even Yugoslavia, which directly suffered from the Hallstein
doctrine, would take the lead in the initiative to recognize the GDR.584 This analysis was most
likely based on information passed on by the Central Committee of the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia (Centralni Komitet Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije/CK SKJ) department of foreign
relations to the Belgrade legation in March.585
The fact that the German question was a considerably less acute global issue than it was
in 1961 and that it  would be much more difficult  to force its  inclusion into the conference
agenda, meant that the East Germans needed to maximize their efforts too. After the conference
agenda was confirmed – as expected, the German question was excluded – the MfAA concluded
that there was still enough overlap between the East German foreign policy and the non-aligned
ideals that a successful campaign to influence the conference would be possible, regardless of
what Kardelj relayed to Ulbricht. To this end, the MfAA sent out a circular note in June to all
East German diplomatic outposts, including the one in Belgrade, with detailed instructions for
the various diplomatic corps.586 
584 “Zur Haltung der wichtigsten neutralen Staaten zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung der 2. Konferenz der 
nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten in Oktober d.J. in Kairo” (June 30, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 93-96.
585 “Aktenvermerk” (March 4, 1964), DY 30/IV A 2/20 241, pp. 2-6.
586 Letter from Kieswetter (June 6, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 83-91.
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Even before  the  MfAA issued these  instructions,  Staimer  addressed  the  issue of  the
conference  agenda  with  a  seemingly  irritated  Mirko  Tepavac,  Yugoslavia’s  deputy  foreign
minister, who noted that the East Germans were “badgering” them, and that “we should tell
them even  now that  they  have  explained  their  position  in  enough detail,  but  that  we have
decided that we will not be moving towards that [goal].” Tepavac advised that this matter should
be  dealt  with  before  the  GDR State  Council  member  Bruno Leuschner’s  imminent  visit  to
Belgrade.587 Tepavac seemed to have had a clear estimation of East Germany’s plans, because in
late  April,  the  MfAA’s  Yugoslav  department  held  a  meeting  with  the  staff  of  the  Belgrade
legation, with the conclusion that Yugoslavia “should be exploited to the largest extent possible
in order to support the GDR’s objectives, namely to increase the consolidation of its authority
among the participating countries, and possibly to arrive at a diplomatic recognition.”588 
It  seemed  that  the  East  Germans  were  unaware  of  the  effect  they  were  having  on
Yugoslav officials (or were unconcerned) because shortly after the MfAA issued its instructions,
the Belgrade legation began lobbying for the GDR at various Yugoslav institutions. While at a
meeting  with  representatives  of  the  Socialist  Alliance  of  Working  People  of  Yugoslavia,
Staimer’s deputy Herbert Schlage diverted the conversation to the topic of the Cairo non-aligned
conference,  wondering  whether  “the  next  step  toward  the  GDR’s  international  affirmation”
would be taken there, adding that he “counted on Yugoslavia to do its part.” It seemed that the
Yugoslav government took Tepavac’s suggestion seriously, and that they informed and coached
relevant  Yugoslav  officials,  because  Schlage’s  interlocutor  simply  deferred  to  Kardelj’s
587 “Zabeleška” (April 16, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, 274/2.
588 Friederike Baer, Zwischen Anlehnung Und Abgrenzung: Die Jugoslawienpolitik Der DDR 1946 Bis 1968. 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 2009), p. 257.
184
statements made in East Berlin in May.589 Nevertheless,  a June MfAA report  comprising an
assessment of Yugoslavia’s current foreign policy and a prognosis of its activities at the Cairo
conference presented a more optimistic view of Yugoslavia’s position. The MfAA’s analysis was
based on general changes in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, primarily its rapprochement with the
Soviet  bloc.  The  East  Germans  wanted  to  use  Yugoslavia’s  influence  on  the  non-aligned
countries, since its improved relations with the USSR would allow East Berlin to extend its own
influence in Africa and Asia. None of the evidence used in the report mentioned the German
Question, but the author believed that “there is no doubt” that Yugoslavia was going to lobby for
a “broad treatment of the German problem,” and while they did not expect Yugoslavia to take
initiative  in  pushing  for  the  GDR’s  recognition,  their  understanding  was  that  it  would
“completely support” any such initiatives from third countries.590
As the conference approached, the West Germans were also looking toward Cairo with
some apprehension, due to the perceived possibility of a pro-GDR campaign at the conference.
The  West  German  government  even  summoned  Yugoslavia’s  representative  in  Bonn  Milan
Georgijević  –  an  unprecedented  move  –  to  share  these  concerns.591 Bonn’s  foreign  office
(Auswärtiges Amt, AA) planned to influence the preparatory meeting in the Ceylon capital of
Colombo,  but  the  documents  do  not  reveal  if  this  mission  was  successful.592 But  the  West
German ambassador in Colombo Rolf Ramisch did report to Bonn that there was no discussion
of the German question at the meeting.593 The Yugoslavs also confirmed this during the joint
589 “Zabeleška” (July 15, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-948.
590 “Einschätzung der jugoslawischen Haltung zur Vorbereitung einer zweiten Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen
Staaten” (June 12, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 114-123.
591 “Zabeleška” (June 13, 1964), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 387/1.
592 Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin, p. 176.
593 Telegram from Ramisch (March 23, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 323-324.
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committee negotiations in  Belgrade in June.594 However,  Ramisch did mention an anti-FRG
campaign in the Ceylonese leftist press, wherein the FRG was attacked for harbouring Ustasha
organizations.595 Ceylon was one of the non-aligned countries which was on the fence regarding
the German Question – the GDR opened a consulate in Colombo just a few months earlier – so
Bonn was especially wary of any anti-FRG campaign there.596 Not leaving anything to chance,
Chancellor  Erhard  considered  inviting  the  Egyptian  president  Nasser  to  Bonn,  in  order  to
convince him of the correctness of the West German position, and ask him to influence other
non-aligned statesmen. In a conversation with the US ambassador in Bonn George McGhee on
April  11,  Erhard estimated that his  chances of succeeding were reasonably high,  since “the
Germans had never fought the Arabs and had, he believed, a considerable reservoir of good will
in  the  Arab  states.”597 Unfortunately  for  the  FRG,  Erhard  could  not  say  the  same  for  the
Yugoslavs, on either count.
According  to  a  January  1964  Bonn  Foreign  Office  (AA)  report  compiled  for  the
Bundestag foreign policy committee, the West German-Yugoslav relations had reached another
impasse.  The  report’s  author  believed  that  the  FRG –  acting  within  the  parameters  set  by
Yugoslavia’s recognition of the GDR – had exhausted all options for improving these relations.
While the recognition of the GDR was the biggest impediment to better relations, several other
issues  plagued  them,  most  prominently  the  war  reparations.598 The  Yugoslav  anti-FRG
594 “Zabeleška” (June 13, 1964), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 387/1.
595 Telegram from Ramisch (March 23, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 323-324.
596  “111. Kabinettssitzung am 19. Februar 1964” accessed on August 1, 2018 at 
http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0/index.html
597 FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1999), Document 25. (ebook)
598 Another issue mentioned in the report was a charge brought by a West German lawyer against Yugoslav foreign
minister Koča Popović for alleged WWII killing of Wehrmacht prisoners of war. The charge was dropped in 
early 1964. “Aufzeichnung” (January 6, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 180-185.
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campaign,  which had been using precisely these issues against  the West Germans,  had also
reached the non-aligned countries. The AA sent out a circular note to its diplomatic outposts in
March warning them that “Yugoslavia was conducting [...] an increasingly strong anti-German
propaganda campaign” and asking them to be vigilant and report back on any such Yugoslav
activities.599 
The reports the AA received from its diplomatic outposts showed that a campaign was
indeed taking place, but not everywhere. And where it was present, it had limited reach. For
example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, there was no Yugoslav propaganda present in
the press, which the West German ambassador assigned to Yugoslavia's good standing in the
country, and which Belgrade did not want to tarnish with political agitation.600 In Cambodia, all
foreign propaganda had to be vetted by the censor’s office before it could be published. Since
Yugoslavia’s material did not meet the censor’s standards, it was confined to being distributed
only in other socialist embassies.601 West Germany’s ambassador in New Delhi Dietrich von
Mirbach noticed a stronger Yugoslav campaign in India, where the Yugoslavs apparently tried to
discredit West Germany, describing it as a less than honest advocate of world peace, but even
here Mirbach saw no reason for countermeasures.602 Furthermore, Mirbach claimed that Tito
was more interested in strengthening his influence among non-aligned countries than he was
invested in the GDR’s agenda.603 The same argument was used by the Yugoslav ambassador in
London.604 The MfAA also came to this conclusion in June.605 Yugoslav propaganda’s furthest
599 “Jugoslawische Haltung in der Deutschland-Frage” (March 12, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 288-289.
600 Letter from Reichold, (March 31, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, p. 351.
601 Letter from Berendonck, (July 13, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, p. 402.
602 Letter from Duckwitz, (March 26, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 346-347.
603 Telegram from Duckwitz, (April 27, 1964), PA AA, AA, B 130 3129A, no page.
604 Telegram from Etzdorf, (May 13, 1964), PA AA, AA, B 130 3129A, no page.
605 “Einschätzung der jugoslawischen Haltung zur Vorbereitung einer zweiten Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen
Staaten” (June 12, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 114-123.
187
reach was in Egypt, which was not surprising, given Tito’s close relationship with Nasser. There
the  state-owned  Cairo  evening  newspaper  Al-Messa  published  an  article  that  described  the
Yugo-West German relations with a discernible Yugoslav bias. According to the West German
embassy in Cairo, the article seemed to be a direct translation of a Yugoslav pamphlet on this
subject.606
The Egyptians did not publish the article merely as a courtesy to Tito, but also because
West Germany was on the verge of recognizing Israel.607 The Arab world was strongly opposed
to any recognition of Israeli statehood, and Egypt’s role in the non-aligned movement, combined
with  the  GDR’s  campaign  for  recognition,  provided  both  Egypt  and  the  FRG  with  some
leverage against each other. But it could only have been used sparsely. Had Egypt recognized
the GDR, it would have triggered the Hallstein doctrine mechanisms. Conversely, had the FRG
recognized Israel,  Egypt  would  have broken off  diplomatic  relations  with the  FRG. At this
junction, Erhard decided to placate the Egyptians, while putting his rapprochement with Israel
on hold until after the conference. Secret aid to Israel did continue, but as William Glenn Gray
has noted, “it was Bonn’s overriding interest in isolating the GDR that led it to court Nasser so
assiduously and, therefore, to prefer only the most clandestine measures in support of Israel.”608
With Egypt not entirely committed to the West German line, and Yugoslavia behaving
somewhat  antagonistically,  the  FRG could  not  rely  on  its  diplomatic  clout  alone  to  secure
guaranteed  compliance  with its  aims.  Therefore,  Bonn turned to  its  allies  for  help.  Foreign
minister Gerhard Schröder pleaded with the American foreign secretary Dean Rusk to lean on
606 Letter from Federer (July 22, 1964), PA AA, AA, B 42-39, p. 403.
607 For the genesis of the FRG’s and the GDR’s relations with Israel and the Arab world, see Lorena De Vita, 
“Overlapping Rivalries: The Two Germanys, Israel and the Cold War,” Cold War History 17, no. 4 (October 2, 
2017): 351–66.
608 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 167.
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the Yugoslavs and obtain their assurance of non-intervention at the Cairo conference, citing their
alleged near-alignment with Soviet foreign policy, which could have been damaging considering
Yugoslavia’s influence in the non-aligned world.609 The American response was not what the
West Germans were hoping for. Even though Americans were also concerned with the apparent
overlap of Yugoslav and Soviet foreign policies, they did not want to push the Yugoslavs even
closer toward Moscow by applying pressure in a matter that was not a priority for them. Their
solution  was  for  the  FRG to  initiate  rapprochement,  which  was  still  anathema to  many  in
Bonn.610 The American proposal was in line with US policy, wherein German reunification was
a noble goal, but not a priority, as Lyndon B. Johnson demonstrated during his first meeting with
Erhard in December 1963. The American president made it clear that he supported Erhard’s
campaign for German reunification,  but  that what  he actually  needed from Bonn was more
financial support for the US troops stationed in the FRG.611 Erhard acquiesced, thereby setting
the precedent for the FRG-US relations during his time in office. Rusk merely followed the
same principle when he turned down Schröder’s request, and because the FRG could not count
on US support, they decided to begin a new round of economic negotiations with Yugoslavia in
June.612 The West Germans offered higher export credit guarantees, a concession they were not
willing to make in previous negotiations. The Yugoslav delegation concluded that the Germans
609 “Bundesminister Schröder an den amerikanischen Außenminister Rusk” (April 22, 1964), AAPD 1964, pp. 
470-474).
610 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 165.
611 Eugenie M. Blang, “A Reappraisal of Germany’s Vietnam Policy, 1963-1966: Ludwig Erhard’s Response to 
America’s War in Vietnam,” German Studies Review 27, no. 2 (2004): 341–60, p. 344.
612 This was just one of the issues where Erhard had acted on Washington’s request. The list of other concessions 
given by the US embassy in Bonn is quite substantial: “increase their aid to underdeveloped countries; speed up
formation of their peace corps; send troops to Cyprus; send aid and a medical unit to South Vietnam; give aid to
Zanzibar; give aid to Turkey; extend the offset agreement; increase their military budget; make concessions to 
Yugoslavia; support our position on observation posts and other disarmament matters; liberalize their restitution
program; give arms aid to Israel; increase American imports.” FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and 
Berlin, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 45. (ebook)
189
had in fact reached the limit of their current capabilities, and recommended to the government in
Belgrade to stop pressuring Bonn for more concessions.613 As a result, on July 14 the FRG and
Yugoslavia signed an agreement regulating “trade and economic relations.” West Germans were
able to include a “good behaviour” clause in the agreement, in which both sides promised to
‘‘avoid  political  disturbances,’’ which  gave  the  West  Germans  at  least  some  hope  that  the
Yugoslavs would not support damaging motions at the Cairo conference.614 After the wrangling
with the Egyptians and the Yugoslavs, the West Germans were probably relieved to hear that
India opposed the inclusion of the German question in the conference agenda.615 Bonn was also
able to count on its other Western allies for support in this matter, as they issued a number of
warnings to the participating countries in the weeks leading up to the conference.616
The GDR’s and the FRG’s last diplomatic efforts before the conference
The East Germans were very interested in the contents of the new economic agreement
between Yugoslavia and the FRG, since they had been closely monitoring Bonn’s activities
leading up to the conference. The MfAA reported a noticeable increase in West German activity
in the non-aligned world – mostly through development aid – with the sole aim of influencing
the Cairo conference.617 Therefore, the GDR saw West Germany’s advances toward Yugoslavia
as part of the same campaign. After the West German press claimed that the recently signed
613 “Zabeleška” (June 13, 1964), AJ KPR I-3-a/82-5, doc. no. 387/i.
614 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, pp. 165-166; Theurer, Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin, p. 180.
615 Telegram from Mirbach, (August 6, 1964), PA AA, AA, B 130 3129A, no page number.
616 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 164.
617 Although, paradoxically, the MfAA’s analysis suggested that this approach made it harder to expose the West 
German neocolonialism, but that at the same time the effects of Bonn’s anti-GDR propaganda were abating. PA 
AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 30-70.
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trade agreement between the FRG and Yugoslavia contained a clause by which the latter would
abstain from raising the issue of German unification, GDR’s deputy envoy  Schlage asked the
head of the Eastern Europe department at the Yugoslav foreign ministry (Dimitrijević) whether
this was true, but Dimitrijević denied it and added that these allegations were just aimed to calm
down certain West German circles, and that Yugoslavia could not be influenced economically.618
It is unclear just how much influence the agreement actually had on Yugoslavia’s behaviour
during the conference, but considering the consistency of Yugoslav statements on the German
Question since the conference’s early planning stages, it seemed that Dimitrijević was not lying
to Schlage.  That  Yugoslavia took advantage of West  German anxieties  (or  rather,  American
ones, since they were responsible for forcing the FRG to the negotiating table) was another
matter altogether.
Ulbricht could not keep up with the West German economic offensive, but he did begin
pushing for a  new agreement with the Soviet Union in  the spring of 1964, one that would
“increase the GDR’s authority.” Moscow was reluctant at first, but ultimately agreed to sign a
‘friendship agreement’, which was a significantly gutted version of Ulbricht’s proposal.619 In
fact, the agreement was so void of substance that the Western observers believed that it was
signed only to raise the GDR’s profile before the Cairo conference.620 But the East German
leader did have one more chance at effective lobbying before the conference. On August 11,
envoy Staimer was able to meet with Tito at his summer residence on the Brioni Islands and
618 “Aktenvermerk” (July 25, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 360/75 p. 76.
619 Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, pp. 220-221.
620 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 163.
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asked whether he would be open to meeting with Ulbricht in September,  during the latter’s
return from a visit to Bulgaria. Tito agreed to hosting Ulbricht “with pleasure.”621
Ulbricht’s first visit to Belgrade was a milestone for the relations between the GDR and
Yugoslavia  (discussed  in  Chapter  2),  but  in  the  context  of  the  East  German  non-aligned
conference campaign, it was hardly a success. In the preparatory notes for Ulbricht’s visit, the
Yugoslav  foreign  ministry  suggested  that  Yugoslavia  should  maintain  the  same  position
regarding  the  Cairo  conference,  especially  since  the  East  Germans  had  not  accepted  the
explanation Kardelj gave them in May, effectively repeating the inner Yugoslav reasoning that
its  position in the non-aligned movement was more valuable than the GDR’s recognition.622
Dimitrijević also noted in his report that the Yugoslavs should brace for East German pressure
regarding the Cairo conference.623 However, the East Germans were well aware of Yugoslavia’s
consistency in this matter, so much so that it was Tito, rather than Ulbricht, who first brought up
the German question and the Cairo conference during their conversation. The fact that Ulbricht
did not press the matter showed a certain level of comfort with the current state of its campaign.
However, Tito seemed more concerned with his and Yugoslavia’s role at the conference, and
was only inquiring about  this  issue because he would be questioned about  it  by other  non-
aligned statesmen. It was Ulbricht himself who stated, “the conference in Cairo will certainly
not address the German question separately,” but he had hoped that the discussion of issues that
might discredit  the FRG, whether  directly or by association,  would take centre stage at  the
conference.624 It seems this was the extent of Ulbricht’s lobbying. Envoy Staimer did attempt to
621 “Zabeleška” (August 11, 1964), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-136.
622 “Informacija” (undated), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8, no number.
623 “Zabeleška” (undated), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8, doc. no. 504/2.
624 Here Ulbricht mentioned Cyprus as well as the nuclear-free zones in Africa and Europe as the two issues he 
expected to occupy the delegates the most. (September 19, 1964), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8, no number.
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organize another, more private meeting between Ulbricht and Tito, but the Yugoslavs rejected
the proposal.625 
The West German state secretary Rolf Lahr also made a visit to Belgrade in September.
The reason for his visit was the FRG’s foreign minister Gerhard Schröder’s circular note on
September  5,  warning  West  German  diplomats  of  the  Soviet  plan  to  influence  the  Cairo
conference and non-aligned countries in order to elicit their recognition of the GDR. Schröder
singled out Yugoslavia as the country most likely to comply with the Soviet plan, or “at least to
promote it” at the conference, but noted that Bonn found the Yugoslav position on the German
Question more palatable since the economic agreements the two countries signed earlier in the
year.626 Nevertheless,  the  West  Germans  wanted  one  last  assurance  before  the  conference.
Although Lahr’s primary mission was probing the issue of war reparations, he also inquired
about  the  Cairo  conference.627 Lahr  found that  his  interlocutor,  the  foreign  minister  Marko
Nikezić, had a “thoroughly Western disposition,” that he was “intelligent, open-minded, without
complexes and taboos,” and that he was a good listener that was not shy about any subject. 628
Yugoslav  foreign minister  Nikezić  assured  him that  Yugoslavia  would not  contribute  to  the
discussions regarding the upgrading of the GDR’s international status.629 This appears to have
been  the  last  official  contact  between  the  West  Germans  and  the  Yugoslavs  before  the
conference. It seems that someone leaked the contents of this meeting to envoy Staimer, because
she asked the deputy foreign minister Mirko Tepavac whether Yugoslavia planned to abstain
625 “Zabeleška” (September 20, 1964), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8, doc. no. 504/6.
626 “Rundschreiben des Bundesministers Schröder” (September 4, 1964), AAPD 1964, pp. 994-995.
627 Lahr had performed a similar mission in Ghana in May. After a meeting with Kwame Nkrumah, Ghanaian 
press ceased with the negative reporting on the FRG. Ibid., p. 994.
628 “Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Lahr” (September 8, 1964), AAPD 1964, pp. 1001-1003.
629  Nikezić also told Lahr that Yugoslavia would not initiate a motion at the UN to grant the GDR observer status 
(like the one the FRG already had), but if a third country did initiate it, Yugoslavia would have to vote in 
support of the motion. “Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Lahr” (September 8, 1964), AAPD 1964, p. 1002.
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from initiating any discussion about East Germany’s international status at the conference, as
per  a  rumour  she  heard.  According  to  Staimer,  it  was  the  West  German  representative  in
Belgrade, Hans Bock, who had disclosed this information. Naturally, Tepavac denied any such
“promise,” but added in his report that it would be “very inconvenient” if any other Yugoslav
official confirmed that this alleged promise was actually given to the West Germans.630
The non-aligned conference in Cairo and the German Question
The 2nd Conference of the Non-Aligned Heads of State or Government in Cairo began on
October 5, with opening speeches from several non-aligned leaders including the host Nasser
and the Yugoslav president Tito. The German Question – seemingly stuck in status quo – had
little chance of reaching the spotlight in Cairo, even without West German intervention. This
was definitely not a “second Belgrade,” as some observers described it.631 The most visible
absence in Cairo was that of Jawaharlal Nehru. India’s first prime minister had passed away in
May, which left non-alignment without one of its founding members, who was the most cautious
of the original triumvirate that first met on the Brioni Islands in 1956. Another change was the
stronger presence of African nations, which had created the Organization of African Unity in
1963 and had an agenda of their own.632 Compared with the Belgrade conference, the delegates
in Cairo were far less focused on the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The issues that affected them were more relevant to the non-aligned countries themselves, such
630 “Zabeleška” (September 15, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 515/3.
631 Dietmar Rothermund, “The Era of Non- Alignment,” in Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada 
Boskovska (eds.), The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung - Belgrade (London: 
Routledge, 2014), p. 27.
632 Ibid., p. 28.
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as the Congo crisis  or Portuguese colonialism. The non-aligned leaders were growing more
aware of their place in global politics and shifted their focus accordingly. Their concerns were
hardly similar to those of Bonn and East Berlin. Besides, the growing number of participating
countries also diminished their capability to form consensus on any point.633
Tito, a European statesman whose international position was by that point firmly rooted
in the Global South, straddled the line between the conclusions of the Belgrade conference and
the new non-aligned issues. The Yugoslav president spoke mostly in general terms, focusing on
the  relief  of  inter-bloc  tensions  and  economic  problems  experienced  by  the  non-aligned
countries. He did mention the German question, but in terms which provided nothing novel:
In line with [the American-Soviet thaw], I think we may conclude that there has
also been a slackening of tension over the German question, a settlement of which
should be sought primarily through negotiations between the two German [s]tates,
thereby enabling the German people to decide on their future.634
To be sure, the East Germans could find nothing wrong with Tito’s statement. The existence of
two German states  and the importance  of  allowing the German people  to  find the  solution
themselves were both staples of East Germany’s German policy, and having them repeated in
front of more than fifty world leaders could have been considered a success. However, Yugoslav
reports of Tito’s private conversations with other leaders showed not only that the Yugoslav
president avoided addressing the German question, but also that his interlocutors never even
633 Jürgen Dinkel, Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten: Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927-1992) (Berlin: de
Gruyter, 2015), p. 130.
634 “Statement by his excellency Josip Broz Tito” (October 6, 1964), KPR I-4-A-5 Box II, p. 6.
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mentioned it.635 Nor did any other speaker take it upon themselves to touch upon the German
question during the plenary meetings.
The West Germans were still actively attempting to influence the conference while it was
already under  way.  After  finding out  that  the issue of  the world’s  divided nations,  such as
Vietnam and Korea,  would be addressed – with the recommendation that they should begin
negotiations for reunification – the West German ambassador in Cairo approached his Italian
counterpart,  and asked him to use his  contacts  to  prevent  the inclusion of this  point  in  the
conference agenda. While he was not successful, he did later express his satisfaction with the
Yugoslav position regarding the German question, which showed that Belgrade honoured the
“good behaviour clause” in the agreement signed by Lahr and Nikezić in September.636
The conference’s vague conclusions reflected the sheer number of participants and their
disparate interests and positions.637 For one, the conference’s final document, the “Programme
for Peace and International Co-operation,” was several times longer than the one from Belgrade,
but still managed to be less precise in its formulations. In the final analysis, the East German
government  could  do  nothing else  but  latch  onto  the  conference  declaration.  In  its  official
statement on the conference, East Berlin agreed with the declaration’s central ideas, inserting
them into its own foreign policy framework, and nestled its own aims among the ones non-
aligned states provided. For example, the East Germans felt vindicated by the declaration’s call
for divided nations “to seek a just and lasting solution in order to achieve the unification of their
territories by peaceful methods without outside interference or pressure.” Furthermore, the GDR
635 Various reports in KPR I-4-a-5 Box II.
636 “Bilten br. 10” (undated), KPR I-4-a-5 Box II, p. 17.
637 Jürgen Dinkel, Die Bewegung bündnisfreier Staaten: Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927 – 1992). (Berlin: 
De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), p. 130.
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also agreed with the non-aligned statement “that resorting to threats or force can lead to no
satisfactory  settlement,  [and]  cannot  do  otherwise  than  jeopardize  international  security.”638
According to the GDR’s response, this idea was aligned with their perennial call for a peace
agreement and the solution of the Berlin question.639 The MfAA assigned some of the perceived
success  to  Ulbricht’s  meeting  with  Tito,  which  smacked of  sycophantism rather  than  sober
analysis.640 The West Germans also found the conference’s outcome acceptable, although they
were dismayed at the effort and funding that went into securing an agreeable treatment of the
German question in Cairo, and the prospect of forthcoming Global South conferences where
they might have had to repeat the same tactics.641 
Conclusion
Yugoslavia’s  relations  with  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  the  German
Democratic Republic continued to fluctuate unevenly in 1961 and 1962. The FRG emerged as
the winner of the diplomatic battle with the GDR over the Belgrade non-aligned conference.
However,  its  relations  with  Yugoslavia  suffered  a  blow shortly  after  the  conference  ended.
Croatian extreme right émigrés in the FRG committed a series of violent incidents and terrorist
attacks on Yugoslav officials. Even though Bonn regretted the incidents, they ignored Yugoslav
demands to implement new repressive measures against these groups, and Belgrade felt that the
638 “Programme for Peace and International Co-operation,” in Summit Declarations of Non-Aligned Movement 
(1961-2009), (Kathmandu Institute of Foreign Affairs: Nepal 2011), p. 18.
639 “Erklärung der Regierung der DDR zu den Ergebnissen der Konferenz nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten in Kairo” 
(October 25, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 15-20.
640 “Einschätzung der Haltung Jugoslawiens auf der Kairoer Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Länder” 
(November 2, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 1-13.
641 The second Bandung Conference was planned for 1965 in Algiers. However, it never took place. Gray, 
Germany’s Cold War, p. 169.
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West German response was wilfully inadequate and initiated their own measures to influence the
opinion  of  Yugoslav  guest  workers  in  the  FRG,  used  as  a  recruitment  pool  for  the  Croat
extremists.  The  East  Germans  attempted  to  exploit  this  crisis  in  West  German-Yugoslav
relations to improve their  own relations with Yugoslavia,  but their  efforts  were not fruitful.
Ulbricht also failed to capitalize on Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, which was gaining momentum
in  1962.  Khrushchev  needed  Tito’s  support  more  than  he  needed  the  GDR’s  international
affirmation. Nevertheless, Belgrade did continue to offer limited assistance to East Berlin in
Africa and Asia as long as it did not jeopardize Yugoslavia’s standing as a non-aligned leader.
When Ludwig  Erhard  replaced  Konrad Adenauer  as  the  West  German chancellor  in
October 1963, not much changed in the FRG’s foreign policy during the first few months of his
tenure, as Gerhard Schröder remained the foreign minister in the new government. However, a
small breakthrough occurred in the spring of 1963 when, with a prod from Washington, Bonn
approached  the  Yugoslavs  and  suggested  a  meeting  of  a  joint  West  German-Yugoslav
commission to discuss bilateral economic questions. The two sides were also able to come to an
agreement  on  the  reparations  for  the  victims  of  Nazi  human  experiments,  which  was  a
significant milestone in the negotiations over war reparations. At the same time, Yugoslavia’s
economic relations with East Germany were improving at a steady pace. Yugoslavia’s trade with
the GDR was growing in almost all sectors, with planned trade volumes being met ahead of
schedule.
Overall, Yugoslavia’s relations with both Germanies had taken a turn for the better in
1963 and 1964. The FRG began to show more goodwill towards Yugoslavia, as evidenced by
the first official contacts between the two governments after 1957 and the agreement on the
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reparations for human experiments. Conversely, the GDR was finally beginning to profit from
the Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, and was on the receiving end of Yugoslav goodwill itself. With
the Cairo non-aligned conference looming, both Germanies could feel more confident about
Yugoslavia’s position than they could three years earlier in Belgrade, but in the zero-sum game
that was the Hallstein Doctrine, only one Germany could profit from this development.
For the FRG and the GDR, the non-aligned conference in Cairo in October 1964 was a
significant diplomatic duel, with the non-aligned position on the German Question at stake. For
the second time since Belgrade in 1961, the GDR had a chance to convince the non-aligned
states  to  endorse  its  recognition  as  a  group,  a  considerably  more  powerful  statement  than
receiving recognition from individual countries. The non-bloc countries’ recognition of the GDR
would have been a decisive diplomatic victory not only for Ulbricht, but also for the Soviet Bloc
in general. Conversely, it would have been the death knell for the FRG’s Hallstein Doctrine.
The GDR was  more  confident  about  its  chances  this  time.  Not  only  had it  mended
relations with Yugoslavia, it had done the same with Egypt and other non-aligned states. In the
months  leading up to  the Cairo conference,  the East  German foreign ministry instructed its
Belgrade diplomats to pressure the Yugoslavs into lobbying for the GDR’s recognition. Given
the  recent  Yugo-Soviet  rapprochement,  especially  in  foreign  policy  matters,  East  Germans
believed that their campaign could prove fruitful. However, the West Germans were able to use
their economic clout to prevent Yugoslavia from agitating for the GDR’s recognition in Cairo. In
July 1964, the FRG and Yugoslavia signed a trade agreement that included a “good behaviour
clause,” which stipulated that the both sides would refrain from exacerbating “political” issues.
Both sides understood that this vague formulation pertained to Yugoslavia’s treatment of the
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German  Question,  and  Bonn  made  certain  to  confirm  the  stipulations  of  this  clause  in
September, during another round of economic negotiations in Belgrade.
The Cairo conference again exposed the disparity between the FRG’s and the GDR’s
diplomacy.  East  Berlin’s  ideological  alignment  with Yugoslavia could not  compete with the
FRG’s economic influence in Belgrade. It could also not compete against the FRG elsewhere,
since the FRG was successful in preventing other leading non-aligned countries from addressing
the German Question in Cairo by measures similar to the ones they employed when dealing with
Yugoslavia.  The  East  German  foreign  ministry  recognized  that  West  German  economic
influence  was  responsible  for  poor  results  in  Cairo,  but  also  that  the  “young nation-states”
simply did not recognize the dangers of West German “imperialism.”642 Even after a second
failed campaign to influence a non-aligned conference, the East German diplomats were not
ready to exercise self-criticism. 
To be sure, this outcome was the result of the FRG’s diplomatic supremacy which –
coupled with the notably lesser importance the German Question held in global politics at that
time – prevented any favourable outcome of the Cairo non-aligned conference. But the East
Germans  were  not  willing  to  concede  that  their  approach  needed  to  change.  From Bonn’s
perspective,  this  was  a  resounding  victory  and  another  reason  for  the  Hallstein  Doctrine’s
supporters to be satisfied with its implementation. However, as we shall see in the next chapter,
the movement against the Doctrine was growing ever stronger, and the Cairo conference was its
last  resounding  success.  The  West  German  government  was  beginning  to  acknowledge  the
642 “Erklärung der Regierung der DDR zu den Ergebnissen der Konferenz nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten in Kairo” 
(October 25, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 15-20.
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negative effects the Hallstein Doctrine was having on its foreign policy. As a result, Bonn would
enact measures that initiated the doctrine’s demise.
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Chapter 6
From Cairo to Kiesinger: The slow Decline of the Hallstein Doctrine (1964-
1966)
In  the  small  Bavarian  town  of  Tutzing  on  July  15,  1963,  at  the  eponymous  Evangelical
Academy, Egon Bahr gave a  talk in  which he outlined a proposal  for a new West German
approach  to  international  engagement,  which  would  become  synonymous  with  the  Federal
Republic of Germany’s (FRG) foreign policy of the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time,
Bahr  was  the  head  of  the  Press  and  Information  Office  for  West  Berlin  and  practically  a
spokesperson for Willy Brandt, the West Berlin mayor, who had given a similar-themed talk at
the same event in Tutzing.643 Brandt was the Social Democratic Party’s political superstar, who
achieved this status during the second Berlin Crisis as the city’s mayor. He travelled the world in
search of support for the West German solution to the crisis, and his popularity even earned him
a ticker tape parade in New York.644 But in Tutzing, it was Bahr’s speech that left the deeper
imprint.645 Bahr demanded an overhaul of Bonn’s German policy, arguing that its rigidity was
643 “Willy Brandts Rede in der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, 15. Juli 1963,” Willy Brandt Biografie (blog), 
accessed June 25, 2018, https://www.willy-brandt-biografie.de/quellen/bedeutende-reden/rede-tutzing-1963-2/.
644 Barbara Marshall, Willy Brandt: A Political Biography, 1997 edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996),
pp. 35-36.
645 It was Egon Bahr whom the German press dubbed “the Architect of the Ostpolitik” upon his death in 2015. 
Karl-Ludwig Günsche, “Zum Tode Egon Bahrs: Wegbereiter Der Einheit,” Spiegel Online, August 20, 2015, 
sec. Politik, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/egon-bahr-ist-tot-willy-brandts-engster-vertrauter-a-
1048965.html; Daniel Friedrich Sturm, “Egon Bahr: Architekt von Brandts Ostpolitik ist Tot,” DIE WELT, 
August 20, 2015, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article145429912/Egon-Bahr-Tod-einer-deutschen-
Jahrhundertfigur.html; “Architekt der Ostpolitik: SPD-Politiker Egon Bahr gestorben,” FAZ.NET, August 20, 
2015, http://www.faz.net/1.3759543; FOCUS Online, “Der Architekt von Brandts neuer Ostpolitik ist tot,” 
FOCUS Online, August 20, 2015, https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/egon-bahr-is-tot-der-architekt-von-
brandts-neuer-ostpolitik-ist-tot_id_4891824.html.
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counterproductive not only to an eventual German reunification, but also detrimental to ending
the  Cold  War.  At  the  heart  of  Bahr’s  speech  was  the  concept  of  “change  through
rapprochement.”  He believed that  only if  both sides cooperated closely could a meaningful
breakthrough be achieved.646 There was no room for negative policies to which Bonn was still
hanging on.
The Hallstein Doctrine, with its own limiting rigidity, clearly fell under the umbrella of
the changes Brandt and Bahr wanted to make in West Germany’s foreign policy. The opposition
to the Doctrine had existed in West German politics since its inception, and Brandt had been at
its forefront for just as long.647 However, the Hallstein Doctrine’s detractors lacked influence
during those years.648 But the dissenting voices grew stronger over the years, convinced that the
Doctrine  weakened,  rather  then  strengthened  the  FRG’s  international  position,  and  Cuba’s
recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1963 only served to prove the point.
Five months before Bahr’s Tutzing speech, on January 11, Cuba had finally recognized
the GDR after years of hesitation. The Cuban act of recognition itself was sudden, since Cuba
had maintained relations with the FRG, established before Fidel Castro took control  of this
Caribbean island, and the new regime was initially reluctant to jeopardize them by recognizing
the GDR.649 Yet by 1963, Cuba was definitely part of the Soviet Bloc and hardly a ‘third state’ as
defined by Hallstein Doctrine. After all, Cuba had been the mouthpiece for the GDR at various
646 “Volltext Egon Bahr, Wandel Durch Annäherung. Rede in Der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing [Tutzinger 
Rede], 15. Juli 1963 / Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (BSB, München),” accessed June 25, 2018, 
http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?
c=dokument_de&dokument=0091_bah&object=translation&st=&l=de.
647 In 1957, the year of Yugoslavia’s recognition of the GDR, Brandt called for closer cooperation with the Soviet 
Bloc. Marshall, Willy Brandt, p. 34.
648 Wolfgang Schmidt “Willy Brandts Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik” in Bernd Rother, ed., Willy Brandts 
Außenpolitik, Akteure Der Außenpolitik (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014), 
//www.springer.com/de/book/9783658029180 (ebook), p. 167.
649 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 115.
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international venues, including the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade in 1961. The FRG was
somewhat surprised by the recognition,  but quickly regrouped and retaliated with full force.
Unlike with Yugoslavia in 1957, Bonn did not pull any punches in its implementation of the
Hallstein Doctrine. It had severed all diplomatic, consular, and economic relations with Cuba.650
While this was an easy decision to make, since Cuba was not one of FRG’s major trade partners
or an important player in European Cold War politics, it did show that the FRG was willing to
go to unprecedented lengths to prevent the GDR’s recognition. 
This mindset was anathema to Brandt. He and Bahr had been working closely since the
1950s, and since then their position on the German question, quite different than Adenauer’s,
had been slowly evolving in constant cooperation.651 At the centre of his thinking lay the idea
that Socialist countries should be approached as partners rather than adversaries.652
In February 1964, Brandt became chairman of the SPD, and the party decided to make
him their next chancellor candidate for the second time. As the SPD chairman and its chancellor
candidate, Brandt was in the best position to make his case in front of the West German public.
However, it would take several years before the ideas Brandt and Bahr put forth became West
German policy and changed the triangular relations between the FRG, the GDR and Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, the Tutzing speeches were indeed a harbinger of change, a change made necessary
after the FRG’s foreign policy painted itself into a corner in 1965 and 1966.
650 Ibid., p. 137.
651 “New Ostpolitik and European integration Concept and policies in the Brandt era” in N. Piers Ludlow, ed., 
European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, 1 edition (London ; New York:  
Routledge, 2007), pp. 67-69.
652 In 1962 Brandt argued that “if we can manage to link the interests of the Eastern bloc, or those of single 
Communist countries,with our own interests, we will have created an instrument of political action far more 
effective than any paper protest.” Willy Brandt, The Ordeal of Coexistence (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1963), p. 34.
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Ulbricht’s temporary triumph
In the three years between Tutzing and Brandt becoming the FRG’s foreign minister in
1966, some positive developments in West German foreign policy had taken place. It cannot be
said that the foreign office under Schröder was not trying to improve relations with the Soviet
Bloc, since the FRG opened a number of trade missions in socialist countries during his second
term in  office.653 However,  after  the  Cairo  Non-Aligned Conference,  the  Hallstein  Doctrine
seemed to have entered a “period of crisis,” as one Yugoslav report described the FRG’s foreign
policy in May 1965. The report  cited Walter Ulbricht’s state visit  to Egypt in February and
March as proof of the Doctrine’s failure.654 The author assigned much agency to the GDR’s
foreign policy and the general interest of Afro-Asian countries in improving their relations with
the GDR.655 This assessment was only partially correct. East Berlin had indeed ramped up its
efforts to break through the Hallstein Doctrine by focusing on a small number of non-aligned
countries.  However,  Egypt  was  nominally  not  a  primary  target  of  these  efforts.656 
Nevertheless, Ulbricht had been pressuring the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser
to invite him for over a year, but the Egyptians finally agreed only after Bonn ignored Arab
protests over West German arms shipments to Israel.657 The Egyptians were willing to call the
FRG’s bluff because the issue of arms trade with Israel took precedence over their relations with
Bonn.  Thus  it  was  not  the  GDR’s  diplomacy  which  exposed  the  Hallstein  Doctrine’s
653 Michael Sodaro, Moscow, Germany and the West (I.B.Tauris, 1993), p. 56.
654 For the GDR’s diplomatic campaign in Egypt and Ulbricht’s meeting with Nasser see Rainer A. Blasius, 
“‘Völkerfreundschaft’ Am Nil: Ägypten Und Die DDR Im Februar 1965. Stenographische Aufzeichnungen Aus
Dem Ministerium Für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten Über Den Ulbricht-Besuch Bei Nasser,” Vierteljahrshefte 
Für Zeitgeschichte 46, no. 4 (1998): 747–805.
655 “Informacija o stanju odnosa SR Nemačka-SFR Jugoslavija” (May 1, 1965), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 161/i.
656 Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, p. 277.
657 Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, pp. 123-124.
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weaknesses, but rather it was the FRG’s own inability to function in a world of  Realpolitik
which caused this potentially dangerous breach. Not surprisingly, the West German reaction to
Ulbricht’s visit was severe. Bonn cancelled several loans and aid programs to Egypt even before
Ulbricht’s arrival in Cairo.658 However, in an attempt to allay the crisis in the Middle East, Bonn
also tried to stop its arms shipment to Israel with mixed success.659 The reason for this decision
was to remove Nasser’s main motive to recognize the GDR.660 But the most interesting West
German decision was the one not made. Soon after East Berlin announced Ulbricht’s visit to
Egypt, chancellor Erhard called for the immediate implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine.661
The FRG’s ambassador in Egypt Georg Federer joined him and suggested threatening Nasser
with the triggering of the Doctrine.662 Foreign minister Schröder, realizing the potential danger
the implementation of the Doctrine on Egypt might pose, talked Erhard off the ledge. Schröder
pointed out that Nasser had been useful in the past, especially among the non-aligned countries,
and that implementing the Hallstein Doctrine would cause an outpouring of solidarity among
Arab nations, which would presumably result in a mass recognition of the GDR.663 Although this
scenario was averted, the Hallstein Doctrine was proving to be a liability for the FRG’s foreign
policy.664
658 Ibid., p. 132.
659 Bonn offered to compensate the Israelis for the arms, but the latter declined the offer. Through underground 
channels and without explanation, 40 out of 90 promised German tanks made it to Israel on an Israeli ship 
sailing from Rotterdam. Ibid., p. 135. 
660 “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Krapf” (February 2, 1965), AAPD 1965, p. 242.
661 Ibid., p. 136.
662 “Botschafter Federer, Kairo, an Staatssekretär Carstens” (January 26, 1964), AAPD 1965, p. 194.
663 Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, p. 137.
664 West Germany’s relationship with Israel was another aspect of its foreign policy that severely limited its 
foreign policy in the Middle East. In May 1965, the FRG finally recognized Israel, but there was no retaliation 
from Arab countries in the form of recognition of the GDR. For an analysis of the FRG’s foreign relations with 
Israel until the recognition, see Yeshayahu Jelinek, Deutschland und Israel 1945–1965, Ein neurotisches 
Verhältnis, Reprint 2014 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2003), https://doi.org/10.1515/9783486594584; For the 
role of social movements in the FRG in Bonn’s decision to recognize Israel see Hannfried von Hindenburg, 
Demonstrating Reconciliation: State and Society in West German Foreign Policy toward Israel, 1952-1965 
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Tito in East Berlin
Several months before Ulbricht’s visit to Cairo was announced, the word got out that
Tito was planning an official visit to East Berlin in June. Initially, this news caused much less
commotion in Bonn than Ulbricht’s Cairo sojourn, and some in the foreign office found these
rumours to be almost unbelievable.665 Nevertheless, West Germans were worried that Tito was
becoming increasingly less considerate towards their interests. As case in point, Ulbricht and his
inner circle had departed for Cairo from the Yugoslav port town of Dubrovnik.666 In previous
years, Tito would not have permitted East Germans to make such use of Yugoslav territory, but
this  time he instructed his  officials  to  provide Ulbricht the “full  protocolar courtesy” at  his
arrival at the Dubrovnik airport, which included a military battalion with “flags and music.”667
To be sure, several SED officials had travelled through Yugoslavia before, but never in such
high-profiled fashion. More importantly, while Ulbricht’s visit to Belgrade in September 1964
was  unofficial,  Tito  would  be  greeted  in  East  Berlin  with  full  honours.  Therefore,  Bonn
instructed their  representative in  Belgrade,  Hans Kroll,  to  inform the Yugoslavs  about  their
position, which was that if Tito could not avoid visiting East Berlin, he should try to downplay
its significance. At the time, Kroll was gravely ill and bedridden, and he invited a Yugoslav
foreign ministry official to his home to discuss Tito’s East Berlin visit over tea. It seemed that
Kroll’s  illness  was  responsible  for  the  tone  of  the  conversation  because,  according  to  the
Yugoslav report,  his  plea was quite  meek.  Kroll  explained to  his  interlocutor  that  the FRG
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).
665 “Möglicher Besuch des jugoslawischen Staatspräsidenten Tito in der SBZ”, (November 30, 1964), PA AA, AA,
B 42 178, p. 119.
666 Ibid., 132.
667 “Informacija” (February 17, 1965), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-13.
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understood the Yugoslavs, but that they “also wanted them to understand us.” Kroll suggested
that  Tito  could  ask  Ulbricht  to  remove  the  Berlin  Wall.  In  general,  Kroll  concluded,  West
Germans  would  have  preferred  if  Tito’s  visit  was  short  and  “unspectacular,”  much  like
Ulbricht’s visit to Belgrade in 1964.668 
Belgrade  sensed a  lack  of  conviction  and intent  in  Bonn’s  contacts  with  Yugoslavia
compared to previous years, and intended to take advantage of the new situation by going ahead
with Tito’s visit. However, the West Germans were not retreating. Bonn decided to break off the
negotiations over a guest worker agreement, and vetoed Yugoslavia’s request to set up a mission
with the European Economic Community.669 It  appeared that the Yugoslavs received Bonn’s
message, and the Belgrade foreign ministry recommended that the Yugoslav legation in East
Berlin  should  not  be  upgraded  to  an  embassy  during  Tito’s  visit,  lest  it  provoke  the  West
Germans  even more.  Belgrade’s  foreign  office’s  assessment  of  Bonn’s  foreign  policy  listed
fifteen countermeasures at their disposal, citing the economic ones as the biggest concern. The
report  clearly  showed  that  the  FRG  had  the  upper  hand  in  the  standoff  over  the  GDR.670
Nevertheless, this was not enough for Tito to reconsider his visit.  He also ignored the West
German suggestion to visit the GDR before his planned visit to Norway, which would have
made his stay in East Berlin look like a stop on the way to Oslo, and not the final destination.671
In the final analysis, Yugoslavia was very mindful of the limits of what was acceptable to Bonn,
but did not cower under West German pressure.
668 “Zabeleška” (January 22, 1965), AJ, KPR I-2/26-2, doc. no. 69/i.
669 The FRG justified the EEC decision with the poor relations between the two countries. Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad,
Ost-Berlin, p. 201.
670 “Informacija” (April 6, 1965), AJ, KPR I-2/26-2, doc. no. 233/i.
671 Baer, Zwischen Anlehnung Und Abgrenzung, p.264. The West Germans based their suggestion on the rumours 
circulating in the Western diplomatic circles in Belgrade. “Angekündigter Besuch Präsident Titos in der SBZ” 
(March 10, 1965), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 123-124.
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Tito landed in East Berlin on June 8, 1965 for what was a historic visit for the Yugoslav
leader as well as Walter Ulbricht, who welcomed him with open arms. Ulbricht greeted Tito at
the Schönefeld airport with the highest honours, and then paraded him through the streets of
East Berlin in an open top limousine in front of thousands of cheering locals.672 The atmosphere
in East Berlin was festive, but Tito received some bad news from the FRG at the end of the day.
In the late evening hours a Croatian extreme right émigré attempted to assassinate the Yugoslav
consul in Munich, Andrija Klarić. Tito instructed his foreign ministry to take “strong diplomatic
steps, and in the press too [sic]. This is not an individual act, rather it is connected to the [West
German] policy toward our country. There are similar émigrés in other countries and such cases
do not happen there.”673 The Yugoslav foreign ministry translated Tito’s anger into a strongly
worded note.674 The Yugoslav president  himself  publicly addressed the assassination attempt
during  his  speech  in  Halle,  condemning  the  fact  that  in  the  FRG “Quislings  from various
countries can continue their terrorist activities unpunished, that the militarist and fascist forces,
that were the bearers of enslavement of other nations and inhumane atrocities are still living
there, and are allowed to be openly active.”675
Tito voiced the same concerns during his meeting with Ulbricht. They might have even
influenced his attitude during their conversation. While neither leader usually shied away from
polemicizing with their interlocutors when in disagreement, these talks were marked by mutual
understanding and flattery. Tito claimed that if he put the two Germanies on a scale, Yugoslavia
would have to be on the side of the GDR, “regardless whether the other one is  richer,” he
672 “Vieltausendfach rief Berlin: Willkommen. Genosse Tito!” Neues Deutschland (Berlin, GDR), June 8, 1965. 
http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/index.php?id=view1&purl=SNP2532889X-19650609-0-1-5-0
673 “Very Urgent” (June 6, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 69.
674 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 203.
675 “Aufzeichnung” (June 18, 1965), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 142.
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continued, “we have to be on the side where socialism is being made, where socialist relations
are being built.”676 After his meeting with Ulbricht, Tito also met with Max Reimann, the exiled
chairman of the illegal West German Communist Party. Reimann briefed Tito on the current
political situation in the FRG, something that Tito could have learned from his own diplomats.
Reimann then inquired whether  the Yugoslav press might  report  on their  meeting,  and also
include  his  statement  condemning  the  assassination  attempt  on  consul  Klarić,  which  Tito
permitted.  At  the  end  of  the  meeting,  Tito  invited  Reimann  to  spend  his  holidays  in
Yugoslavia.677 While  it  might  have  been  part  of  Tito’s  protocol,  the  Yugoslav  leader  was
certainly aware that publishing a report about their meeting and the invitation for Reimann to
visit  Yugoslavia  could  only  have  been  construed  as  a  provocation  in  Bonn.  The  Yugoslav
president allowed himself this little jab at the West Germans after their attempts to influence his
visit to the GDR. 
Tito’s provocation only added to Bonn’s already considerable discontent. It felt betrayed
by his actions. After the two countries adopted the “good behaviour” clause prior to the Cairo
non-aligned conference, by which Yugoslavia agreed not to disturb the status quo of its relations
with the GDR, Tito’s visit seemed like a gross dereliction of responsibility. On July 15, foreign
minister Schröder announced that Yugoslavia could not expect any more leniency from Bonn.678
The West German government was upset with the Yugoslavs for a couple of reasons. Apart from
reneging on the agreement, the Yugoslavs also claimed that Tito was only returning the favour
after Ulbricht’s visit in 1964, but this was clearly a lie since Tito asked Ulbricht to visit Belgrade
676 Transcript of Tito-Ulbricht talks (June 12, 1965), AJ, KPR I-2/26-2, doc. no. 69/26. The reason for this meeting
was not included in the file on Tito’s visit.
677 “Beleška o razgovoru druga Tita sa drugom Maksom Rajmanom” (June 12, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. 
no. 68.
678 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 204.
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again in  1966.  According to  the  West  Germans,  this  was part  of  a  wider  strategy to  mend
relations with Moscow, which experienced a patchy period after Khrushchev’s ousting.679 
To what extent was the West German analysis correct? It is true that the future of Yugo-
Soviet  relations  was  unknown  when  the  news  of  Khrushchev's  demise  reached  Belgrade.
However, the new Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev quickly made it clear that, as far as
their  relations  were  concerned,  continuity  would  be  preferable.  A number  of  high-profiled
meetings between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs took place in the first half of 1965, culminating
with Tito’s visit to Moscow in late June and early July, right after his visit to the GDR. The
Soviets made an effort to host Tito almost as an equal, without any indications that there was a
rift between them. Quite the opposite, their aim was to bind the Yugoslavs to their policies. 680 
Tito  was certainly  pleased  with the  way the  Soviets  treated  him.  At  the  same time,
Yugoslavia’s new foreign minister Marko Nikezić – who belonged to the liberal wing of the new
crop of Yugoslav Communists – pushed for better relations with the United States, and preferred
to keep a distance between Yugoslavia and the USSR, especially in the very delicate matter of
the Vietnam War, which was proving to be an ever growing concern in global diplomacy. This
dichotomy of “ideological affinity and the imperative of maintaining national independence,” as
Dragan  Bogetić  put  it,  was  a  staple  of  Yugoslavia’s  foreign  policy,  but  it  seemed  that  the
German  Question  was  no  longer  an  issue  that  would  cause  a  rift  between  Tito  and  his
diplomats.681 The  antagonism  between  the  FRG  and  Yugoslavia,  at  this  juncture,  was
undoubtedly  initiated  by  Bonn.  Tito’s  visit  angered  the  West  German  foreign  office
(Auswärtiges Amt, AA), and this attitude lingered there even after the September 19 Bundestag
679 Teleprinter from Krapf (June 30, 1965), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 170-172.
680 Tripković, Jugoslavija – SSSR, p. 174.
681 Bogetić, Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971, p. 187.
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elections. The Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union
in Bavaria (CSU) were able to remain the largest party bloc, and even increase its number of
seats in the Bundestag compared to the 1961 election. Their coalition partners, the liberal Free
Democratic Party (FDP) lost votes, but remained strong enough to continue the coalition. The
Social Democrats, with the Berlin mayor Willy Brandt as their chancellor candidate, received
40% percent of the vote, seven percent behind CDU/CSU.682 This meant that any changes in
Germany’s foreign policy would happen only if  Erhard and his coalition partners  agreed to
them.
Erhard was able to save the foreign office from any major changes. However, while he
won  the  election  comfortably,  the  cabinet-building  process  took  a  toll  on  the  chancellor,
especially concerning the foreign office. Schröder had many detractors among his fellow party
members, including former chancellor Adenauer, but also in the FDP, his coalition partner.683
Erhard fought to keep Schröder in the cabinet, but he was able to secure political support for
him only by promising to curb the AA’s plans for a diplomatic campaign in the East.684 Schröder
had namely intended to take a more positive approach to the Socialist countries, but Erhard’s
enemies ensured that this plan was scrapped. They preferred to maintain the status quo, which
prolonged  the  poor  state  of  relations  between  Bonn  and  Belgrade  for  most  of  Erhard’s
chancellorship. The tensions surrounding Tito’s trip to East Berlin before the election certainly
did not help the matter.
682 Dietrich Staritz, Das Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Geschichte, Entstehung, Entwicklung ;  
eine Einführung. (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1976), pp. 1963-164
683 Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard, p. 199.
684 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, pp. 207-208.
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The Yugoslavs understood that no progress could be made with the current government
in  Bonn,  and  they  regretted  the  halt  in  negotiations  on  reparations  and  other  open  issues.
However, the status quo also assured the continuation of economic relations in their current
state,  which  was  hardly  a  punishment  from  Belgrade’s  perspective.  By  the  end  of  1965,
Yugoslav exports to the FRG had risen by 16.6 percent, while the imports had decreased by 2.3
percent.685
There were indications that negotiations regarding Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG
were also exempt from limitations set by Bonn, and might resume in early 1966.686 The number
of all foreign guest workers among the employed in the FRG rose from 1.3 percent (279,000) in
1960 to 6.1 percent (1,314,000) in 1966, primarily due to the West German economy’s growing
need for cheap labour.687 This was an issue which both sides wished to regulate as soon as
possible, since Yugoslavia was also more than happy to send a number of its citizens to the
West, not only to relieve the pressures of an ever growing workforce on its ailing economy, but
also to reap the benefits of remittances, a valuable source of hard currency.688 The Yugoslavs
conceded that  they  had “relatively  weak capabilities”  to  apply  pressure on the  FRG in  the
matters of reparations and the extreme right émigré organizations, and that Belgrade had done
little to change this.689 However, the Yugoslav government did not want to directly address Bonn
to improve its position. The likely reason for this was that there were no signals from Bonn that
685 “Odnosi SFRJ-SRN” (December 8, 1965), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 651/i.
686 Ibid.
687 Ulrich Herbert and Karin Huhn, “Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic” in The 
Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 196.
688 For a detailed discussion of the history Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG and Austria, see Vladimir Ivanović, 
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a  satisfactory  resolution  was  possible.  Instead,  the  Yugoslavs  considered  developing  their
cooperation with those European countries that could limit the FRG’s bullish foreign policy.690
None of the options mulled over by the Yugoslav leadership included a downgrade in
relations with the GDR, but it did proceed with caution. In December 1965, delegations from
both countries met in Belgrade to discuss the GDR’s initiative on European security and its
application for membership in the United Nations. East Germans wanted Yugoslavs to act as
messengers for their security campaign and to lobby for the GDR’s membership at the UN.
Foreign minister  Nikezić  was reluctant to  offer  Yugoslavia’s unconditional assistance,  citing
numerous problems that lobbying for the GDR might create for Belgrade.691 This was not the
answer the East Germans were expecting, as they were hoping to build on Tito’s visit.  East
German  expectations  were  not  exactly  unfounded.  Just  a  few weeks  prior  to  the  Belgrade
meeting, a Yugoslav diplomat assured them that they would receive all the necessary help from
Belgrade.692 Regardless of the less than satisfactory Belgrade meeting, East Germans did not
have  to  fear  for  their  relations  with  Yugoslavia,  especially  as  long as  the  FRG insisted  on
maintaining the status quo. Because the anti-Schröder faction prevented West German diplomats
from initiating dialogue with the Soviet Bloc, they could only observe from the sidelines as the
GDR continued to develop its relations with Yugoslavia, with Ulbricht’s upcoming Belgrade
visit as the next East German coup.
If the recent manifestations of friendliness between Ulbricht and Tito could have been
construed as a new phase in GDR’s relations with Yugoslavia, their day-to-day dealings did not
690 This report does not mention which European countries the Yugoslav foreign ministry had in mind. “Zaključci”
(December 2, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 364/11.
691 “Informacija” (December 21, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-3.
692 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 214.
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reflect this. On the contrary, there was little evidence of a shift in the way the two countries
cooperated.  For  example,  bilateral  trade  had failed  to  reach its  goal  for  the  year,  and  Tito
rejected the East German request to open a consulate in Zagreb, which the GDR planned to use
for strengthening its presence and influence in the more affluent western Yugoslav republics of
Slovenia  and Croatia.693 The  League  of  Communists  of  Yugoslavia  (SKJ)  also  rejected  the
SED’s proposal to increase the number of East German party officials who were to spend their
holidays in Yugoslavia.694 The Yugoslavs were willing to invite only six SED officials and their
wives, and in the spirit of parity, they themselves would send only six SKJ officials to spend
their holidays in the GDR.695 Overall, however, party relations were evolving at a steady pace.
Erhard’s “Peace Note”
In the meantime, Bonn itself was beginning to feel the pressure of its outdated, negative
Ostpolitik. The realization that it was doing more harm than good could be traced to the success
of the East German New Economic System, which had made the GDR’s economy stronger than
ever. The NES allowed East Germans to enjoy levels of prosperity not experienced since before
World War II, and for many of its younger citizens it was as good as it ever was.696 The West
Germans believed, not without reason, that the SED gained the peoples’ consent through these
changes, and that with their newly gained legitimacy it would be improbable that Ulbricht’s
693 Ibid., p. 215.
694 “Beleška” (January 21, 1966), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-100-147, doc. no. 05-117.
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regime would collapse in on itself.697 The West German realization was sped up by the lack of
Allied support. The United States president Lyndon B. Johnson, whom Erhard considered his
most important ally, found the chancellor’s problems secondary at best.  He needed the West
Germans to support the United States’ war in Vietnam, and for the FRG to pay off its offset
obligations.698 The  latter  would  later  become  an  even  larger  stumbling  block  in  Erhard’s
relationship with Johnson.699
West Germans understood that “German reunification could only be achieved with the
full support of all three Western powers.”700 Without US backing, any hope of reunification was
dashed, but the West Germans could not even gain support from the UK or France. Somewhat
isolated, West Germans resigned themselves to a course correction. Although they were still
unwilling  to  recognize  the  GDR,  chancellor  Erhard  extended  an  offer  to  all  Soviet  Bloc
countries – excluding the GDR – to sign a nonaggression agreement with the FRG. This offer,
named the “Peace Note,” was published on March 25 and circulated to all countries with which
the FRG had diplomatic or consular  relations.701 The SPD praised Erhard’s bold move, and
several years later Willy Brandt identified the Peace Note as one of the important acts in the
697 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 192.
698 Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard, pp. 199-200. 
699 These offset payments were an agreement between the FRG and the US, by which the FRG agreed “to reduce 
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Heidelberg University Founding Director Detlef Junker et al., The United States and Germany in the Era of the
Cold War, 1945-1990: A Handbook Vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 51-52.
700 Eugenie M. Blang, “A Reappraisal of Germany’s Vietnam Policy, 1963-1966: Ludwig Erhard’s Response to 
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rapprochement between the FRG and the Soviet Bloc.702 Foreign observer, including those in the
Global South, saw the note as a positive step.703
The Yugoslavs did not receive the note as favourably, which was understandable given
the state of relations between the two countries. On February 12, just weeks before the West
Germans circulated the Peace Note, the FRG’s representative in Belgrade Hans Bock met with
Ljubo Drndić, the chief Yugoslav economic negotiator with the FRG. Bock intended to brief
Drndić about  his  recent  visit  to  Bonn,  but  the meeting soon turned into a mutual  airing of
grievances. However, Drndić was able to glean from the conversation that the West Germans
were considering making the Hallstein Doctrine more flexible.704 For Yugoslavia, this was the
first  indication  that  the  FRG  was  reconsidering  its  Ostpolitik.  However,  Belgrade  was
disappointed by the contents of the Peace Note.  The official  Yugoslav response to  the note
reflected this feeling. The Belgrade foreign ministry found no particular change not only in the
FRG’s goals, but also in the way it pursued them, since it presumed that German reunification
was the only precondition for European security. The Yugoslavs also found Bonn’s continuous
implied support for the Hallstein Doctrine – “the current policy gave results which encourage
the government to maintain this course” – severely lacking, more so because the Note did not
call for establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Bloc countries.705 A draft of the official
Yugoslav response to the note revealed the same reluctance to acknowledge Erhard’s note as a
genuine  contribution  towards  solving  the  European  security  situation.  According  to  the
Yugoslavs, the West German government was putting the cart before the horse by claiming that
702 Rainer A. Blasius, “Erwin Wickert Und Die Friedensnote Der Bundesregierung Vom 25.März 1966,” 
Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte 43, no. 3 (1995): 539–53, p. 539.
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705 “Informacija” (April 7, 1966), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-6, doc. no. 335/i.
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German reunification was a precondition for European security and cooperation. The Yugoslavs
also pointed out that omitting their own situation from the note was a sign that Bonn was not
acting in good faith. After all, how does one initiate a campaign of inclusion without including
the  one  European  country  with  which  the  FRG  has  broken  diplomatic  relations?706 The
Yugoslavs  were not  alone in  their  negative assessment  of the note.  The USSR, Poland and
Czechoslovakia rejected it as propaganda, with the Polish especially angered by the anti-Polish
sentiment in the note.707 By May 1966, when the Yugoslavs published their answer, it was clear
that the note failed to initiate a dialogue between Bonn and the Soviet Bloc countries. It turned
out to be Erhard’s last-ditch effort to make gains in the East without abandoning the Hallstein
Doctrine altogether. What followed was a return to status quo, which would only be broken
towards the end of his tenure.
Ulbricht’s second visit to Yugoslavia
Erhard’s failure must have put a smile on Ulbricht’s face, and the fact that the status quo
was maintained also meant that the international community and the East German public would
see his September visit to Yugoslavia as another victory over the FRG. Bonn was certainly not
happy with the Yugoslav decision to welcome Ulbricht with full honours, as a head of state.
Throughout the summer of 1966, the AA tried to convince foreign diplomats in Yugoslavia not
to attend the official events the Yugoslavs planned for Ulbricht.708 At the same time, the East
Germans were intending to take full advantage of Ulbricht’s first official visit to Yugoslavia.
706 “Nacrt odgovora vlade SFRJ na notu vlade SR Nemačke” (May 21, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-6, doc. no. 335/ii.
707 “Informacija” (May 18, 1966), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-6, doc. no. 418736.
708 Various reports and telegrams in PA AA, AA, B 42 178.
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One East German diplomat commissioned 500 posters depicting the GDR’s and Yugoslavia’s
friendship from the Croatian Institute for Advertising. The posters were to be placed in visible
locations in Zagreb and Ljubljana. Tito allowed the placing of only a fraction of these posters,
but saw no issue with the images themselves.709 Aside from the propaganda, East Germans also
aimed to  take  full  political  advantage  of  this  visit.  Before  Ulbricht  arrived,  deputy  foreign
minister Günter Kohrt met with Yugoslav foreign ministry officials to determine the topics of
conversation for Ulbricht and Tito. Kohrt’s attitude was “rigid and pessimistic,” which his hosts
interpreted as a way of testing the Yugoslav positions on various foreign policy questions.710 The
upshot was that the Yugoslavs expected Ulbricht to push for “much stronger” support for the
GDR on a number of issues pertaining to its international status. Specifically, Ulbricht expected
Yugoslavia  to  aid  the  GDR in  strengthening  its  position  among  the  non-aligned  countries,
especially the Arab ones, and to lobby for the GDR’s membership at the UN, if possible directly
with the Secretary-General.711 East German demands had a definite triumphalist tone, but the
Yugoslavs were not ready to fully comply with their demands. On the contrary, the Yugoslav
foreign  ministry  found  that  the  GDR’s  zealous  approach  to  conducting  foreign  policy  was
“objectively  creating  difficulties  for  positive  movement  in  Europe”  and,  more  specifically,
“weakened  [Yugoslavia’s]  position  in  terms  of  wider  activity  in  Europe.”  Yugoslavia  was
equally reluctant  to  provide all  the assistance the GDR demanded in Asia and Africa,  even
though the Yugoslavs wielded considerably more influence there. Yugoslavia agreed to represent
East German interests in Ghana, but only in a limited capacity. Therefore, with all these issues
709 The photos used for the posters showed, among other scenes, Tito and Ulbricht during a toast, Tito’s and 
Ulbricht’s wives, Jovanka and Lotte, visiting in East Berlin; and Tito at the GDR pavilion at the Zagreb Fair. 
“Zabeleška” (September 21, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15, doc. no. 223/21.
710 “Informacija” (September 21, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15, doc. no. 429380.
711 Ibid.
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weighing  down  the  Yugo-GDR  relations,  the  timing  of  Ulbricht’s  visit  was  “not  most
convenient.”712
Finally, on September 26, Ulbricht and the rest of the East German delegation arrived in
Belgrade for their first official state visit to Yugoslavia that was, compared to his previous visit
in 1964, a grand entrance by any measure. According to a West German report, the streets of
Belgrade were decorated with many flags, more numerous that during the visits by the king of
Norway and the Iranian Shah, but about the same as during Nasser’s visit. Near the Dedinje
palace the Yugoslavs constructed an arch – apparently reserved only for the most prominent
statesmen  –  adorned  with  the  slogan  “Long  live  the  GDR State  Council  President  Walter
Ulbricht.”713 Ulbricht  met  with  Tito  the  following  day.  In  his  opening  statement,  Ulbricht
attempted to couple the GDR’s search for recognition in Africa and Asia with the opposition to
the Vietnam War and the “US imperial expansion.” According to Ulbricht, in order to combat
the spread of American and West German influence in “Afro-Asian countries,” it was necessary
to build an opposing front, made up of socialist as well as non-aligned countries. He argued that
this  front could only be made stronger with the GDR’s participation,  and more specifically,
membership in the UN. Tito avoided addressing this particular Ulbricht's hint, but agreed with
his negative assessment of West German foreign policy, especially in Europe. Tito expressed his
irritation with the FRG’s refusal to accept responsibility for the war reparations, which they had
been using as leverage against further rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the GDR. The
Yugoslavs had had enough, and Tito informed Ulbricht that the time had finally come to upgrade
712 “Informacija” (September 24, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15, doc. no. 429380.
713 Telegram from Belgrade (September 26, 1966), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 232-233.
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their respective diplomatic outposts to the rank of embassies. “The West Germans have been
blackmailing us for far too long,” Tito concluded.714
After the meeting, Ulbricht and Tito visited the Friendship Park at the confluence of the
Danube and Sava rivers,  where Ulbricht  planted a  lime tree.715 This  was an honour denied
Ulbricht during his previous stay in Belgrade. At the end of Ulbricht’s visit, the two leaders
presented  a  joint  communiqué.716 In  it,  they  attacked the  FRG for  obstructing  the  security-
building processes in Europe. The decision to upgrade legations to embassies was also included,
albeit in one sentence and without explanation.717 
The  West  German  reaction  to  the  communiqué  was  subdued.  Publicly,  the  Bonn
government  simply  pointed  out  that  it  was  just  a  continuation  of  a  “regrettable”  Yugoslav
German policy, as witnessed during Tito’s visit to East Berlin in 1965.718 But internally, the visit
was seen as an egregious breach of the “good behaviour” clause Yugoslavia agreed to in 1964.
The West German mission in Belgrade suggested several sanctions for this transgression. The
most punishing measure suggested was a temporary ban on issuing entry visas to Yugoslav guest
workers.  This  ban  would  presumably  cause  mass  protests  in  Yugoslavia,  with  the  people
blaming the regime for “throwing away” their chance at achieving good income.719 Conversely,
the Belgrade mission also suggested taking certain measures to improve the political relations
714 Transcript of the Tito-Ulbricht conversation (September 27, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15.
715 “Land des Lächelns,” Der Spiegel, October 3, 1966. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46414390.html
716 The second meeting of Ulbricht’s visit took place on October 1 at Tito’s Brioni Island residence. The focus of 
those talks was the economy, without any mention of bilateral relations or international politics. Transcript of 
the Tito-Ulbricht conversation (October 1, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15.
717 “Zajedničko saopštenje” (October 1, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15.
718 Ulbricht in Jugoslawien; Gesandtschaften werden Botschaften; Stellungnahme der BRD
[Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: Oktober, P. 1. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 22131 (cf. 
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with Yugoslavia, such as stricter control of Croatian extreme right organizations in the FRG.
These positive measures, however, were to be implemented at some point in the future, lest they
be misinterpreted as an admission of guilt by Bonn.720
Erhard’s demise
Ulbricht’s  visit  also  had implications  for  West  German domestic  politics.  Chancellor
Erhard had been unable to consolidate his position since the elections in 1965, and was in dire
need of a foreign policy victory.  An American general – and Erhard’s close acquaintance –
visiting  the  FRG “reported  that  never  before  had he seen the  Chancellor  in  such a  shaken
condition. He is fighting for his political life, and knows that many of his party colleagues are
sharpening their knives to take advantage of the first opportunity to finish him off.”721 Foreign
minister  Schröder  provided Erhard  some relief,  as  he  was able  to  improve relations  with  a
number of socialist countries, especially Romania.722 In a conversation with the Americans on
September 19, the West German vice-chancellor Erich Mende went as far as to argue that “West
Germany's difficulties are limited to the East Zone and to a lesser extent to Moscow.”723 The
“East Zone” was indeed proving to be quite a headache for Erhard, but it was hardly an isolated
problem. Bonn’s foreign office also noted that Ulbricht’s visit to Belgrade was just one of many
Soviet  Bloc  delegations  visiting  Yugoslavia.  The West  Germans also observed a  number of
Yugoslav officials visiting socialist countries. The West Germans believed that the Yugoslavs
720 Ibid.
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were  trying  to  align  themselves  with  Moscow  in  the  Sino-Soviet  conflict,  which  included
courting the Albanians to return to Moscow’s fold.724 This movement toward socialist diplomatic
consolidation could have also had grave implications for the way the German question was
treated by the international community. Around the same time, the United Nations Security
Council began considering the GDR’s motion – in the form of a letter from Walter Ulbricht – to
join the organization.725 According to some West German diplomats, Yugoslavia was providing
the GDR with the much need non-socialist bloc support at the UN, adding to the FRG’s foreign
policy woes.726
 Fortunately  for  Erhard,  the  Western  Powers  at  the  UN  Security  Council  vetoed
Ulbricht’s application on the simple grounds that the GDR was not a state.727 However, this was
an insignificant victory that came too late for the West German chancellor. Erhard had already
been living on borrowed time, and shortly after the UNSC decision, it became clear that Erhard
was abandoned by his allies at home and abroad, making his demise a foregone conclusion.
Erhard  had visited  Washington again  in  late  September.  He travelled  there  with  the
conviction that he was visiting his closest ally, and that he could negotiate more favourable
offset payments, since he was unable to do so during his last meeting with President Johnson in
1965.  Erhard’s  optimism  was  unfounded.  Johnson  was  just  as  adamant  about  the  FRG’s
obligations as he was the last time they met. This time Johnson went even further than the last
time they met  and attempted  to  bully  Erhard  into  complying with  American  demands,  and
although Erhard was able  to  reject  Johnson,  it  became obvious  that  he could not  count  on
724 Bonn foreign office circular (June 30, 1965) PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 170-172.
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American support (even though Erhard himself still believed the opposite).728 In the meantime,
another crisis was brewing back in the FRG. Amidst a small recession – which the media had
exaggerated, by invoking many comparisons to the market crash of 1929 – Erhard had also lost
the support of the FDP, his coalition partners. The Liberals had lost all confidence in Erhard and
withdrew their  ministers from the government on October 27, effectively ending the Erhard
chancellery. Erhard accepted the decision, and informed his party of his resignation later that
day. 
The CDU/CSU decided to hold internal elections on November 8 to find his successor.
Kurt  Georg Kiesinger,  the  prime minister  of  Baden-Würrtemberg,  won the  vote in  front  of
Gerhard Schröder.729 Kiesinger was not an uncontroversial choice. He had been a Nazi Party
member from 1933 until Germany’s defeat in May 1945. His Nazi past would also prevent him
from forging a close relationship with his new coalition partners, the SPD.730 Kiesinger’s history
was hardly an issue for the CSU, whose support was decisive in the vote. The chairman of the
CSU, Franz-Josef Strauß, preferred Kiesinger over the other two candidates, foreign minister
Schröder and the CDU/CSU Bundestag whip Rainer Barzel.731 
With  the withdrawal  of  the  FDP from the government,  the possibility  of  a  coalition
between the two largest West German parties became a reality. Willy Brandt was not directly
involved in the great coalition negotiations. Even though he was the SPD chairman, he had
728 Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard, p. 200.
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suffered a short but grave illness that prevented him from taking on a more active role, but he
was instrumental in persuading the party membership of the merits of a coalition with CDU.732
He himself became the second most powerful person in the FRG when the new government was
announced on December 1.  As the  vice-chancellor  and minister  of  foreign  affairs  he  could
finally begin to implement the ideas he and Egon Bahr had been developing for years. The plan
announced in Tutzing in 1963 would slowly start replacing the Hallstein Doctrine. Within the
next few years, the FRG’s German policy would experience a complete transformation, and so
would its relations with Yugoslavia and East Germany.
Conclusion
Ludwig  Erhard’s  time  as  chancellor  marked  the  beginning  of  the  transition  period
between the Hallstein Doctrine and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Although the former remained the
official policy until Brandt became chancellor, the first changes in the FRG’s eastern policy
were  made  under  Erhard’s  supervision,  as  Bonn  was  beginning  to  feel  the  weight  of  the
Hallstein Doctrine on its foreign policy. Although the FRG was able to continue operating from
a position of strength when dealing with Yugoslavia, this was possible despite, not because of
the Doctrine. Besides, the Doctrine could not prevent Tito’s visit to the GDR, nor Ulbricht’s to
Yugoslavia.  In  addition,  the  doctrine  severely  hampered  any  attempts  at  developing  better
relations  with the Soviet  Bloc countries.  Therefore,  towards  the end of  Erhard’s tenure,  his
foreign  minister  Schröder  began  pushing  the  boundaries  of  the  Hallstein  Doctrine  to
accommodate a more positive policy towards socialist countries. 
732 Marshall, Willy Brandt, p. 49.
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Yugoslavia  did  not  directly  benefit  from these  changes.  The “Peace  Note,”  Erhard’s
March 1966 diplomatic initiative to improve relations with the socialist countries of Eastern
Europe was directed solely at the countries of the Soviet Bloc, which excluded Yugoslavia. This
was mostly due to Yugoslavia’s constantly improving relations with the GDR, the highlight of
which was Tito’s official state visit to the GDR in June 1965. Bonn saw this as a breach of the
“good behaviour” clause, which both the FRG and Yugoslavia agreed upon and which stipulated
that neither side would disturb the German Question status quo. Tito’s GDR visit only served to
reinforce the West German belief that Yugoslavia could not be trusted,  and did not deserve
Bonn’s good will. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the next chapter, it was precisely Schröder’s




The new Ostpolitik and Yugoslavia (1967-1968)
The new West German chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger made his first public announcement
about the country’s foreign policy during his inaugural speech at the Bundestag on December
13, 1966. After distancing himself from the previous coalition government, which, among other
things, was responsible for “foreign policy worries,” Kiesinger turned to his own foreign policy
plans.733 As  Kiesinger  spoke  about  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany’s  relations  with  the
socialist countries, it was clear that the chancellor did not intend to initiate tectonic changes in
the FRG’s Ostpolitk. If anything, it seemed that he had settled on the continuation of Erhard’s –
or rather Schröder’s – late stage efforts. Kiesinger contended that it was true that West Germany
desired better relations with the Soviet satellites, but that crucial questions such as the German-
Polish border could only be agreed upon by a democratically elected all-German government.734
Kiesinger did not mention Yugoslavia specifically, and his speech did not seem to offer any
reason for Belgrade to be optimistic. Yugoslavia had not profited much from Schröder’s eastern
campaign,  and  towards  the  end  of  his  tenure  the  Belgrade  foreign  office  lamented  Bonn’s
“negative approach [...] to some principled questions of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy,” one of the
reasons for this being the “traditional German interests in the Balkans, to which the existence of
Yugoslavia had always been an obstacle.”735 The “traditional German interests” was a thinly
733 Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen 
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veiled accusation that the FRG is continuing the work of the Nazis, since in earlier times the
Balkans were traditionally an Austrian, and not a Prussian or German sphere of influence. This
extremely defensive tone reflected the poor state of relations between Belgrade and Bonn. While
a new West German government seemed like a good opportunity to avoid further deterioration
of relations with Yugoslavia, Kiesinger’s speech contained no clues as to their future.
Regardless  of  Kiesinger’s  relatively  discouraging  message,  the  Yugoslavs  apparently
expected some positive changes in Bonn’s foreign policy, and not without reason. With Willy
Brandt in place as the FRG’s foreign secretary,  Belgrade had every right to expect positive
changes.736 It spent the weeks following Kiesinger’s speech trying to elicit, unsuccessfully it
seems,  some sort  of  clarification about  the  FRG’s plans  for  Yugoslavia  from West  German
diplomats in other countries.737 The West Germans were even reluctant to divulge the details of
their  foreign policy to  the Americans,  but  Brandt  admitted to  the US ambassador  in  Bonn,
George McGhee, that he wanted the FRG to go beyond the parameters of Erhard’s peace note.738
In a conversation with his French counterpart Jacques-Maurice Couve de Murville on January
13, 1967, Brandt was more candid as he addressed the case of Yugoslavia. He disclosed that he
would have preferred if the reestablishment of relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia did
not  give  other  non-aligned  countries  the  wrong  idea.739 Indeed,  the  Bonn  foreign  office
(Auswärtiges Amt, AA) sent out a note to several Asian and African countries later that month
736 For West Germany’s role in the European detente, see Gottfried Niedhart, Entspannung in Europa, Die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Warschauer Pakt 1966 bis 1975 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg,
2014), https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486856361; For Brandt’s Ostpolitik and Détente see M. E. Sarotte, Dealing 
with the Devil East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973, New Cold War History (Chapel Hill, Chapel 
Hill [N.C.] ; London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
737 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 234.
738 FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1999), Document 188. (ebook)
739 “Gespräch des Bundesministers Brandt mit dem französischen Außenminister Couve de Murville in Paris” 
(January 13, 1967), AAPD 1967, p. 86.
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reminding them that nothing had changed in the way the FRG would react if another country
recognized East Germany.740 For good measure, the Western Allies also distributed a note with
the same message.741 While Brandt pointed out that the FRG perceived East Germany the same
way as  the  previous  West  German governments,  his  conversation  with  Couve  De Murville
revealed that he was considering making an exception for Yugoslavia.742 It appeared that the
Yugoslavs were expecting the same. Brandt told Couve de Murville that Yugoslav officials had
informed Bonn that they expected West Germany to make the first move, and indeed it seemed
that – infused with new dynamism – the AA was moving towards making it.743
West Germany’s new representative in Belgrade, Hans Werner Loeck also favoured a
more lenient treatment for Yugoslavia. He urged Brandt to consider the damage that excluding
Yugoslavia  from  his  East  European  diplomatic  efforts.  Apart  from  the  illogical  aspects  of
ignoring Yugoslavia, namely that it would be difficult to justify treating Soviet satellites better
than Yugoslavia, a country that “in actual relations is closely allied” with the FRG, especially if
the alleged motivation for a new Ostpolitik was détente. In the final analysis, Loeck found more
positives in the reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia than continued isolation.744
A week after Brandt’s visit to the Quai d'Orsay, chancellor Kiesinger revealed the FRG’s
plans during a press conference in Bonn. Asked whether the FRG would be willing to recognize
Yugoslavia despite its  recognition of the GDR, Kiesinger  answered:  “Conditions permitting,
740 Vladimir Ivanović, Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973: Između Ideologije i Pragmatizma (Belgrade: Institut
za savremenu istoriju, 2009), p. 65.
741 Gray, Germany’s Cold War the Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969, p. 200.
742 “Gespräch des Bundesministers Brandt mit dem französischen Außenminister Couve de Murville in Paris” 
(January 13, 1967), AAPD 1967, p. 86.
743 Ibid.
744 “Die Frage: Was wird mit Jugoslawien? Bei der Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zu einigen 
osteuropäischen Staaten” (January 11, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 169, pp. 5-13.
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yes,”  and  added  that  West  Germany  needed  to  be  “pragmatic”  when  dealing  with  “these
countries,” meaning the countries which have recognized the GDR.745 
The FRG demonstrated its pragmatism only eleven days after Kiesinger’s statement. On
January 31, it established diplomatic relations with Romania. Granted, the FRG took a different
approach to the Soviet satellites, which was defined by the  Geburtsfehlertheorie (birth defect
theory), which posited that the Soviets forced these countries to exchange ambassadors with the
GDR, and therefore they could not be blamed for their actions.746 This theory was former foreign
minister Schröder’s brainchild, and the FRG began the negotiations with Romania during his
tenure. 
The FRG’s decision to focus on Romania was well thought out. Although Romania was a
member of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, it was able to create for itself in the 1960s – first
under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and later under Nicolae Ceaușescu – a certain degree foreign
policy autonomy, far greater than other Warsaw Pact countries. Dennis Deletant characterizes
this autonomy as “the right to formulate indigenous policy rather than independence.”747 This
autonomy  manifested  itself  prominently  in  1967  and  1968,  when  Ceaușescu  reestablished
diplomatic relations with the FRG, refused to break of diplomatic relations with Israel during
the  Six Day War,  and strongly  criticized  the  Soviet  intervention  in  Czechoslovakia,  clearly
defying Soviet foreign policy in all three instances.748
The fact that Brandt picked up where his embattled predecessor had left off and was able
to  successfully  conclude  the  negotiations  with  Romania  was  a  testament  to  the  new
745 “Zur Außenpolitik der Großen Koalition” in Bettzuege and Auswärtigen Amts, Aussenpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 305.
746 Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, p. 337.
747 Dennis Deletant, “‘Taunting the Bear’: Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1963–89,” Cold War History 7, no. 4 
(November 1, 2007): 495–507, p. 496.
748 Ibid., p. 499.
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administration’s resolve in making positive changes in West Germany’s foreign policy. Apart
from a direct  promise from Kiesinger  or  Brandt  to  restore relations,  Yugoslavia could have
hardly wished for better signals from Bonn.749
The SED found the ever more proactive West German efforts in Eastern Europe a source
of serious concern. Since the Geburtsfehlertheorie took hold in Bonn, Ulbricht, with the aid of
the  Soviets,  started  applying considerable  pressure  on  other  Bloc  countries  to  end bilateral
negotiations with Bonn, claiming that Brandt’s offensive was “an aggression in felt slippers.”750
He argued that the Warsaw Pact countries could establish relations with the FRG only if the
latter recognized the GDR first.751 Ulbricht finally managed to force the other countries to accept
this position – which came to be known as the ‘Ulbricht Doctrine’ – during a meeting of Warsaw
Pact  heads  of  state  in  Warsaw  in  February.752 Ulbricht  could  not  afford  another  Romania.
Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was a different case. Here no coercion could help, and a more
delicate diplomatic approach was necessary. However, by forcing the Ulbricht Doctrine on his
allies, Ulbricht had not only cut off all of Bonn’s contacts with the Soviet Bloc, but he had also
left Yugoslavia as the FRG’s only alternative socialist port of call.753 This meant that if the FRG
wanted  to  make inroads  in  the  Soviet  Bloc,  it  was  able  to  do so only  through Yugoslavia.
Therefore,  Ulbricht  was now faced with the double task of  courting Yugoslavia,  while  also
attempting to drive a wedge between it and the FRG. In any case, the situation required some
749 Brandt considered changing Yugoslavia’s classification at the AA to an Eastern European country, but 
“admitted making a special case of Yugoslavia is a headache.” FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and 
Berlin, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 199. (ebook)
750 Julia von Dannenberg, The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West 
Germany and the USSR, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 29.
751 Baer, Zwischen Anlehnung Und Abgrenzung, p. 293.
752 Apart from recognizing the GDR, other conditions placed on the FRG in the Ulbricht Doctrine were: the 
abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine; the recognition of the existing borders in Europe, meaning the Oder-
Neisse border; the admission that the Munich Agreement was void from the beginning; abandonment of nuclear
weapons; and the recognition of Berlin as a free city. Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, pp. 337-338.
753 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 238.
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creativity.  For  example,  the  East  German  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  (Ministerium  für
Auswärtige  Angelegenheiten/MfAA)  considered  reframing  its  strategy  on  the  West  Berlin
Question. Instead of insisting on Yugoslavia’s wholesale rejection of the West German claim on
West  Berlin,  the  MfAA broke  down  their  conditions  into  several  separate  categories.  The
reasoning behind this was that if  the MfAA could make Yugoslavia agree to some of these
categories, it would be easier to elicit a full endorsement from Belgrade further down the line.754 
Despite  these  nominally  mild  changes,  the  East  Germans  continued  to  apply  their
traditionally  abrasive methods in Yugoslavia.  A Yugoslav report  from April  showed that  the
GDR was “not only constantly asking for our support” in international organizations and among
non-aligned  countries,  but  was  also  “often  trying  to  dictate  the  shape  and  nature  of  this
support.”755 The  same  report  claimed  that  the  USSR  had  also  attempted  to  influence  the
Yugoslav  decision-making.  Indeed,  the  Soviet  ambassador  in  Belgrade  Alexander  Puzanov
called on Tito on March 30 to discuss the German Question. Tito rejected the Ulbricht Doctrine
at this meeting, arguing that Yugoslavia “will not place any conditions” in the eventual process
of reestablishing relations with the FRG.756 Then, a week and a half later, the Soviet embassy
directly asked the Yugoslav foreign ministry to join Soviet Bloc countries in pressuring several
Asian and African countries into recognizing the GDR. The Yugoslavs also rejected this plan on
the grounds that it would undermine Yugoslavia’s position in the non-aligned world.757 
754 “Vorschlag zur Veränderung der Haltung der SFRJ in der Westberlinerfrage” (January 11, 1967), PA AA, 
MfAA, C 441, pp. 1-6.
755 “Informacija” (April 10, 1967), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-148-174, p. 94.
756 “Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike J. B. Tita sa ambasadorom SSSR A. N. Puzanovom 30. marta 
1967 god.” Miladin Milošević, Jugoslavija -- SSSR: susreti i razgovori na najvišem nivou rukovodilaca 
Jugoslavije i SSSR : 1965-1980  , (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2016), p. 237.
757 Tripković, Jugoslavija – SSSR, p. 196.
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Keeping Yugoslavia non-aligned was a constant concern for the Yugoslav leadership,
which found this a constant balancing act given its communist pedigree, but it was an especially
pressing matter at this point in time. After the Cairo non-aligned conference, the interest for
non-alignment in the Global South waned, mostly due to the various forces pulling it apart,
including disparate national interests of various non-aligned countries, which led to tensions
between them, and discussions about the future of non-alignment. Tito found this development
troubling and, as Lorenz Lüthi explained, tried to act as a mediator between Egypt and India, so
that at least the main axis of non-alignment maintained dialogue.758 Considering that the future
of non-alignment was hanging in the balance, the Yugoslavs wanted to avoid making decisions
that might push them towards Moscow, or even create that perception among other non-aligned
countries.
Soviet Bloc pressure on Yugoslavia continued throughout the spring of 1967. The 7 th
SED  congress  in  East  Berlin,  which  took  place  between  April  17  and  22,  was  another
opportunity to influence Yugoslavia’s German policy. Economic growth buoyed the SED and
the congress reflected that, with the main message being the “completion of socialism,” rather
than the “all-round construction of socialism” touted at the previous party congress.759 On the
back of this  success,  the East  Germans were not  about  to  sit  back while  Bonn was on the
offensive, and they felt confident enough to demand changes in Yugoslav foreign policy. One of
the  main  impressions  of  the  League  of  Communists  of  Yugoslavia’s  (Savez  Komunista
Jugoslavije/SKJ) delegation was that their hosts were primarily interested in influencing their
position on the German Question in the light of Bonn’s new German policy. Their efforts were
758 Lorenz Lüthi “Non-Alignment, 1961-1974,” pp. 96-97.
759 Martin McCauley, The German Democratic Republic since 1945, (ebook) (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016). p. 123.
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somewhat spoiled by the Yugoslav decision not to send a party delegation to Conference of
European Communist Parties on European Security, which was to take place in Karlovy Vary in
Czechoslovakia in April of that year.
The Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev intended to use the Karlovy Vary Conference to
consolidate the Soviet Bloc after the recent changes in European politics, not least the quite
proactive  Kiesinger  administration.  Apart  from  several  smaller  West  European  Communist
parties,  only  Romania  and  Yugoslavia  did  not  send their  delegations  to  the  resort  town in
Western Bohemia.760 The Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu was in the midst of a conflict
with Moscow – with the establishment of relations with the FRG being just one of the issues –
and the absence of a Romanian delegation undermined the planned show of communist unity.761
Yugoslavia considered sending a delegation, but after the organizers refused to acknowledge
some of the SKJ’s suggestions, Belgrade decided to eschew the conference.762 From an East
German perspective, the Yugoslav absence was more damaging, since the Soviets intended to
officially  endorse  the  Ulbricht  Doctrine  in  Karlovy  Vary.763 By  avoiding  the  conference,
Yugoslavia also avoided agreeing to the Ulbricht Doctrine, and denied Ulbricht the guarantee
that Belgrade would not follow Romania’s example and establish relations with the FRG.
To preempt West  German advances in  this  respect,  Ulbricht  sent a  letter  to  Tito via
ambassador Staimer on April 19, several days before the Karlovy Vary conference. In the letter,
760 “The Karlovy Vary Conference,” Survival 9, no. 7 (1967): 208–15, p. 208.
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Studies 48, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 83–95, p. 86. For a general overview of Romania’s relationship with the 
Warsaw Pact, see Dennis Deletant, Mihail Ionescu, “ Romania and the Warsaw Pact: 1955 - 1989, ” Cold War 
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234
Ulbricht repeated his eponymous doctrine’s stipulations,  and asked Yugoslavia to reject any
West  German  requests  for  a  mutual  recognition  of  sovereignty.  “Every  state  can  only  be
responsible for the territory where it can exercise state authority,” Ulbricht argued.764 Tito tried
to allay East German fears when he told Staimer that Yugoslavia “is in no rush to establish
diplomatic  relations  with the  FRG. We have lived long without  these  relations  and we can
continue living without them.” Tito complained that there were some West German initiatives
by lower level officials, but that the FRG government has been keeping quiet.765 It seems that
Tito wanted to reinforce this message, because at least two Yugoslav delegates at the 7 th SED
congress mentioned the Ulbricht Doctrine in their speeches, including its specific stipulations.766
Bonn’s new Yugoslav policy takes shape
Yugoslavia’s  criticism of  the  FRG in  private  conversations  with  GDR officials  was
understandable, but the public repetition of the GDR’s policy was counterproductive, especially
after the quite positive signals it received from Bonn at the end of March, when the head of the
Eastern European department at the AA,  Jörg Kastl, visited Belgrade. In a conversation with
Srđa Prica, the advisor to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Kastl declared, “the FRG has serious
intentions  to improve relations with Yugoslavia,  including the reestablishment  of diplomatic
relations.” However, the Hallstein Doctrine still loomed large over the Bonn-Belgrade relations.
Kastl echoed Brandt’s earlier concern, pointing out that the timing of the reestablishment was
still an issue, since it might motivate a number of non-aligned countries to recognize the GDR.
764 Ulbricht’s letter to Tito (April 18, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-17, p. 7.
765 “Zabeleška” (April 19, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-17, doc. no. 461/i.
766 Speeches by Djoka Pajković and Mirko Lacković (April 21, 1967), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-148-174.
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Prica concluded that the FRG was certainly changing its approach, but that only concrete steps
could move their relations forward.767 He did not specify what these steps might have been.
What Prica noticed was not insignificant. Brandt had indeed begun transforming West
Germany’s foreign policy. This included a more lenient stance toward Yugoslavia. For example,
the West Germans had begun to take a more proactive approach in dealing with the Croatian
émigré organizations, a longstanding issue between the two countries.768 On a broader level,
foreign minister Brandt was in the process of defining the FRG’s framework for reestablishing
relations  with  Yugoslavia,  including  the  concrete  steps  that  emigre  Belgrade  had  been
anticipating since Kiesinger’s election. Earlier in March, he laid out his plan to Kiesinger in a
letter. As before, the potential wave of non-aligned recognition of the GDR still presented the
largest diplomatic obstacle. Brandt believed that both the FRG and Yugoslavia were responsible
for preventing this outcome. In Brandt’s opinion, Yugoslavia recognized the GDR under unique
Cold War circumstances, and no non-European country should see the reestablishment of FRG-
Yugoslav relations as an “alibi” to recognize the GDR.769 Brandt predicted that their diplomatic
relations with Yugoslavia could be reestablished by the end of the year, if Belgrade agreed to
fulfill a number of conditions.770 In the final analysis, Brandt saw fit to redefine the Hallstein
Doctrine if its only purpose was to negate the existence of the GDR. He believed that non-
recognition  was  merely  a  means  for  achieving  peace  in  Europe,  not  a  purpose  onto  itself,
thereby effectively turning the FRG’s foreign policy on its head.771
767 “Informacija” (March 30/31, 1967), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-148-174, pp. 91-92.
768 “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete” (March 10, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 457-459.
769 “Bundesminister Brandt an Bundeskanzler Kiesinger” (March 6, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 412-415.
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The  West  Germans  were  somewhat  confused  by  Yugoslavia’s  indifference  to  their
advances. After Tito hosted the GDR’s defence minister general Heinz Hoffman, who was in
Yugoslavia to hold a lecture titled “The GDR’s Defence Policy with Particular Focus on the
Aggressiveness of the KIESINGER [sic] Government,” the West German mission in Belgrade
drew two conclusions about the Yugoslav policy that to them seemed plausible. The first one
was that the Yugoslavs believed that they could develop their relations with the two Germanies
independent of each other, and the second was that they attached considerable importance to
their relations with the GDR. The West Germans concluded that the Yugoslavs were going to do
as much as they could to help the Soviets with Ulbricht, but not enough to damage their current
state of relations with the FRG.772 However, there were signs that Yugoslavia was not as aloof to
the new currents in Bonn as it might have let on. At a session of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe in Geneva, the Yugoslav envoy informed his West German counterpart
that  Belgrade  was  slowly  becoming  impatient  with  Bonn’s  reluctance  to  initiate  the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations. More importantly, the Yugoslav diplomat hinted that in
case the relations were reestablished, Yugoslavia would not  be inclined to urge non-aligned
countries  to  recognize  the  GDR,  directly  addressing  one  of  Bonn’s  greatest  fears.773 This
encouraging  conversation  was  most  likely  a  relief  for  the  AA,  as  it  indicated  a  more
accommodating Yugoslav German policy.
It seemed that Brandt, energetic as he was, was not the only one responsible for this
breakthrough. During a meeting of a joint FRG-Yugoslav trade commission in Belgrade in late
April,  the  head  of  the  West  German  delegation,  Egon  Emmel,  claimed  that  the  Bonn
772 Telegram from Belgrade (April 7, 1967), PA AA, AA B 42 177, pp. 400-403.
773 “Aufzeichnung des Staatsekretärs Schütz” (April 13, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 586-588.
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government’s decision to improve relations with Yugoslavia was “irrevocable” and that this was
due to Brandt and Kiesinger’s determination to make the rapprochement succeed.774 Emmel was
an experienced diplomat, and he certainly would not have made this statement lightly.775 The
mention  of  Kiesinger  showed  that  the  West  German  chancellor  had  accepted  Brandt’s
suggestions – the meeting of the joint trade commission was after all one of Brandt’s conditions
for the reestablishment of relations included in his March 6 letter to Kiesinger. In another show
of good faith, Brandt had also vowed not to obstruct Yugoslavia’s relations with the European
Economic Community just prior to the joint commission meeting.776 
Although the meeting of the joint commission was intended to be a purely economic
affair,  both  sides  were  aware  of  its  importance  in  the  overall  rapprochement  process,  and
therefore other issues were discussed as well. Emmel was quick to point out the difficulties the
West Germans faced in their new Ostpolitik – mostly because they were trying to avoid angering
the  Soviets  –  but  wanted  the  Yugoslavs  to  understand  that  West  Germany  had  “the  best
intentions.”  The  Yugoslavs  did  not  appreciate  Emmel’s  argument,  and  scolded  him  for
discussing the reestablishment of relations instead of actually doing it, and more importantly, the
West Germans did not offer a solution for the war reparations, a bilateral issue which they knew
Belgrade wanted to regulate more than any other.777 While on the evidence of the Yugoslav
report this meeting was not overly successful, it did provide a number of results pertaining to
economic  issues,  including  the  West  German  agreement  to  begin  negotiations  over  the
774 Ivanović, Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973, p. 69.
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regulations for guest workers.778 From the West German perspective, it was important to make
several  concessions  but  to  keep  the  real  “prize,”  namely  the  West  German  capital  and
investments, firmly out of Yugoslav reach but near enough to be used as leverage at a later date.
Emmel reported that the FRG delegation achieved just that.779
Despite the relatively successful joint commission meeting, it was the Yugoslav opinion
that Bonn had somehow reached the peak of its elasticity within its  Ostpolitik and that it now
had  to  go  “one  step  further,”  which  meant  establishing  relations  with  a  country  that  also
recognized the GDR, which – following the introduction of the Ulbricht Doctrine – was only
possible with Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs believed that the West Germans were skittish when it
came to crossing this line, and that this reaction was, to an extent, influenced by Belgrade’s
refusal  to  beg for  loans  – which would have put  the West  Germans in  a better  negotiation
position.780
Not the one to be discouraged by Yugoslav hard-headedness, Brandt wanted to make
sure that they understood all that was on the table. With this in mind, he sent an unofficial envoy
to Belgrade in early June. Oskar Schlitter, the erstwhile West German economic negotiator who
had lead the FRG delegation during the 1964 talks  with Yugoslavia,  arrived in Belgrade to
reveal all the concessions Bonn was willing to make in order to reestablish relations. These
concessions  were  precisely  the  ones  Brandt  listed  in  his  letter  to  Kiesinger  in  March.781
Schlitter’s interlocutor was not authorized to respond, but Brandt’s decision to send an envoy
who  was  a  “man  from [Brandt’s]  party,  who  was  in  a  certain  period  actively  engaged  in
778 “Informacija” (April 29, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-7, doc. no. 487/i.
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German-Yugoslav relations” and someone with an “anti-Nazi past,” made a good impression in
Belgrade.782 Schlitter’s  visit  was all  the more timely as it  coincided with the end of Walter
Ulbricht’s holiday in Yugoslavia.
On May 21, Walter Ulbricht arrived in Yugoslavia for a two week long stay, in a visit that
reflected the good state of relations between him and Tito. From the East German perspective,
the visit  was timed perfectly as it  gave Ulbricht an opportunity to personally try to drive a
wedge between Bonn and Belgrade. The East Germans had already attempted to disrupt the
FRG’s  Ostpolitik  earlier  that  month,  when their  prime minister  Willi  Stoph sent  chancellor
Kiesinger  an  open  letter,  asking  him  to  abandon  the  claim  to  sole  representation  and  to
acknowledge the  intra-German border.783 The  East  Germans never  intended for  the  letter  to
improve German-German relations, since there was no realistic chance of Bonn accepting these
suggestions.  Instead,  as  Hermann Wentker  argues,  they  merely  used  it  to  amplify  their  old
positions.784 Nevertheless,  the  Yugoslavs  described  this  latest  East  German  initiative  as
“valuable,” and argued that the Bonn government could no longer ignore the GDR.785 They
understood the East German position, and expected Ulbricht to press them on several issues
during his visit, but the most important one was certainly the development of their relations with
the  FRG.786 Another  point  of  East  German focus  was  the  non-aligned world.  East  German
foreign minister  Otto Winzer  had just  completed a  tour  of several  Arab countries.  Winzer's
objective was to prevent Arab-West German rapprochement, which had started with the Arab
782 Ibid.
783 Brief von Stoph an Kiesinger; erste Stellungnahme Kiesingers
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League secretary-general Abdul Khalek Hassouna’s April 21 visit to Bonn and his meetings with
Kiesinger and Brandt.787 Given the worsening of the political situation in the Middle East –
discussed below – the Yugoslavs found that the GDR was aiming to use this crisis to gain Arab
support in their quest for recognition, with Yugoslavia’s help, of course.788
On May 22, after a long walk around the Brioni Island, Ulbricht sat down to talk with
Tito  on  the  patio  of  Hotel  Neptun.  Their  conversation  quickly  turned  to  the  West  German
government.  Ulbricht attacked Brandt for feigning confusion about the Soviet Bloc position
regarding the establishment of relations between the FRG and socialist countries. He believed
that  the FRG was planning to  infiltrate  the socialist  markets because it  was experiencing a
recession,  and finding millions  of new consumers  was the way out  of it.789 In  their  second
conversation on May 30, the two leaders focused on the crisis in the Middle East, which was
coming to a head. Ulbricht argued that after Bonn failed to negotiate the reestablishment of
relations with the Arab countries, it decided to side with the United States and Israel.790 In the
final Yugoslav report on Ulbricht’s visit, the anonymous author mentioned that the Middle East
crisis occupied much of the other conversations between the two leaders. The upshot of these
meetings was that the GDR’s and Yugoslavia’s positions on the simmering Arab-Israeli conflict
were aligned.791
787 Brandt was careful not to give this meeting too much gravity and pointed out that it an “exchange of ideas” and
not a negotiation about the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. “Gespräch des Bundesministers Brandt mit 
Generalsekretär Hassouna, Arabische Liga” (April 21, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 620-627.
788 “Poseta ministra inostranih poslova NDR Oto Vincera arapskim zemljama” (May 18, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-
19, supplement to doc. no. 515/6.
789 “Zabeleška” (May 22, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, doc. no. 515/7.
790 Draft of minutes of Tito-Ulbricht conversation (May 30, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, p. 13.
791 “Informacija” (undated), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, doc. no. 1348/1.
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Ulbricht departed Yugoslavia on the eve of the Six-Day War.792 Yugoslavia had been very
concerned about the recent developments in the Arab world, not least because the majority of
the Arab countries were non-aligned. Tito saw the conflict as more than merely an Arab-Israeli
affair, but as a battle between the imperialistic and progressive forces.793 In this constellation,
after the fruitful talks with Ulbricht, it became clear that Yugoslavia could very possibly clash
with the FRG over the war because of Tito’s convictions.
West Germany’s relations with Israel had been the cause of much frustration among Arab
nations in the post-World War II period. After the news of secret West German arms shipments
to Israel became public in 1964, the countries of the Arab League were on the brink of breaking
off diplomatic relations with the FRG, and when chancellor Erhard decided to recognize Israel
in 1965, the Arab League statesmen could no longer justify upholding relations with Bonn,
which they broke off on March 15, 1965.794 The East Germans attempted to take the FRG’s
place, but were unable to secure the support of the majority of Arab League countries.795 The
Arabs were not looking for a West German surrogate while they were still fostering relations
with the FRG. Therefore, with the outbreak of the Six-Day War and West Germany’s allegiance
to  Israel,  a  new  window  of  opportunity  was  opened  for  the  GDR  to  negotiate  an  Arab
recognition.
792 For a recent history of the Six-Day War, see Guy Laron, The Six-Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); For US policy in the Six-Day War see Peter L. Hahn, “The Cold 
War and the Six Day War: US Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Crisis of June 1967,” in Nigel John Ashton (ed.) 
The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Cold War History Series 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2007); The United Nations’ role in the Arab-Israeli conflict is covered in 
Danilo author Di Mauro, The UN and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: American Hegemony and UN Intervention 
since 1947, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics ; 42 (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge,    
2012); For an analysis of the Soviet involvement in the Six-Day War see Yaacov Ro’i and B. Morozov (eds.), 
The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War, Cold War International History Project Series (Washington, 
D.C.: Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford University Press, 2008).
793 “Informacija” (undated), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, doc. no. 1348/1.
794 Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, p. 143.
795 Ibid.
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Yugoslavia’s reaction to the outbreak of fighting in Egypt on June 5, 1967 was in line
with its traditionally pro-Arab Middle East policy. Tito condemned the Israeli attacks on Arab
countries and demanded its immediate retreat.796 Soviet Bloc countries, including the GDR, also
condemned the attacks.  Neues Deutschland  published on its front page Ulbricht’s message of
support for the Syrian president Nureddin al-Atassi on the first day of war. Ulbricht did not fail
to attack the FRG in his message, accusing Bonn of “supporting Israel for years. This includes
close cooperation in the military sphere. Leading politicians as well as the press, radio, and
television are taking the Israeli position and vilifying the just cause of the people of the Syrian
Arab Republic and of other Arab peoples.”797 
Ulbricht’s message was not purely performative.  Just  hours before Israel ordered the
attack on Syria, he received a report – via foreign minister Winzer – from the GDR general
consul in Damascus Horst Grunert, who had just returned from talks with several high ranking
Syrian officials. Grunert was happy to report that the Syrians were more than willing to establish
diplomatic  relations  with the  GDR, which  they  called  a  “necessity”  that  was  “undeniable.”
Grunert also noted that the Syrian military was interested in developing relations with their East
German counterparts.798 Ulbricht followed up with his defence minister, Heinz Hoffmann, who
informed him that his ministry had already begun developing these plans.799 While the GDR’s
response came too late for the Syrians to make a difference in the war, the East German military
support would begin arriving in Syrian ports shortly after the fighting had ended, along with
796 Dragan Bogetić and Aleksandar Životić, Jugoslavija i Arapsko-Izraelski Rat 1967 (Belgrade: Institut za 
savremenu istoriju, 2010), p. 116.
797 “DDR entschlossen an der Seite der arabischen Staaten” Neues Deutschland (Berlin, GDR), June 5, 1967. 
http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19670605-0-2-0-0
798 Letter from Winzer to Ulbricht, Stoph, Honecker, and Axen (June 5, 1967), BA-SAPMO, NY 4182/1334, p. 16.
799 Letter from Hoffmann’s deputy Keßler to Ulbricht (June 9, 1967), BA-SAPMO, NY 4182/1334, p. 20.
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supplies  from  other  Soviet  bloc  countries.800 In  an  explicit  show  of  socialist  cooperation,
Yugoslavia had provided the East Germans with the use of its ports in the Adriatic to transport
the  weapons  to  the  Middle  East.801 Although Yugoslavia  had more  reason to  be diplomatic
during the actual war – there were still 300 Yugoslav soldiers stationed on the Sinai peninsula as
part of the First United Nations Emergency Force mission – Tito had no intention of remaining
neutral.802 When the Egyptian authorities fed the diplomatic corps in Cairo with false reports of
Arab  successes,  the  Yugoslav  ambassador  in  Egypt  Salko  Fejić  allegedly  stormed  into  the
embassy salon and shouted, “We are entering Tel Aviv!”803 
In the meantime, Tito decided to take control of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy in this crisis.
On June 9 he flew to Moscow without any of his top diplomats, in order to participate in a
meeting of the heads of communist parties. The Soviets called the meeting to coordinate the
Bloc’s reaction to the war. The participants released a statement the same day calling for Israel’s
immediate withdrawal.804 Tito’s sojourn in Moscow caused an uproar among his closest foreign
policy associates, for several reasons. Apart from Tito’s refusal to consult his diplomats and his
decision  to  travel  alone,  they  also  criticized  his  decision  to  support  the  Arab  countries
unconditionally, which was a clear violation of the principles of non-alignment.805 Apart from
signing the joint statement, Tito also decided to sever diplomatic ties with Israel, a decision
which would remain in effect until 1992, when it was reversed by the already partially dissolved
800 Jeffrey Herf, Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left, 1967–1989 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 48-50.
801 Ibid., p. 49.
802 The history of the Yugoslav National Army’s contingent in the United Nations mission on the Sinai peninsula is
covered in Aleksandar Životić, Forsiranje peska: odred JNA na Sinaju (1956-1967) (Beograd: Medija centar 
“Odbrana,” 2011).
803 Bogetić and Životić, Jugoslavija i Arapsko-Izraelski Rat 1967, p. 117.
804 Petrović, Titova lična diplomatija, p. 213.
805  Ibid., p. 214.
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Yugoslavia.806 Tito was obviously guided by his concern for Nasser – his closest international
partner  –  as  the  United  Arab  Republic’s  president,  which  caused  him  to  disregard  his
subordinates’ pragmatism.807 But  Tito’s  alignment  with  the  Soviet  Bloc  in  this  matter  also
brought  him  closer  to  Ulbricht.  Paradoxically,  he  was  now  a  better  ally  to  Ulbricht  than
Ceausescu, a head of a Warsaw Pact country, who refused to travel to Moscow for this party
meeting.
The effects of this harmonization were immediately tangible. On June 15, the Yugoslav
deputy foreign minister Miša Pavićević informed ambassador Staimer that Tito had met with the
Algerian  president  Houari  Boumédiène  and  suggested  that  now  would  be  a  good  time  to
recognize  the  GDR.808 Compared  to  records  of  previous  Yugoslav  conversations  with  third
parties about the recognition of the GDR, this was a noticeable departure in the way Belgrade
lobbied  for  the  GDR.  There  was  almost  an  air  of  nonchalance  in  the  Yugoslav  approach.
Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs were aware of the limits of their influence, and were reluctant to act
as couriers for the latest Ulbricht memorandum on GDR-FRG relations to countries outside of
the non-aligned world. Even in the case of Switzerland, which was a neutral country, there was
some hesitation at the Belgrade foreign ministry.809
806 Jacob Abadi, “Israel and the Balkan States,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 4 (1996): 296–320, p. 299.
807 As Vladimir Petrović argues, this was one of the rare occasions when Tito’s diplomats openly challenged him. 
Ibid. p. 213.
808  This report did not include Tito’s arguments for this suggestion. “Zabeleška” (June 16, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-
b/81-4, doc. no. 1457/i.
809 “Generalnom sekretarijatu predsednika Republike” (July 25, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-4, doc. no. 733/1.
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Clearing the way for a new start
Naturally, Bonn was curious about these latest developments in Yugo-GDR relations. On
June 6, the West German representative in Belgrade Hans-Werner Loeck called on the head of
the  West  Europe  department  at  the  Yugoslav  foreign  ministry  Zvonko  Lučić  and  “without
mentioning the name Ulbricht,” asked about the recent “lively” contacts with the “Soviet Zone.”
Lučić  tried  to  downplay  Ulbricht’s  visit,  asserting  that  he  practically  invited  himself  to
Yugoslavia,  and that  he did not  inquire  about  the recent  developments  in  relations  between
Belgrade and Bonn, since he was aware that the Yugoslavs were sensitive about any criticism of
their  foreign policy.810 Loeck was not  convinced with the Yugoslav attempt to  diminish the
importance of Ulbricht’s visit, but he did get the sense that Yugoslavia would not be moved by
the GDR’s wish to attach some conditions to their reestablishment of relations with the FRG.811
This  was  surely  a  comforting  assessment  for  the  Kiesinger  government  at  a  time  when
Yugoslavia  seemed  to  be  veering  dangerously  toward  Moscow.  Tito  had  also  made  some
positive remarks about the exchange of open letters between the GDR’s prime minister, Stoph,
and the FRG’s chancellor, Kiesinger, even though its real value was symbolic, since both sides
continued rejecting each other’s proposals for solving the German question. Apparently, even
the GDR’s foreign minister, Otto Winzer, found Tito’s support of the exchange surprising, given
its cynicism and lack of any substance.812 
The West Germans were likewise confounded when Yugoslavia reverted to demanding
war reparations from the FRG. On July 12, Yugoslavs handed the West Germans a verbal note in
810 Telegram from Loeck (June 7, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 172, pp. 11-14.
811 Ibid.
812 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 256.
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which they again laid out their claim about the reparations for the victims of Nazi persecution.813
There was no official reply, but after two months of considerations, counsellor Loeck suggested
to the AA that the timing of the note was not a shift in Yugoslav policy, but rather a scramble for
West German money. According to Loeck, with the prospect of Bonn establishing diplomatic
relations with a number of Soviet satellites in the near future, Belgrade feared that West German
financial  incentives  or  aid  to  these  countries  would  deplete  any  potential  funds  for  war
reparations. Belgrade wanted to avoid this potentially embarrassing situation.814 However, by the
time Loeck wrote his analysis in which he decided that the reparations would mostly likely not
present a roadblock, the Bonn-Belgrade relations had already moved on.
September seemed to have been a turning point of sorts for Bonn-Belgrade relations. On
September 9, the West German Minister of Family Affairs and Youth Bruno Heck arrived in the
Croatian town of  Karlovac to  discuss the next  steps  in  the Yugo-FRG relations.815 It  is  not
surprising  that  Kiesinger  chose  Heck  for  this  mission.  Heck  was  the  secretary  general  of
Kiesinger’s party,  the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and although he claimed that the
chancellor did not “order” him to come to Karlovac, it seemed that the meeting was indeed a
somewhat clandestine operation that was initiated by Kiesinger.816 Apparently, the West German
press was not even informed about Heck’s trip.817 It is unclear whom Heck met, or why he met
them in Karlovac, but this was most likely Kiesinger’s attempt to regain some of the control
813 Ivanović, Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973, p. 99.
814 “Botschaftsrat Loeck, Belgrad, an das Auswärtige Amt” (September 19, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1274-1277.
815 The official reason for Heck’s visit was a fire fighting competition in Karlovac. Heck himself was a district fire 
chief in West Germany and a foreign policy advisor to the president of the West German Firefighters Union, 
Albert Bürger. Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik 
der Großen Koalition, p. 194.
816 Untitled report by anonymous author (date illegible), AJ, KPR i-5-B/82-7. Heck himself stated that he visited 
Karlovac in late summer, probably September. Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der 
Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition, p. 194.
817 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 250.
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over Bonn’s delicate relations with socialist  countries,  which he believed were in danger of
slipping away from him due to his own foreign minister’s efforts. Namely, Willy Brandt had
visited Romania in August, and during a dinner toast declared that European security could only
be achieved if the existing conditions were taken into account, including “both political orders
that currently exist on German soil.” According to a report in the West German daily Die Welt,
Brandt had added this quote to his speech by hand.818 Brandt later noted that he made this minor
alteration “to relieve people of their sense of insecurity and their fear of war.”819 
The incident in Romania was symptomatic of the relationship between Kiesinger and
Brandt. While the latter was willing to publicly push the envelope of the FRG’s Ostpolitik, the
former was more cautious.820 He and Brandt had an uneasy relationship as coalition partners,
especially  in  the  area  of  foreign  policy.  Apart  from  having  differing  views  on  their  East
European policy, they also did not see eye to eye in their West European policy, especially in the
matters  of  rapprochement  with  De  Gaulle  and  the  United  Kingdom’s  candidacy  for  the
European  Economic  Community  (EEC).  As  Henning  Türk  explained,  for  Brandt  the  EEC
expansion was “imperative” for the kind of foreign policy he championed, while Kiesinger was
wary  about  the  UK’s  willingness  to  cooperate  once  inside  the  Community.821 Apart  from
disagreeing with Brandt regarding the methods of conducting foreign policy, Kiesinger also had
to endure criticism from his supporters on the right.822 To add to his woes, Kiesinger failed to
818 “Brandt in Rumänien” [Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: August, P. 13. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der 
Gegenwart, P. 23407 (cf. AdG Bd. 5, P. 4342)]
819 Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics (New York: Viking, 1992), p. 163.
820 Judith Michel “Willy Brandt und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika” in Bernd Rother, ed., Willy Brandts 
Außenpolitik, Akteure Der Außenpolitik (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014), 
//www.springer.com/de/book/9783658029180 (ebook), p. 128.
821 Henning Türk, Die Europapolitik der Großen Koalition 1966-1969 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2006), p. 237.
822 Joost Kleuters, Reunification in West German Party Politics From Westbindung to Ostpolitik (Springer, 2012), 
(ebook) p. 136.
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gain  the  support  of  West  German  students.  Beginning  in  the  early  1960s,  students  began
organizing throughout university campuses in the FRG in protest against the current political
system, domestically as well as abroad. They took aim at the American involvement in Vietnam,
but also domestic topics ranging from union politics to child rearing. Kiesinger, with his career
in the Third Reich, was certainly not the politician that commanded respect from the mostly left-
leaning students, some of whom even called for a Mao-inspired cultural revolution.823 Just a few
months before Heck’s visit to Yugoslavia, the West German police killed Benno Ohnesorg, one
of  the  students  protesting  Iranian  Shah  Mohammed  Reza  Pahlavi’s  visit  to  West  Berlin.
According to Nick Thomas, this was a watershed moment in West German politics, one that
“exposed and deepened fault lines of opinion throughout West German society.”824 And while
Kiesinger denounced the student movement as the victims of an “international sickness,” his
government had difficulties containing student protest “without provoking more radicalism.”825
Attacked from all sides, Kiesinger needed to show – not necessarily to the public at large – that
not only was he in charge of the Great Coalition, but that he also knew what he was doing.826
823 Michael A. Schmidtke, “Cultural Revolution or Cultural Shock? Student Radicalism and 1968 in Germany,” 
South Central Review 16/17 (1999): 77–89, p. 78.
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1966 Bis 1968,” Geschichte Und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft 17 (1998): 35–55; Oskar Negt, Achtundsechzig. 
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(München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2011); Robert Lorenz and Franz Walter, 1964 - das Jahr, mit 
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825 Suri, Power and Protest, p. 178.
826 Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen 
Koalition, p. 171.
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Kiesinger must have therefore felt vindicated about his approach in Yugoslavia, because
Heck’s meeting with Yugoslav officials produced surprisingly positive results. At this meeting,
the Yugoslavs disclosed for the first time that they would not be making the war reparations a
condition for the reestablishment of relations. This matter was an “issue [to be addressed] after
the normalization,” hinting that they did not wish to completely forget about the reparations.827
Heck also disclosed that he met the American and British ambassadors in Bonn to discuss the
FRG’s potential reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia – “without letting them know that
we are already working on it” – and that they were supportive of the idea. 828 It appeared that the
reestablishment of relations was all but a foregone conclusion. With this in mind, Heck also
reiterated West  German fears  over non-aligned countries recognizing the GDR, and meekly
asked whether Yugoslavia might be able to exercise its influence in these countries to prevent
such an outcome.829
The Yugoslavs found Heck’s visit to have been very significant. Heck was the highest
ranking West German official  who had not only visited Yugoslavia, but also discussed their
relations since 1957. More importantly, the content of the talks pointed towards an imminent
breakthrough. The Yugoslavs singled out three main points Heck made during his presentation:
a) the West German need to recognize the GDR and the existing borders in Europe as a reality;
b) the need for the FRG to foster good relations with the USSR and other socialist countries in
order to build a foundation for German reunification; and c) the role of Yugoslavia as the most
important intermediary in this process because of the “position it now holds in the world [...]




where it should practically act as a bridge for bringing together East and West.”830 These new
impulses  from Bonn forced Belgrade  to  take  stock of  their  relations.  The Yugoslav  foreign
ministry argued that in the nine months it had been in power, the Kiesinger government had
consistently acted in accordance with the ideas the chancellor had announced at the beginning of
his tenure,  including building a better  relationship with the Soviet Bloc countries. Although
West  German  foreign  policy  was  still  anchored  by the  claim to  sole  representation,  it  was
marked by a new “elasticity,” which helped it move away from the antagonism of the previous
governments.831 But  in  terms  of  bilateral  relations,  the  Yugoslavs  were  more  critical.  They
argued that the FRG had done little to really improve relations with Yugoslavia, with all the
progress happening in areas of secondary importance – all while the FRG’s economic presence
in Yugoslavia was rapidly expanding – and with no foreseeable change in Bonn’s approach. 832
The Yugoslavs were also worried that the FRG’s diplomatic successes elsewhere would
diminish Yugoslavia’s  relative importance in Bonn’s  foreign policy.  Therefore,  the Belgrade
foreign ministry suggested a more proactive German policy, one containing measures which –
and this was a crucial point for the Yugoslavs – would force Bonn to make concrete steps to
improve relations with Belgrade.833 It is clear from the list of these measures that Yugoslavia did
not have much leverage against West Germany, apart from perhaps the guest worker agreement,
where the Yugoslavs considered cooperating with West German syndicates in order to pressure
Kiesinger’s  government  from within the  FRG as  well.834 This  miscalculation,  however,  was
830 Untitled report by anonymous author (dated October 19, 1967 but probably written just after Heck’s visit), AJ, 
KPR i-5-B/82-7, doc. no. 992/1.
831 “Spoljna politika SRN, bilateralni problemi i predlozi za naše dalje reagovanje” (September 9, 1967), AJ, KPR 
i-5-b/82-7, pp. 1-3.
832 Ibid., p. 21.
833 Ibid., pp. 19-22.
834 Ibid., p. 22.
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inconsequential  because  at  this  point  the  only  obstacle  to  an  immediate  reestablishment  of
relations was Kiesinger’s and Brandt’s opposition in their own parties.835 
In the end, the Yugoslavs settled on a proactive approach in regards to the first step
towards the reestablishment of relations. Any defensiveness immediately following Heck’s visit
would have been counterproductive. As a result, on September 15 Yugoslavia announced that it
intended  to  name Zvonko  Lučić,  previously  of  the  West  Europe  department  at  the  foreign
ministry,  as  the  new head of  the  Yugoslav  mission  at  the  Swedish  embassy  in  Bonn.  This
position  had  been  left  vacant  since  1965,  when  the  last  representative  Milan  Georgijević
returned to Belgrade. Equally significant was the West German decision to grant Lučić the rank
of envoy, which was a point of contention in previous years as it was deemed too high of a rank
for this position.836 But the decisive Yugoslav act came on September 18 in Paris, when their
foreign minister Marko Nikezić admitted to his hosts that Yugoslavia had great expectations
from  the  current  West  German  government,  and  that  Yugoslavia  had  wished  that  the  two
countries had already reestablished relations. Even though Nikezić regretted that this had not
occurred, he declared that Yugoslavia would not create any obstacles for this to happen, and that
the way it would happen was a secondary concern.837 Although Tito addressed the matter of war
reparations again during a speech on October  3,  it  would appear that  his  statement did not
constitute a serious change in Yugoslav policy and was most likely intended to appeal to the
Yugoslav public.838
835 Ivanović, Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973, p. 76.
836 “Aufzeichnung” (September 19, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 169, pp. 95-96.
837 Telegram from Paris (September 18, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 179, p. 42.
838 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 259.
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By mid-October, however, the Yugoslavs were clearly beginning to feel frustrated over
the lack of Bonn’s initiative. The latter’s stalling over the guest worker agreement – hitherto an
issue nominally not tied to the reestablishment of relations – gave the Yugoslavs an opportunity
to express this frustration, so much so that on October 12, FRG’s representative in Belgrade
Hans-Werner Loeck urged Bonn to finally set a date for the negotiations, before the Yugoslavs
“abandon their restraint” and begin attaching conditions to the reestablishment of relations.839
Brandt responded the very next day. In his speech to the Bundestag, Brandt declared that “ non-
aligned Yugoslavia is, in the East as well as the West, an honoured member of the European
community of states. The federal government wants to normalize relations with precisely this
country.” Brandt also added that the FRG had scheduled “the negotiations over the finalization
of a long-term trade agreement, over guest workers, and over cultural questions.”840 Brandt had
conveyed a different message than chancellor Kiesinger, who in an October 11 interview had
emphasized that there were “more substantial problems” in the FRG’s relations with Yugoslavia
as opposed to other socialist countries.841 Regardless of the discrepancies between Brandt and
Kiesinger’s statements,  the West German government argued that it  was exercising extreme
caution and “examining at this point in time all  aspects and ramifications” of reestablishing
relations.842 However, at that time Kiesinger and Brandt simply did not have the support of the
coalition parties necessary for moving forward with their agenda. Kiesinger admitted as much in
a conversation with the US ambassador McGhee on November 15.843
839 “Botschaftsrat Loeck, Belgrad, an das Auswärtige Amt” (October 12, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1364-1265.
840 Brandt’s speech at the Bundestag (October 13, 1967), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/05/05126.pdf.
841 “Intervju kancelara Kizingera...” (October 23, 1967), AJ, KPR i-5-b/82-7. 
842 “Aufzeichnung” (November 7, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 169, pp. 115-116.
843 FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1999), Document 239. (ebook)
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East  Germany’s  attempts  at  preventing  the  reestablishment  of  relations  between
Yugoslavia and the FRG
As in previous months, the Yugoslavs attempted to downplay the increasingly close contacts
with the FRG when discussing them with East German officials, although it seemed that the
latter were not quite convinced by reassurances from Belgrade.844 Nevertheless, there were no
signs that East Berlin was desperate to prevent the Bonn-Belgrade rapprochement. The GDR’s
Belgrade embassy continued to pursue their usual tasks without much urgency. For example,
they complained to the Yugoslav foreign ministry about the Zagreb Fair, where the exhibits from
West Berlin were labelled with the FRG’s flag and country name,  a staple  of East German
complaints during the Hallstein doctrine period, but a matter of relatively low importance.845 The
East Germans did not even use party channels to apply pressure on Belgrade. In fact, according
to the Socialist Unity Party Central Committee member Kurt Tiedke, party relations with the
League  of  Communists  of  Yugoslavia  in  1967  were  more  developed  than  with  any  other
communist  party,  excluding  the  CPSU,  naturally.846 Why was  the  GDR so  indifferent  to  a
development that would have provoked Ulbricht's regime in earlier times? One explanation is
that by late 1967, the East Germans believed that the reestablishment of relations between the
FRG  and  Yugoslavia  was  a  foregone  conclusion.  The  GDR’s  foreign  minister  Winzer’s
November 24 message to his Yugoslav counterpart Nikezić lends credence to this assessment.
Winzer wanted to visit Belgrade in the near future, not to persuade the Yugoslavs to reverse their
decision, but to seek their support in gaining recognition from “at least one Arab country” before
844 Theurer, Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin, p. 268.
845 “Aktenvermerk” (September 11, 1967), PA AA, MfAA C 1420/70, pp. 86-88.
846 “Zabeleška” (October 23, 1967), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-148-174, doc. no. 05-1857.
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Bonn and Belgrade came to an agreement.847 The GDR was still looking to exploit the aftermath
of the Six-Day War, and was looking for support from the most influential actors (Winzer also
disclosed that the GDR asked for Moscow’s help in the matter).848 It appeared that Ulbricht
sensed the end of the Hallstein Doctrine and wanted to deal it the final blow by negotiating one
more recognition of the GDR. Yugoslavia was not a priority anymore.
Bonn and Belgrade come to an agreement at last
West Germans spent much of November mulling over their next step. In late October, the
head of the Eastern subsection of the Political Department at the AA Ulrich Sahm compiled a
report based on conversations Franz Barsig, the editor-in-chief of the Deutschlandfunk (the West
German state-owned radio broadcaster) had with Moma Marković, the editor of the SKJ daily
Borba and a member of the SKJ CC and Zvonko Lučić, the recently appointed Yugoslav envoy
to Bonn. Their  conversations covered ground familiar  from previous contacts between West
German and Yugoslav officials, but Sahm’s report synthesized expectations of both sides, as
well  as  the West  German response options.  Although these conversations  took place before
Loeck’s warning to Bonn about Yugoslav impatience, the general positions remained the same.
Sahm  singled  out  the  war  reparations  as  the  single  largest  obstacle  in  the  FRG-Yugoslav
relations, regardless of Belgrade’s decision to accept the postponement of negotiations over this
issue.  Nevertheless,  Sahm argued  for  a  “destruction  of  Yugoslav  illusions”  regarding  their
reparation demands in order to prevent any problems at a later stage. Apart from the issue of
847 “Zabeleška” (November 24, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-20, doc. no. 1135/1.
848 Ibid.
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reparations,  Sahm also  warned  of  the  possible  public  backlash  over  the  reestablishment  of
relations with Yugoslavia. According to him, the Bonn government should not look desperate in
the process.849 
Based on Sahm’s report, Brandt asked the head of the East European Department at the
Bonn foreign office, Hans Hellmuth Ruete, to create a note for Kiesinger. Presumably based on
Brandt’s instructions, Ruete wrote that, by waiting, the FRG “will not find a more opportune
moment for the resumption [of relations], nor will it improve the conditions for it.”850 Hinting at
the problem of non-aligned countries recognizing the GDR, Ruete suggested that  Kiesinger
should dedicate his time to this issue before his forthcoming Asian tour, and that the foreign
office could initiate the negotiations with Yugoslavia as soon as he returned from Asia.851 In the
meantime, Barsig again met with the SKJ Central Committee member Marković in Belgrade on
November 28. Brandt had instructed Barsig to probe the Yugoslav about some open questions.
Marković assured Barsig that Yugoslavia would not bring up the issue of war reparations during
the  negotiations,  nor  would  it  comment  on  the  German  Question  after  relations  were
reestablished. For Bonn, this was an important concession, since Romania continued to criticize
the FRG’s German policy after they established diplomatic relations in January.852
Kiesinger was able to secure guarantees from his hosts in India, Ceylon, and Pakistan
that they would not recognize the GDR in the case of a reestablishment of relations between the
FRG and Yugoslavia.853 Thus, the path was cleared for the FRG to make the first step that the
Yugoslavs desired for so long. Kiesinger returned to Bonn on November 29, and already on
849 “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Sahm” (October 25, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1448-1454.
850 Ibid., p. 1454.
851 Ibid.
852 “Bundesminister Brandt an Bundeskanzler Kiesinger” (December 5, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1594-1597.
853 “An die Grenze” Der Spiegel, December 4, 1967. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46164830.html
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December 1 Loeck approached the Yugoslavs and laid out the West German blueprint for the
negotiations over the guest worker agreement. Although Yugoslavia officially did not attach any
conditions to the reestablishment of relations, it would have been imprudent for Bonn to take
these statements at face value. Therefore, the FRG anticipated the diplomatic negotiations with
the economic ones.854 
Kiesinger had a hard time breaking down the resistance in his own party, which was
using Yugoslavia for domestic politics. More precisely, the CDU was using this issue against the
SPD,  in  order  to  “demonstrate  that  it  was  defining  the  rules  of  politics  through  the
chancellor.”855
During  this  time,  the  two  Superpowers  took  opposite  approaches  to  the  unfolding
situation. The United States had been supportive of Kiesinger and Brandt’s efforts. After all,
they  had  been  lobbying  for  better  relations  between  the  FRG and  Yugoslavia  even  during
Adenauer and Erhard’s respective tenures, when this option was more or less a taboo in Bonn. In
May, during a discussion in Washington about the new Ostpolitik, the Americans argued that for
“this policy to be effective [The FRG] needs not only American understanding and trust, but as
necessity arises also active American support against the Soviets.”856 By September, however,
the US embassy in Bonn reported that there was “no present military pressure from the East, and
the Germans are therefore in a position to concentrate more of their attention on problems where
the US role is less important,” but also that the West Germans “appear to have concluded that
too close an association with the US can be more of a handicap than a help.”857 As a result, the
854 “Zabeleška” (December 1, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-7, doc. no. 1166/i.
855 Letter to Loeck from unknown author, (November 23, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 169, pp. 137-138.
856 “Botschafter Knappstein, Washington, an das Auswärtige Amt” (May 27, 1967), AAPD 1967, p. 780.
857 FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1999), Document 229. (ebook)
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United States seemed to have kept their distance throughout the duration of this process. The
Americans were also considerably less involved in Yugoslavia. 
On the other hand, the Soviet Union was irritated by Bonn’s persistence in courting the
Soviet Bloc countries. After the Warsaw Pact countries closed ranks by adopting the Ulbricht
Doctrine, the Soviets began harshly criticizing Bonn for focusing its attention on Yugoslavia.
Because of this, the Soviets and the East Germans stepped up their claims that “the Federal
Republic was in the hands of former Nazis and Nazi sympathizers.”858
The Soviets were understandably far more critical of Bonn then they were of Belgrade.
During  and  following  the  Six-Day  War,  the  compatibility  of  Yugoslav  and  Soviet  Middle
Eastern policies was at an all-time high, exemplified by the fact that out of all the socialist
countries,  only  Belgrade  and Moscow provided  free  aid  to  Arab  countries.859 Although  the
Yugoslav ambassador in Washington Bogdan Crnobrnja vehemently denied the accusation “that
Yugoslavia, as a member of the Socialist Camp, was more or less obliged to side with the USSR
when major  issues  arose between the  US and the  USSR,” the  fact  remained that  from the
Western perspective Yugoslavia behaved no differently than Soviet satellites.860 In September,
Belgrade even hosted a conference of socialist vice prime ministers aimed at organizing a better
aid system for Arab countries.861 Around this time, Tito also considered cooperating with Soviet
Bloc  countries  in  various  endeavours  in  the  non-aligned  world.  For  example,  during  a
conversation  with  Antonin  Novotny  –  the  General  Secretary  of  the  Communist  Party  of
858 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 205.
859 Bogetić, Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971, p. 240.
860 FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1996), Document 186. (ebook)
861 Ibid.
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Czechoslovakia  and  the  country’s  president  –  Tito  suggested  that  Yugoslavia  and
Czechoslovakia should work together in non-aligned countries, economically and politically.862 
The exceptionally good cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc was most
likely the reason why Moscow decided not to criticize Belgrade’s rapprochement with the FRG,
even though Yugoslavia bore responsibility for the rapprochement as well. On December 8, the
Soviets delivered another note to the FRG embassy in Moscow (as well as the embassies of the
other three occupying powers). In it, the Soviets again addressed the alleged reawakening of
National Socialist tendencies in West German politics and society. Although the direct cause for
the note was the extreme right National Democratic Party of Germany’s congress in Hamburg,
the Soviets also criticized the FRG’s Ostpolitik by referencing the consequences of Germany’s
World War II  occupation of Eastern Europe,  including Yugoslavia.863 The Bonn government
found the mention of Yugoslavia “unusual.” Foreign office’s Ulrich Sahm argued that it could
not be ruled out that – apart from it being a direct attack on the FRG’s Ostpolitik – the note also
served as an indirect attempt at exerting pressure on Yugoslavia, since the Soviets released a
similarly worded note during the FRG’s negotiations with Romania earlier that year, prior to the
establishment of relations between these two countries.864 
The Soviet note was rejected by all recipients. Moscow’s pressure was not strong enough
to stop Kiesinger and Brandt from following through with their plan to reestablish relations with
Yugoslavia. On December 5, Brandt suggested to Kiesinger that this matter be included in the
agenda  for  the  December  13  government  meeting.  Kiesinger  agreed  to  this,  having  finally
862 Dimić, Jugoslavija i hladni rat, pp. 319-320.
863 Sowjeterklärungen an BRD, USA, Großbritannien und Frankreich wegen neonazistischer und militäristischer 
Vorgange in der BRD; [Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: Dezember, P. 74. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der 
Gegenwart, P. 23848 (cf. AdG Bd. 5, P. 4427)]
864 “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Sahm” (December 11, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1623-1626.
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subdued the CDU faction opposed to reestablishing relations with Belgrade.865 Brandt was in
Brussels at a meeting with the foreign ministers of the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom when Kiesinger phoned him to inform him of his decision. Brandt then relayed the
news to his interlocutors, adding, “if the pressure from Moscow and East Berlin does not put a
spoke in [our] wheel, the relations [between the FRG and Yugoslavia] will be reestablished very
soon.”866 
Judging by ambassador Staimer’s December 4 meeting with a Yugoslav foreign ministry
official, the FRG had little to worry about. Staimer argued that the GDR had nothing against the
reestablishment of relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia. In fact, it welcomed it as definite
evidence that the Hallstein Doctrine was broken.867 The GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer’s
surprise visit to Belgrade on December 11 also failed to make a difference. It is probable that
Ulbricht did not expect much from Winzer’s mission anyway. Neues Deutschland gave minimal
attention in its pages to Winzer’s meetings in Belgrade, leaving out any information about their
contents  or outcomes,  while  its  headlines  were dominated by Ulbricht’s  visit  to  Moscow.868
Winzer’s half-hearted attempt to influence the Yugoslavs appeared to be the last East German
effort  against  the  reestablishment  of  FRG-Yugoslav  relations.  The  GDR  accepted  the
rapprochement. The SED informed the Yugoslavs that they had no issues with their decision to
“normalize” relations with the FRG, and that if there was anything problematic with the process,
it was surely to be found on the West German side, where Kiesinger and Brandt were facing
865 FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1999), Document 241. (ebook)
866 “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete” (December 12, 1967), AAPD 1967, p. 1640.
867 “Zabeleška” (December 4, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5.b/81-4, doc. no. 1180/1.
868 See the Neues Deutschland issues from December 12 and 13, 1967.
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strong opposition.869 This statement amounted to a practical blessing from the SED – not that
Tito asked for one – that the negotiations could proceed.
Although the Yugoslavs still maintained the somewhat noncommittal position that there
was no need for negotiations since the reestablishment of relations was either wanted or not,
there was no actual obstacle left in its path.870 West German belief in a positive outcome of the
as-of-yet  unconfirmed  negotiations  was  such that  Loeck  submitted  a  request  to  rent  a  new
embassy building in Belgrade, until a new embassy was constructed.871 On December 18 West
Germans  contacted  the  Yugoslav  foreign  ministry  to  arrange  the  time  and  location  for  the
negotiations.872 Yugoslavs suggested Belgrade as the location. They also wanted to start as soon
as  possible,  since  no  real  negotiations  were  to  take  place,  beyond  the  ones  focused  on
technicalities.873 However,  West  Germans  preferred  Bonn,  and  since  neither  side  wanted  to
negotiate in their partner’s capital, they finally settled for Paris and January 23, 1968 as the
location and date.874
The  negotiations  took  place  at  Hôtel  de  La  Trémoille,  the  Yugoslav  ambassador’s
luxurious residence in the 16th arrondissement, and although Der Spiegel described the talks as
an attempt to salvage “at least the facade” of the “crumbling monument to Germany’s foreign
policy” that was the Hallstein Doctrine, there was no sense of West German desperation during
those seven days in Paris.875 The West  German delegation was led by the  head of the East
869 “Zabeleška” (January 11, 1968), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-175-236, doc. no. 013/III-140.
870 “BRD beschließt Verhandlungen über Wiederherstellung diplomatischer Beziehungen”
[Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: Dezember, P. 82. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 23856 
(cf. AdG Bd. 5, P. 4428)]
871 Telegram from Heize (December 18, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 169, p. 168.
872 Ivanović, Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973, p. 78.
873 Ibid., p. 80.
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European Department at the AA, Hans Hellmuth Ruete, while Zvonko Perišić, the head of the
West European Department at the Yugoslav foreign ministry represented Yugoslavia. After both
sides decided not to attach any bilateral issues to the negotiations, the only point left on the
agenda was a joint statement, to be released after the successful completion of negotiations.
In addition, West Germans wanted the second part of the statement to include unilateral
statements from each government.876 West Germans drafted both unilateral statements, and when
Ruete tried to convince the Yugoslavs to accept their portion of the draft – which included the
standard West German endorsement of the right to self-determination for all Germans – Perišić
protested.  He argued that  what  Ruete was attempting amounted to  influencing Yugoslavia’s
foreign  policy,  which  was  unacceptable  to  them.  What  they  wanted  was  a  short  joint
statement.877 The following day, Ruete attempted to convince Perišić to accept the West German
draft, but the latter again refused, arguing that Yugoslavia would not accept any statement that
included taking a position on the German Question.878 Ruete decided not to insist any longer,
and  the  two  delegations  began  working  on  the  joint  statement.  The  negotiations  over  the
statement lasted for hours and were “dogged,” as Ruete reported to Brandt, but the upshot was
that Perišić would not object if the German Government addressed the German Question in a
separate statement, after the negotiations had ended.879 Understanding the need for clarification
beyond the short joint statement, Ruete and Perišić decided to have their respective governments
make  their  own  statements  independently.880 However,  Ruete  then  demanded  that  the  two
governments authorize each other’s statements, which elicited a sharp response from Perišić,
876 “Aufzeichnung des Legationsrats Gehl” (January 24, 1968), AAPD 1968, pp. 81-82.
877 Ivanović, Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973, pp. 79-80.
878 “Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z. Z. Paris, an Bundesminister Brandt” (January 25, 1968), AAPD 1968, p. 86.
879 “Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z. Z. Paris, an Bundesminister Brandt” (second report from January 25, 1968), 
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who questioned the Bonn government’s readiness to actually proceed with the reestablishment
of relations. Ruete then withdrew his demand, but still asked whether the Yugoslavs could be
more “benevolent” in their statement.881 In addition to the reestablishment of the relations, the
Bonn  government  also  wanted  a  Yugoslav  endorsement  of  their  foreign  policy,  but  the
Yugoslavs wanted to avoid the appearance of the FRG influencing their decisions. On January
29,  Ruete  and  Perišić  initialled  the  joint  statement,  and  forwarded  it  to  their  respective
governments,  both  of  which  approved  the  statement  and  voted  in  favour  of  reestablishing
relations on January 31.882
The Bonn government announced its decision on the same day in a news conference,
while  the  Yugoslavs  released  their  statement  through  Tanjug,  the  government-owned  news
agency. Both statements were quite curt and did not reflect the monumental nature of the event,
at least from a West German perspective. Among West Germany’s allies, the prevailing emotion
was that of relief because the constraints of the Hallstein Doctrine were finally lifted.883 The
GDR, left in the dark by Yugoslav officials during most of the Paris negotiations, attempted to
use the reestablishment of relations as evidence of Bonn’s foreign policy’s failure, but it was a
thinly  veiled  admission  of  defeat  in  face  of  a  watershed moment  for  Germany’s  Cold War
history.884 It was a harbinger of a much more open West German foreign policy that would be
ushered in with the Brandt chancellorship in 1969. Although Bonn still claimed the validity of
the Hallstein Doctrine, the reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia showed that it had run
its course.
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West  Germany’s  reestablishment  of  relations  with  Yugoslavia  was  an  achievement
worthy of the Great Coalition’s name. Kiesinger and Brandt had managed to usher in a new era
of the FRG’s foreign policy by initiating the dismantling of the Hallstein doctrine in just over a
year after forming the new government. Although the chancellor and his foreign minister did not
always see eye-to-eye on various foreign policy issues, they both recognized the detrimental
effect the doctrine had on the FRG’s relations with the Soviet Bloc,  but also with the non-
aligned world. To be sure, the new government built on the efforts of their predecessors, but
Kiesinger, and especially Brandt, infused this process with not only new energy, but also great
conviction, as witnessed by the FRG’s establishment of relations with Romania.
The reaction in the Soviet Bloc to the new winds blowing from the West was to close
ranks. Spurred by Walter Ulbricht and enforced by the Soviets, Moscow’s satellites rejected
Bonn’s  advances  by  accepting  the  Ulbricht  doctrine,  which  stipulated  that  the  FRG had to
recognize the GDR if it  wanted to establish relations with a Bloc country.  By enacting this
doctrine, the GDR relegated itself to the role of an observer. It also left Yugoslavia as the sole
socialist country that was still open to improving relations with the FRG, acting as a back door
to  the  Soviet  Bloc  for  a  new  Ostpolitik.  Conversely,  the  Yugoslavs  recognized  that  West
Germany  was  genuinely  interested  in  making  progress  in  bilateral  relations,  yet  Belgrade
expected Bonn to initiate change.
The first major step toward Yugoslav-West German rapprochement during the Kiesinger-
Brandt era started with the meeting of a joint economic commission in Belgrade, which also
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dealt with the diplomatic relations between the two countries. Following these talks, a number
of  West  German  emissaries  visited  Belgrade  to  negotiate  the  conditions  of  reestablishing
relations.  The  main  point  of  contention  were  the  war  reparations  for  Yugoslavia  and  the
regulation of Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG. While the West Germans demanded that no
financial conditions be attached to the agreement on reestablishment of relations, the Yugoslavs
were adamant about linking these issues to the negotiations. A compromise was struck in late
summer, when Yugoslavs agreed to forego the linkage of their demands with the reestablishment
of relations, but both sides promised to address them as soon as possible. Yugoslavia and West
Germany finally reestablished diplomatic relations on January 31, 1968. This was not the final
act of the Hallstein doctrine – which continued to be in force for the next few years – but it was
a definitive sign that Bonn learned from its mistakes, and had opted to build bridges instead of
burning them. It was only fitting that Yugoslavia, which had been the first country to experience
the former, would also be the first to experience the latter.
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Conclusion
A journalist once asked the former Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović whether there were
any moments during his time in office when Yugoslavia veered away from its principles. To this,
Popović replied: 
We were becoming prisoners of these [...] partners who were never happy with the
things we did for them. This was, to give a second example, happening to us with
the East Germans whom we, it is my deepest conviction, unnecessarily recognized
too early and brought into question our vital interests in Western Europe, and they,
that is the East Germans, pressured us and asked for more after that.885
Popović gave this interview in 1989, thirty-two years after Yugoslavia recognized the German
Democratic Republic (GDR), and twenty-one after Yugoslavia reestablished relations with the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). One could argue that he had used the benefit of hindsight
to form his opinion, yet the evidence reveals that Yugoslavia did not always act in accordance
with its most important foreign policy tenet, namely non-alignment, where the two Germanies
were concerned.
This dissertation has shown that relations between Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic between 1955 and 1968 were influenced by
broader  Cold  War  developments,  but  to  a  large  extent  also  by  these  countries’ individual
concerns and interests,  and that  often the latter  trumped the former.  Their  relations did not
follow a set trajectory,  and suffered from numerous fluctuations. In a thirteen year game of
885 Nenadović, Razgovori s Kočom, p. 125.
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diplomatic  snakes  and  ladders,  these  countries  added  their  own  rules,  often  to  their  own
detriment.
Between 1955, the year the West Germans created the Hallstein Doctrine, and 1957, the
year  Yugoslavia  recognized  the  GDR,  both  Germanies  approached  Yugoslavia  as  a  unique
foreign policy object. Yugo-Soviet relations were experiencing a thaw during these two years,
and leading Yugoslav officials, especially president Tito, became more confident in voicing the
opinion that there were two German states on German soil.  Consequently,  the GDR pushed
Yugoslavia to support those statements with its recognition, while the West Germans lobbied
against it. After two years, the East Germans won this diplomatic tug-of-war.
Seen in the light of Yugoslavia’s post-1955 rapprochement with the Soviet Union, its
recognition of the GDR was part favour to the Soviets, part fulfillment of the conditions for a
massive Soviet capital investment to create Yugoslavia’s aluminum production. In that sense, the
recognition  was  a  practical  matter.  In  Belgrade’s  foreign  ministry,  the  Yugoslav  antipathy
towards the GDR’s overzealous leadership (which had spent the years since the Tito-Stalin split
in  1948  criticizing  Yugoslavia)  was  somewhat  overlooked  when  it  came  to  rebuilding  its
relationship with Moscow. This was a manifestation of Tito’s pragmatism, not his ideological
compass.  However,  it  was a miscalculation on his part,  since the evidence showed that  the
Yugoslavs did not really believe that the West Germans might break off relations with them.
Similarly, the United States and other Western Powers supported Bonn’s claim to sole
representation, and augmented the FRG’s diplomatic campaign against the GDR’s recognition in
the Global South. Yet they were less pleased with the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine
on Yugoslavia. Since both superpowers were careful not to alienate Yugoslavia due to its unique
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position in the Cold War, they passed on their concerns to their respective German allies. For
example, the United States nudged Bonn to resume economic negotiations with Yugoslavia in
1964 when it seemed that their relations had reached a nadir. Therefore, it would be false to
claim that superpower influence on the relations between Yugoslavia and both Germanies was
negligible. However, after 1957, the relations between Yugoslavia and the two Germanies were
largely created by these three states. The United States and the Soviet Union monitored them,
but  maintained their  distance.  The USSR in  particular  was not  willing or  able  to  influence
Yugoslavia’s German policy. This can be traced back to the fact that in times of rapprochement,
when Moscow was focused on mending its relations with Yugoslavia, it did not press the matter
of  the GDR’s international  status,  and during periods  of poor  relations,  it  did not  have the
leverage to do so.
In the case of Yugoslavia, there existed two levels in its foreign policy during this period.
On top there was Tito, who set the tone for Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and signed off on all key
diplomatic initiatives. While his actions in 1948, namely the split with Stalin, and subsequent
opening to the Global South showed that he was not conflicted about the course Yugoslavia
should have been taking, he did remain sympathetic to the Soviets, which at times caused ire
and  frustration  of  his  diplomats  and  foreign  policy  advisors,  but  almost  never  direct
confrontation. Regarding Yugoslavia’s relations with the FRG, Tito was less active, since the
Hallstein Doctrine precluded contacts between him and Bonn’s top officials. Thus most of the
bilateral communications occurred between lower-level officials and diplomats or, in rare cases,
between their respective embassies in third countries.
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Likewise, the evidence shows that the West German leadership did not believe that the
recognition of the GDR had to spell the end of all relations with the country that recognized it,
even during Konrad Adenauer’s  tenure.  Severing diplomatic  relations  with any country that
questioned West Germany’s claim to sole representation – as per the Hallstein Doctrine – was
indeed a brutal response. However, at least in the case of Yugoslavia, West Germany left the
door open for economic relations to continue developing. Although admittedly the Doctrine did
hamper the latter to a degree, the West Germans opted not to proceed with full-scale economic
sanctions. This line of action was peculiar, since Yugoslavia did not hide the primary reason for
its cooperation with the West during the Cold War, namely economic support.
Regardless of West German motives, this arrangement allowed both countries to save
face.  West Germany could claim that it  had sacrificed relations with Yugoslavia in order to
defend  its  claim  to  sole  representation.  Narrowly  considered,  it  was  quite  effective  as  a
deterrent. If the leading non-aligned country was not safe from the Hallstein Doctrine, then the
newly born post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia had no chance of escaping Bonn’s wrath.
Conversely, after 1957, Yugoslavia could claim that by recognizing the GDR it had only reacted
to  the  realities  on  the  ground,  meaning  the  existence  of  two  German  states.  In  addition,
Yugoslavia could also criticize West Germany for what it perceived to be the resurrection of
fascism, especially in connection to the mostly Croat fascist groups which openly organized and
perpetrated terrorist attacks on Yugoslav diplomats on West German soil. Thus both countries
could  honestly  claim  that  they  were  adhering  to  their  principles,  while  developing  solid
economic relations with each other.
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And while both countries learned to deal with the situation they created in 1957, it was
not the preferred modus vivendi for either, and the continued (and growing) trade, West German
tourists on the Adriatic coast, and the Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG’s factories prove this.
Indeed, West Germany did eventually recognize that – as far as deterrents went – its economic
power was far more effective than diplomatic threats and, even while the Hallstein Doctrine was
in effect, decided to boost its humanitarian and development aid in the Global South as part of
its  efforts  to  maintain  its  claim  to  sole  representation.  It  follows  that  for  West  Germany,
Yugoslavia was part of its diplomatic learning curve. After 1957, Bonn had already played its
trump card against Belgrade, and subsequently seemed only to drag its feet when it came to
economic relations. And although Yugoslavia was not a newly-independent former colony in the
Global South that could be easily bullied, it was dependant on Western aid.
The GDR was far more zealous than the FRG in its relations with Yugoslavia. However,
it was also toothless, having little to no economic or political leverage of its own, and relied
mostly on the Soviets for assistance. As mentioned above, Yugoslavia’s recognition of the GDR
in 1957 was a result of Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, not of any East German diplomatic skill.
Nevertheless,  the  East  German  leadership  felt  a  sense  of  entitlement  when  dealing  with
Yugoslavia, invoking socialist solidarity, or even duty, equally before and after the recognition.
In  fact,  Ulbricht  became even  more  forceful  in  the  1960s,  as  his  regime  achieved  relative
stability  and  economic  growth  at  home.  This  attitude,  which  was  closer  to  arrogance  than
confidence, coupled with disdain for Tito and his maverick actions made for a pungent stew that
which the Yugoslavs never found particularly palatable. Hence, East German pressure did not
translate  into  systematic  Yugoslav  diplomatic  support.  While  Belgrade  did  lobby  for  East
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Germany in some instances – for example in various United Nations agencies – it was far more
careful  not  to  emphatically  endorse  the  GDR’s  recognition  among  its  non-aligned partners.
Therefore, on the base of available evidence, one can describe these efforts as sporadic at best.
In the first few years following the recognition, there was little incentive for Yugoslavia
to  do  East  Germany’s  bidding,  since  the  Soviets  failed  to  provide  the  promised  aid  for
Yugoslavia’s aluminum industry. In addition, lobbying for the GDR’s recognition would have
jeopardized  Yugoslavia’s  economic  relations  with  the  FRG.  This  became  an  even  bigger
obstacle in the mid-1960s, after the rekindled diplomatic contacts between Belgrade and Bonn
opened up space for better economic cooperation.
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia’s relations with the GDR also improved at this time, marked by
Ulbricht’s unofficial visit to Belgrade in 1964, and Tito’s official state visit to East Berlin in
1965.  Hence,  after  the turbulence of  the 1950s and the first  half  of the 1960,  the relations
between  Yugoslavia  and  the  two  Germanies  entered  a  period  of  relative  normalcy.  West
Germany’s  foreign  policy  began  to  change  during  the  last  year  of  the  Ludwig  Erhard
chancellery, and his foreign minister Gerhard Schröder began to question the rigidity of the
FRG’s  Ostpolitik.  The FRG made concessions in trade as well  as in their  negotiations with
Yugoslavia over war reparations, which helped mend relations, while East Germany decided to
adjust its Yugoslav policy in accordance to the latest Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, as they did in
the past, but with a notably more cordial approach which yielded above mentioned dividends.
Kurt Georg Kiesinger’s victory in the 1965 FRG federal elections only made the change
in  West  Germany’s  Eastern  policy  more  pronounced.  Its  catalyst  was  Kiesinger’s  foreign
minister Willy Brandt, who had been lobbying for cooperation with the Soviet Bloc rather than
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obstruction that bordered on self-sabotage. While initial West German efforts were directed at
several Soviet satellites, the GDR – with Soviet backing – successfully forced the Bloc countries
to close ranks and reject  the FRG’s diplomatic  advances,  using what  became known as the
Ulbricht Doctrine. Thus the West Germans turned to Yugoslavia in 1967, and found that the
Yugoslavs  were  quite  receptive  to  the  idea  of  reestablishing  relations  as  long  as  the  West
Germans made the first step, and that the process was not dragged out. While the GDR would
have preferred for Yugoslavia to adopt the Ulbricht Doctrine, they had no way of forcing them
to  do  so.  As  a  result,  the  East  Germans  accepted  the  inevitability  of  Yugo-West  German
rapprochement, and turned their attention toward gaining recognition from several non-aligned
countries before the FRG dismantled the Hallstein Doctrine, which was a matter of prestige
rather than a practical concern. By December 1967 the FRG and Yugoslavia had reached an
agreement to reestablish relations.  This was a relatively painless process for both sides, and
revealed the desire of both governments to put the past eleven years of poor relations behind
them.
Looking toward the future
Walter Hallstein, the West German technocrat after whom the Hallstein Doctrine was
named, found himself  coming out of retirement and back in West German politics in 1968.
Hallstein,  who had left  the West German foreign office in 1957, the year  the FRG severed
diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, was elected the first president of the Commission of the
European Economic Community (EEC) the following year, a position he held until 1967. Now,
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on January 26, 1968, he spoke at a Christian Democratic Union conference in Saarbrücken as
one of the party’s new frontrunners for the 1969 federal election. After a career in which he
focused on the FRG’s foreign policy, and after ten years of EEC politics, Hallstein’s main goal
was to overthrow Willy Brandt, whose European policy he did not find European enough.886
Hallstein was elected into the Bundestag the next year, and spent his term working mostly in
committees dealing with the FRG’s European policy.887 However, he was not able to dislodge
Brandt, whose Social Democratic Party achieved a strong result in 1969 and was able to bypass
the CDU/CSU to form a coalition government with the liberal Free Democratic Party. 
In a way, however, Hallstein’s career trajectory reflected the new historical development
in Europe as much as Brandt’s Ostpolitik did. While under Brandt the FRG’s focus had shifted
from disputing the GDR’s existence and sanctioning its supporters to a more forgiving foreign
policy which centred on cooperation, Hallstein’s vision was that of West European integration.
Yet both were engendering the realities of postwar Europe. On the one hand, Brandt understood
that European peace could not be achieved by rigid policies like the Hallstein Doctrine. On the
other hand, European integration was the natural response in the West after the horrors of World
War II, and provided security for the future.
Yugoslavia  also  adjusted  its  foreign  policy  at  this  time.  The  Soviet  invasion  of
Czechoslovakia  in  August  1968  spurred  fears  in  Belgrade  that  Yugoslavia  might  be  next,
especially after it had vocally criticized the Soviet intervention.888 This caused Yugoslavia to
seek new alliances and improve old ones. It did not have much success with the latter ones.
886 “Marsch auf Bonn” Der Spiegel January 29, 1968. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45465045.html.
887 Thomas Jansen, “Walter Hallstein After the Presidency,” in Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?, ed. 
Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, and Wolfgang Wessels (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998), 165–80, p. 
171.
888 Bogetić, Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971, pp. 248-249.
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When Belgrade attempted to revive the somewhat dormant non-aligned contacts, it found it a
difficult task. Global South countries’ interest in non-alignment waned in the late 1960s. Their
individual  national  interests  acted  as  a  centripetal  force  in  the  non-aligned  movement,  and
Yugoslavia’s efforts here did not yield immediate dividends.889 However, the contacts with the
EEC did. In September 1968 Yugoslavia and the EEC established diplomatic relations. As in the
past interactions with the West, these relations were based on economic considerations after
1968. And while they were not free from complications, they indicated Yugoslavia’s desire for
economic  integration  with  the  West.890 The  reestablishment  of  relations  with  the  FRG was
crucial here. Up until this point, the FRG had been obstructing Yugoslavia’s integration into
West  European  organizations.  Therefore,  the  end  of  the  Hallstein  Doctrine  allowed  both
countries to move on after thirteen years of stalemate, even beyond their bilateral relations.
After Willy Brandt ended the official part of his meeting with Tito on the Brioni Islands
in June 1968, the two statesmen stayed on the patio of Tito’s residence and talked privately for a
while.891 After he returned to Bonn, Brandt sent his Yugoslav counterpart Marko Nikezić a letter
thanking him and Tito for the productive meetings,  and asserted that the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations was “the right decision.”892 Yugoslavia’s German policy caused Bonn much
grief over the previous eleven years, but now it  was finally met by a West German foreign
policy committed to  bridging Cold War bipolarity,  and one which matched non-alignment’s
optimism.
889 Dinkel, Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten, p. 161.
890 Ivan Obadić, “A Troubled Relationship: Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community in Détente,” 
European Review of History: Revue Europeenne d’histoire 21, no. 2 (2014): 329–48.
891 “Razgovor predsednika Tita sa Willijem Brandtom” (June 15, 1968), AJ, KPR I-3-a/83-19, p. 2.
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